Archive for the ‘child support enforcement’ Category

Changes in Temporary Maintenance and Child Support Statutes

Sunday, March 18th, 2012

Because of the language in the statute providing for cost of living adjustments, temporary maintenance guidelines income cap was raised from $500,000 to $524,000. The “cap” on each spouses annual income, to be utilized in calculating temporary maintenance orders, has increased from $500,000 to $524,000 effective January 31, 2012 in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5-a][b][5]. The statute provided that:

Beginning January 31, 2010 and every two years thereafter, the income cap increases by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the united states department of labor bureau of labor statistics for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. The office of court administration is required to determine and publish the income cap. See Domestic Relations Law § 236[B], [5-a][b][5].

Similarly, the child support cap was modified as well. The “combined parental income amount” utilized in calculating child support orders has increased from $130,000 to $136,000 effective January 31, 2012. The amount of the “combined parental income” is established by Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (2) as the amount set forth in Social Services Law § 111-I (2) (b). Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (2) provides that the amount established shall be multiplied by the appropriate child support percentage and such amount shall be prorated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. Social Services Law § 111-I (2)(b) provides that the $130,000 cap is increased automatically on January 31, 2012 and on January 31 every two years thereafter by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars.

While the change in the temporary maintenance cap is not likely to be applicable in vast majority of divorce cases, the change in the basis economic support amount applicable to child support cases is likely to be significant in a large number of cases in Family Court and Supreme Court.

Multiple Child Support Orders and Change In Circumstances Warranting Modification of Child Support

Saturday, January 29th, 2011

One of the issues that I periodically see in child support cases is that a party who is already paying child support has another child or children with a different party, resulting in additional child support orders.  Usually in those circumstances, the child who is the subject of the first order is receiving support on the entire income of the payor.  The subsequent children receive child support on the basis of payor’s income after child support payable pursuant to the first order is deducted.  As a result, the child who is the subject of the first order will always receive higher child support amount than the child or children receiving child support under the subsequent orders.  In addition, the payor’s income is subject to multiple orders and can pay half or more of his gross income in child support.

The above approach has been traditionally applied in Family Court cases.  In a recent decision, Demetrius D. v. Lori T., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21025 (Fam. Ct. Clinton Co. 2011), the court questioned the logic of this approach.  The court noted that:

From the children’s perspective, the fact that one child receives more child support than another child based solely upon which custodial parent obtains the first support order is unfair and irrational. Obviously, the children cannot control which parent applies for support first nor can the child control the speed of litigation. Nevertheless, this is the statutory law of the State of New York. It should be noted that it is not the age of the children, but rather the order in which the children receive a child support order that determines which children will receive preference under the law[FN4]. Of course, it would also be unfair and irrational to give preference to one child over another based solely upon birth order.

Id. at 3.

Further, the court stated that creation of these additional support order may be grounds for modifying the original child support obligation under Family Court Act § 413(1)(b)(5)(vii)(D):

Subdivision D also raises multiple issues with respect to modification petitions. There is no express provision in the Family Court Act which limits the Subdivision D deduction in modification cases to court orders issued prior to the original order sought to be modified. In other words, in the event that a parent demonstrates a material change of circumstances which warrants the re-application of the Child Support Standards Act, there is no language that excludes new orders issued between the date of the original order and the date of the hearing on modification petition from Subdivision D. Thus, the Court concludes that if there is a material change of circumstances that warrants the new application of the Child Support Standards Act, the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a deduction under Subdivision D for all child support actually paid pursuant to Court orders for other children, whether or not the Court orders for other children were issued before or after the original order for the subject child.

But in Demetrius D., what the court gave with one hand, it took with the other.  The more flexible approach as stated in the decision, was subject to application of general child support modification standards, including a determination that the hardship came as a result of payor’s voluntary actions and was self-inflicted. The court found that having additional children was a self-inflicted hardship that came as a result of his voluntary actions that does not warrant downward modification of payor’s child support obligation.

What is the lesson here for the family law lawyers? If the payor can establish that somehow the act of having more children was involuntary, then the payor may be entitled to a modification of the original child support obligation on the basis of subsequent orders.  It is hard to see the circumstances where it would be remotely possible. On the other hand, under appropriate circumstances, the above approach may help a payor dealing with multiple child support orders.

Major Changes in New York’s Family Law Are Now In Effect

Wednesday, October 13th, 2010

Today is the day when New York’s family law begins a new era. The no-fault divorce law is now in effect and grounds for divorce will no longer preclude someone from obtaining a divorce.    In addition to the new no-fault divorce legislation, three new laws applicable to divorces and child support proceedings became effective including:

1.   a new procedure and formula for setting awards of temporary maintenance while a divorce is pending;
2.  a presumption toward grating attorneys fees to the less monied spouse during the divorce; and
3.   new circumstances for reviewing and modifying child support awards.

Here is the summary of the most important provisions of the new laws:

No-Fault Divorce

There is a new no-fault cause of action for divorce that can be granted if the spouse filing for divorce makes a sworn statement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down for a period of six months preceding the commencement of the divorce action.

Temporary Maintenance

The new law provides that maintenance is to be awarded during the divorce when one parties’ income is less than 2/3of the other spouse’s income.

The amount of maintenance is determined by the following formula as the lesser of a) 30% of the payor’s income minus 20% of the non-payor’s income or b) 40% of the combined income minus the non payor’s income.

Attorneys Fees

The  attorneys fee bill creates a  presumption that the “monied”  spouse should pay to the “non-monied” spouse interim attorneys fees in all divorce or family law case.  The purpose of the law is to make both spouses to be able to litigate their divorce case on equal basis.

Modification of Child Support

The Family Court Act (“FCA”) and matching provisions of the Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”) were amended to allow modification of an order of child support due to “substantial change in circumstances” which is now defined in a change in either party’s gross income by 15% or more.  Also, if three years have passed since the last order was entered, modified, or adjusted, the court can modify an order entered after October 13, 2010 order, unless the parties specifically opt-out of that provisions.  Additionally, a reduction in a party’s income shall not be considered as a ground for modification, unless it was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment.

As I have written previously, these are important development in New York’s family law and I think that it will take some time to assess their impact.  At the same time, I think that they will be welcomed by divorce lawyers in this state and will make divorce easier for the divorcing spouses. With respect to the bill establishing the formula for temporary maintenance, it is highly likely that any such temporary maintenance award is going to be used by the courts as a basis for a permanent maintenance award.

Upcoming Changes to New York’s Child Support Law and Social Services Law

Wednesday, September 8th, 2010

When New York’s Legislature finally passed the no-fault divorce law and made changes to temporary maintenance and attorneys fees awards, it also passed a number of less publicized changes to the Child Support Standards Act, and related laws, which govern child support in New York. The new legislation modified the Family Court Act, Domestic Relations Law and the Social Services Law, substantially altering the parties’ ability to modify child support awards. It also gave the Family Court additional powers in situations where the party paying child support is unemployed.

The following will describe the most significant changes included in the new legislation.

Family Court Act (FCA) §451 was amended to conform the language of the FCA provision governing the modification of child support orders to the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) so that both provisions provide for a “substantial change in circumstances” as a basis for modification of an order of child support.

This section further provides two new bases for modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party’s income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section would provide that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions and also would clarify that retroactive support is paid and enforceable as provided under FCA §440.

DRL §236B(9)(b) was amended to separate out the “substantial change of circumstances” basis for modification of child support orders into its own section for clarity and would provide two new bases for the modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party’s income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section provides that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions.

The bill also added a new FCA §437-a to authorize the Family Court to require the non-custodial parent of a child to seek employment, or to participate in job training, employment counseling or other programs designed to lead to employment, where such programs are available, if he or she is unemployed at the time the court is establishing the support order unless he or she is in receipt of supplemental security income (SSI) or social security disability (SSD) benefits.

Another section of the bill amended Social Services Law (SSL) §111-h to provide that if the respondent is required to participate in work programs or activities, and if the order of support is made payable on behalf of persons in receipt of public assistance, the support collection unit may not file a petition to increase the support obligation for twelve months from the date of entry of the order if the respondent’s income is derived from the work activity or program. FCA §461 was also amended to reflect the two new bases for modification of an order of child support.

Sections of the bill dealing with modification of child support only apply to child support orders which incorporate but do not merge stipulations or settlement agreements if the stipulation or agreement was executed on or after the effective date of the bill. The amendments, with exception of certain sections of the Tax Law, become effective 90 days after the passing of the bill.  The effective date of the amendments is October 14, 2010.

This bill represents a substantial change to the prior statutory provisions and case law dealing with modification of child support.  While New York’s child support orders were always subject to modification, these changes will make modification of child support easier. I do not know at this time how these provisions will apply to the orders already in place and whether the party seeking modification of child support will be able to use some of the new provisions to modify existing child support orders.

Limitations on Child Support Arrears and Child Support Standards Act

Sunday, March 14th, 2010

One question that I am often asked with respect to child support arrears is whether there is a limit on the amount of child support arrears that can be accrued.  My usual response is that there is only one limitation in the Child Support Standards Act with respect to the limits on child support arrears and it exists solely in situations where the payor’s income is below the amount set by the poverty income guidelines for the single person, as reported by the federal Department of Health and Human Services.

Specifically, where the payor’s annual income is below the poverty income guidelines, then in accordance with the Family Court Act §413(1)(g), then payor’s child support arrears are limited to $500.00.  For 2009, the federal poverty guideline for a single person was set at $10,830.00.  This provision can be very helpful to family law lawyers and their clients since this provision allows for retroactive limitation on child support arrears, but it is limited to those situation where the party who owes child support has an extremely low level of income.

There are some limitations even in situations where the payor’s income was below the poverty guideline amount.  The party charged with paying child support couldn’t have voluntarily reduced his/her income, and must demonstrate inability to earn a higher amount (i.e., cannot have income imputed on the basis of ability to pay or other factors).  On practical level, the most likely situation where this provision becomes applicable is typically where a party becomes disabled and does not seek downward modification of the child support obligation until after child support arrears have accrued.

What is also interesting about the Family Court Act §413(1)(g), is that it directly contradicts Family Court Act §451, which prohibits the court from reducing or annulling arrears accrued prior to the filing of a modification petition unless the party shows good cause for failure to make the application sooner.  The courts were able to harmonize both sections by deciding that if the payor’s income is below the poverty level guideline, then by operation of section 413(1)(g) the arrears had never accrued.  Ronald F. v. Kathy Jo O., 25 Misc 3d 1229 (Fam.Ct. Erie Co. 2009)

Child Support and Public Assistance

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

While I have repeatedly written about various issues involving New York’s Child Support Standards Act, here, here, here, and here, one issue that was not previously discussed and bears mentioning, is the interplay between the Child Support Standards Act and public assistance received by the parent receiving child support.  In Gregory v. Gregory, 68 A.D.3d 770 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept), the Appellate Division, Second Department decided the amount of child support payable by the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent was receiving public assistance.

In Gregory, the parents physically separated and the mother retained custody of the children.  Eventually, the parents agreed that the father would have primary custody of their two sons, and the mother would have primary custody of their daughter.  While there was no written agreement or court order concerning child support, the father claimed that he and the mother agreed that each parent would support the child or children in her or his custody, respectively.

Thereafter, the mother applied for and was awarded public assistance.  The mother received public assistance from August 1, 2004, until May 31, 2007, totaling $26,830.67, of which $13,415.44 was attributable to the support of the parties’ daughter, who was the child in mother’s custody.  In May 2007 the mother commenced a proceeding seeking child support for the parties’ daughter.  The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened in the proceeding, seeking payment of child support from the father, which sum included the money it had paid to the mother on behalf of the parties’ daughter.

After a hearing, the Support Magistrate calculated the father’s support obligation for his daughter for the period to be $26,006.26, and directed him to pay that amount to the DSS.  The Appellate Division held that Family Court’s directive that the father pay the DSS the sum of $26,006.26 was proper.  Since the support obligation of a parent of a child receiving public assistance is measured by the child’s needs and the parent’s means, not by the amount of public assistance paid on behalf of the child, the Family Court acted properly in declining to limit the amount required to be paid by the father to the DSS to the child’s share of the public assistance grant.  Contrary to the father’s contention, he was not entitled to offset alleged unpaid child support from the mother against the amount he owed to the DSS. During the relevant time period, there was no support obligation imposed upon the mother for the children who were in the custody of the father.

The lesson of this case is that whenever the DSS is involved in assisting the custodial parent, this assistance is likely to come at a high price to the non-custodial parent.  What is significant in the opinion is that the typical child assistance payment amounts to a few hundred dollars.  On the other hand, the amount of child support owed by the non-custodial parent and calculated on the basis of that parent’s income, can be several times higher.  The non-custodial parent will not receive the difference between the two figures since it would be retained by the DSS.  In similar situations, depending on the incomes involved, a family law lawyer may recommend to the non-custodial parent to pay the custodial parent the total amount of public assistance privately since it may cost a lot less.

Child Support and High Income Non-Custodial Parent

Sunday, November 1st, 2009

I have previously written about various child support issues, here, here, here and here.  While the number of issues is substantial, one situation that comes up periodically, is the one where the non-residential parent earns a substantial income, placing the combined parental income well in excess of the basis economic support under the Child Support Standards Act.  While the income limit for basic economic support under the CSSA is about to increase substantially, what happens in situations where the nonresidential parent earns several hundred thousands dollars or more per year?

In a recent decision,  Jackson v. Tompkins, 2009 N.Y. Slip. Op. 06550 (2nd Dept. 2009), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that in high income cases, appropriate determination under F.C.A. §413(1)(f) for an award of child support on parental income in excess of $80,000 should be based upon child’s actual needs and amount required for child to live an appropriate lifestyle, rather than upon wealth. See, Brim v. Combs, 25 A.D.3d 691, 693 (2nd Dept. 2006).  The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order which directed that the father pay $6,700 in monthly child support.

The above decision is consistent with the prior cases, such as Cassano,  and its progeny.  The Appellate Division cited Brim v. Combs in reaching its holding.  That case makes for an interesting reading since the respondent in Brim v. Combs was Sean “Puffy” Combs.  In Brim, the mother’s net worth statement and her extensive testimony at the hearing established that her expenses related to the child were $19,148.74 per month, exclusive of the child’s educational, health, medical, dental, school transportation, school supplies/books, security, and summer camp expenses, which in any case are paid by the father. The court further noted that this amount was deemed admitted as fact by the father due to his failure to comply with the compulsory financial disclosure requirements of Family Court Act § 424-a. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that the Family Court erred in awarding $35,000 in monthly child support to the mother. Instead, the mother should have been awarded monthly child support in the sum of $19,148.74 to satisfy the child’s actual needs and to afford him an appropriate lifestyle (see Family Ct Act § 413).

Thus, if you earn a substantial income and you are obligated to pay child support, your family law attorney would do well to know what are the child’s needs and what are the actual expenses  associated with child, and be prepared to challenge any unsubstantiated claims at a hearing.

Enforcement of Child Support Arrears and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

Sunday, October 25th, 2009
Support Magistrate determined that respondent willfully failed to pay $7,814.90 in child support arrears, and referred matter to Family Court for confirmation. Respondent’s commencement of Chapter 13 bankruptcy stays all actions and proceedings to collect pre-petition claims against debtor and his property. See, 11 USC § 362[a][1]. Although Family Court is precluded from exercising its enforcement powers pursuant to FCA § 454 to recover arrears while Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is in effect, Family Court finds that it is not prohibited to confirm finding of willful violation already made by Support Magistrate and hold enforcement in abeyance pending completion of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
In the Matter of a Support Proceeding Marcia T., Petitioner,
v.
Raymond W., Respondent.
F-01769-08/08A
Family Court, Albany County
Decided on September 1, 2009
CITE TITLE AS: Matter of Marcia T. v Raymond W.
Marcia T., Matter of, v Raymond W., 2009 NY Slip Op 51883(U). Parent and Child-Support-Bankruptcy Proceedings Not Bar to Recovery of Arrears under Prior Determination of Support Magistrate. (Fam Ct, Albany County, Sept. 1, 2009, Maney, J.)
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Bixby, Crable & Stiglmeier, PLLC (Carol Stiglmeier of counsel) for Marcia T.
Jeffrey S. Berkun, Esq. for Raymond W.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Gerard E. Maney, J.
By order dated January 14, 2009, the Support Magistrate determined that respondent Raymond W. willfully failed to obey an order of the Court pursuant to Family Court Act § 156 by failing to pay $7,814.90 in child support arrears. The matter was referred to this Judge for confirmation in accordance with Family Court Act § 439 (a).
Counsel for respondent maintains that because respondent filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy relief in November 2008, the confirmation hearing must be stayed. Counsel argues that the bankruptcy code contains an automatic stay provision that provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of actions or proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor that arose prior to the commencement of the case. Although certain exceptions to the automatic stay provisions exist, counsel argues that none apply in the instant family court proceeding.
The court agrees with counsel that the commencement of a case under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code stays all actions and proceedings to collect pre-petition claims *2 against the debtor and his property (11 USC §362 [a] [1]) or to obtain possession and control of property of the estate (11 USC §362 [a] [3]). The property of the estate, which is broadly defined, specifically includes “earnings” (11 USC §541 [a] [6]; §1306 [a];). Because payments to creditors must come from the debtor’s post-petition earnings, those earning are property of the Chapter 13 estate (11 USC §1306 [a] [2]). Thus, “[t]he claimant seeking to collect arrearages in support obligations is not free to pursue the Chapter 13 debtor’s post-petition earnings” (Margaret Howard, A Bankruptcy Primer for the Family Lawyer, Family Law Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 3, Fall 1997, at 380).
Although the court finds that it is precluded from exercising its enforcement powers pursuant to Family Court Act §454 to recover arrears while the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is in effect, it does not find that it is prohibited by the bankruptcy laws from confirming the finding of a willful violation already made by the Support Magistrate and holding its authority to enforce such finding in abeyance pending completion of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
It is this court’s understanding that petitioner has filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the support arrears and that such arrears will be payable under the bankruptcy plan. If the payment of arrears is not satisfied when the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is closed, petitioner may move to restore the matter to the family court calendar to have the court exercise its enforcement powers to compel the payment of arrears.
Accordingly, after examination and inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case and after hearing the proofs and testimony offered in relation thereto and based on evidence that a lawful order of support was in effect and respondent had the ability to pay but willfully failed to do so, it is
ADJUDGED that Raymond W. failed to obey the order of this court for the support of his children , A. W. and S. W., and that such failure was willful;
ORDERED that the determination of the Support Magistrate pursuant to Family Court Act § 156 made herein that Raymond W. willfully failed to obey an order of the court is hereby confirmed; and it is further
ORDERED that if the payment of arrears as set forth in the Support Magistrate’s January 14, 2009 order is not satisfied when respondent’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is closed, petitioner may move to restore the matter to the family court calendar to have the court exercise its enforcement powers pursuant to Family Court Act §454.

I have previously written about several different situations involving interaction between New York’s Family Law and bankruptcy.  The basics of divorce and bankruptcy were addressed in this post,  the issues related to the bankruptcy court’s handling of domestic support obligations were addressed in this post, and the issues related to attorneys fees and bankruptcy were addressed in this post.  Because of the complexity of the issues involved, New York courts continue to decide cases were the family law and bankruptcy law interact.  A recent case of Marcia T. v. Raymond W., 24 Misc.3d 1245(A) (Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. 2009), addressed whether Chapter 13 bankruptcy stay prevented recovery of child support arrears and a finding of willful failure to pay.

Respondent father filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy relief in November 2008.  Petitioner mother brought a willful violation petition based upon the father’s failure to pay several thousand dollars in child support arrears.  Support Magistrate determined that respondent willfully failed to pay $7,814.90 in child support arrears, and referred matter to Family Court for confirmation in accordance with Family Court Act § 439(a).  Respondent’s lawyer argued that because of Chapter 13 filing, the confirmation hearing must be stayed since automatic stay prevents recovery of any claims that arose prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

The Family Court held that respondent’s commencement of Chapter 13 bankruptcy and resulting automatic stay stops all actions and proceedings to collect pre-petition claims against debtor and his property.   Because payments to creditors must come from the debtor’s post-petition earnings, those earning are property of the Chapter 13 estate, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1306 (a)(2).  Thus, the claimant seeking to collect arrearages in support obligations is not free to pursue the Chapter 13 debtor’s post-petition earnings.  It further held that although Family Court is precluded from exercising its enforcement powers pursuant to FCA §454 to recover arrears while Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is in effect, Family Court found that it is not prohibited to confirm finding of willful violation already made by Support Magistrate and hold enforcement in abeyance pending completion of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.

The court further noted that petitioner has filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the support arrears and that such arrears will be payable under the bankruptcy plan. If the payment of arrears is not satisfied when the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is closed, petitioner may move to restore the matter to the family court calendar to have the court exercise its enforcement powers to compel the payment of arrears.

The above is an excellent illustration of how a Chapter 13 bankruptcy can be utilized to prevent serious problems that a finding of willful violation may present.  Further, since the typical Chapter 13 plan lasts for 5 years, this allows the party paying child support to extend payment of child support arrears over 5 years.  A family law lawyer needs to be familiar with bankruptcy law issues since it is not uncommon for these areas of law to interplay.

Upcoming Changes to New York’s Child Support Statute

Sunday, September 27th, 2009

New York’s child support statute has been long criticized for its its $80,000.00 cap on the basic economic child support.  The critics have argued that since the statute was enacted approximately 20 years ago, the basic economic child support cap figure was too low.  New York Legislature apparently heard those concerns.  Laws of 2009, Chapter 343  enacted the “child support modernization act” which amended  the provisions of the Child Support Standards Act to raise the cap on combined parental income to $130,000.00, effective January 31, 2010, and to provide for the adjustment of the $130,000.00 cap every two years to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index.  The child support percentages of payments that non-custodial parents are obligated to make toward child support were not modified by the amendments.  Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b) (2) and Family Court Act §413 (1) (c) (2) were each amended to provide that the court shall multiply the combined parental income up to the amount set forth in Social Services Law §111-i, (2) (b).  Social Services Law §111-i (2)(b) provides that the combined parental income amount to be reported in the child support standards chart and utilized in calculating orders of child support in accordance with Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b) (2) and Family Court Act §413 (1) (c) (2) shall be one hundred thirty thousand dollars; and that beginning January 31, 2012 and every two years thereafter, the combined parental income amount shall increase by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars.  These amendments take effect on January 31, 2010.

While I view the changes as necessary to keep up with economic changes, once the two year recalculation provision takes effect, it is going to make more difficult for family law lawyers to calculate the appropriate child support figures.

Paying For Summer Camp and Child Support

Monday, May 25th, 2009

As the end of the school year approaches, parents usually begin to look at various activities their children may participate in during the summer.  One such popular option is a summer camp, which may be a day camp or a sleep-away camp.  I am often asked who is obligated to pay for it.

I have previously written that under New York’s Child Support Standards Act, the parent paying child support is typically obligated to pay a portion of child care and other expenses.  In Micciche v. Micciche, 2009 NY Slip Op 03702 (2nd Dept. 2009), the Appellate Division affirmed the principle that the cost of the summer camp is considered to be a part of the  child care expense, and as such, both parties are required to contribute their pro-rata share in accordance with their income.

If there are no contrary provisions in the parties’ separation agreement or judgment of divorce, and one of the parents refuses to contribute his or her share of summer camp, I recommend that the other party discuss this issue with an experienced family law lawyer.  Sometimes, it only takes a letter from an attorney to resolve such disputes.