I have previously written about separation agreements and their validity, here, here and here. Periodically, I see separation agreements that are extremely one-sided or I am asked to draft a separation agreement that is very one-sided. In those situations a divorce lawyer is usually asked if the agreement can be set aside. My usual response is that the court’s determination whether to set aside the agreement depends on a variety of factors.
The legal standard for setting aside separation agreements states that a separation agreement in a divorce proceeding may be vacated if it is manifestly unfair to one party because of the other’s overreaching or where its terms are unconscionable, or there exists fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident. Separation agreements may be set aside as unconscionable if their terms evidence a bargain so inequitable that no reasonable and competent person would have consented to it. Moreover, evidence that one attorney ostensibly represented both parties to a settlement agreement raises an inference of overreaching on the part of the party who is the prime beneficiary of the assistance of the attorney. Such an inference is, rebuttable, if it appears that the separation agreement is fair and equitable or that both parties freely agreed to it with a thorough understanding of its terms.
In a recent case of Pippis v. Pippis, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 00492 (2nd Dept. 2010), the Appellate Division, Second Department vacated the separation agreement holding that plaintiff was guilty of overreaching with respect to the parties’ separation agreement. The court found that the defendant was not represented by counsel at any point during the relevant time period. According to the plaintiff, his attorney drafted the stipulation of settlement, and only one attorney was present at the signing. Under these circumstances, and where the terms of the stipulation “evidence a bargain so inequitable” in favor of the plaintiff “that no reasonable and competent person” would have consented to the defendant’s end of the bargain, an inference of overreaching on the part of the husband was raised. Since the plaintiff failed to rebut the inference, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly determined that the stipulation was the product of his overreaching, and granted the defendant’s motion to set it aside. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly rejected the plaintiff’s ratification argument, since the defendant “received virtually no benefits from the agreement and thus cannot be said to have ratified it”.
While occasionally I am asked to prepare a separation agreement in a situation where the opposing party is unrepresented, I advise my client that it is in his/her best interests that the other party is represented and that the agreement is not entirely one-sided. As a divorce lawyer, I have to advise my client that any agreement that is extremely one-sided may be vacated by the court in any pending or subsequent divorce action. If the agreement is reviewed by counsel and conveys some benefits to the other party, the likelihood of it being overturned by the court is greatly diminished.
Tags: attorney, county, divorce, Family Law, lawyer, Livingston, Monroe, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, overreaching, rochester, separation agreement, settlement agreement, stipulation, Supreme Court, unrepresented party, vacate, Wayne