Archive for the ‘Child Support Standards Act’ Category
Monday, March 9th, 2009
Periodically, I am asked about situations where an overpayment of child support has taken place. Most of the time in those situations, I, as a lawyer, have to deliver to the client the unpleasant news that the amount overpaid cannot be recovered. This is true whether the child support was being paid pusuant to a judgment of divorce, separation agreement, or an order of Family Court. With respect to child support, there is a strong public policy against restitution or recoupment of any overpayment. See Katz v. Katz, 55 A.D.3d 680 (2nd Dept. 2008). The strong public policy considerations as decided by the New York courts, prevent recoupment or refund of child support paid. However, a parent may be entitled to a credit, enabling him or her to re-coup the overpayment of the child support payments against his/her share of the statutory add-on expenses – the portion of child support intended to cover child care and a child’s educational and special needs. See Coull v. Rottman, 35 AD3d 198 (1st Dept. 2007).
There are also certain limited circumstances in which a refund of child support may take place. For example, a refund may be directed when there was a mathematical error in the calculation of the amount of support (Colicci v. Ruhm, 20 AD3d 891 (4th Dept. 2005); when the support amount in the final order of support is less than in the temporary award (Maksimyadis v. Maksimyadis, 275 AD2d 459 (1st Dept. 2000)); or when it is shown that the subject child is not the biological child of the payor and there is no finding of estoppel (Thomas v. Commissioner of Social Services, 287 AD2d 642 (2nd Dept. 2001). There may be another category of cases where a refund of child support may be ordered. In Spencer v. Spencer, previously discussed on this blog, the Court of Appeals hinted that the recoupment may be available where it is ultimately determined that New York court lacked jurisdiction to order payment of child support.
If you are in a situation where you believe that child support was or is being overpaid, speak with an experienced family law attorney and find out what your options are and what can done in your particular case.
Tags: attorney, child support, credit, cseu, divorce, domestic relation law, Family Court, Family Law, lawyer, new york, overpayment, recoupment, rochester
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, modification, New York Law, procedure, Settlement Agreements, Stipulations, Supreme Court, UIFSA | No Comments »
Monday, January 26th, 2009
I am asked occasionally whether a parent’s child support obligation can be terminated on the grounds that the child stopped all contact with the parent in order to avoid parental control. My usual response is that it can be done, but the parent must establish either abandonment or constructive emancipation, and faces a substantial burden of proof.
The Family Court Act §413 mandates that parents support their children until they reach the age of 21. The courts in New York have held that a child’s right to support and the parent’s right to custody and services are reciprocal, and that a parent may impose reasonable regulations. Generally, where a minor of employable age and in full possession of her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, the child forfeits his/her right to demand support. Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971); Matter of Ontario County Department of Social Services (Christopher L.) v. Gail K., 269 A.D.2d 847 (4th Dept. 2000), leave denied, 95 N.Y.2d 760 (2000).
While the duty to support is a continuing one, the child’s right to support and the parent’s right to custody and services are reciprocal. Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971). Thus, a parent, in return for maintenance and support, may establish and impose reasonable regulations for his/her child. In Roe v. Doe, supra, the Court of Appeals explained:
Accordingly, though the question is novel in this State, it has been held, in circumstances such as here, that where by no fault on the parent’s part, a child “voluntarily abandons the parent’s home for the purpose of seeking its fortune in the world or to avoid parental discipline and restraint [the child] forfeits the claim to support” . . . To hold otherwise would allow, at least in the case before us, a minor of employable age to deliberately flout the legitimate mandates of her father while requiring that the latter support her in her decision to place herself beyond his effective control.
The doctrine of constructive emancipation is applicable to the non-custodial parent where the child unreasonably refuses all contact and visitation. Matter of Commissioner of Social Services (Jones) v. Jones-Gamble, 227 A.D.2d 618 (2nd Dept. 1996). In that case, the court held that the evidence clearly established that the child wanted no relationship with her father. Despite the father’s prior support payments, there was essentially no parent-child relationship between them. The appellate court held that, to require the father to provide reimbursement for the support of a daughter who had renounced and abandoned him would have clearly resulted in an injustice under the facts of that case.
In the Fourth Department case, Perez v. Perez, 239 A.D.2d 868 (4th Dept. 1997), appeal dismissed, 91 N.Y.2d 956 (1998), the record established that the parties’ 18 year old daughter had refused to visit with the father or to have any relationship with him. That child was found to be a minor of employable age and in full possession of her faculties, who had voluntarily refused to have a relationship with plaintiff. The child thereby forfeited her right to support from her father. Accordingly, the Fourth Department rejected the mother’s contention that the lower court erred in modifying the parties’ divorce decree by suspending father’s obligation to pay child support for the parties’ child until further order of the court.
Children of employable age and in full possession of their faculties who voluntarily and without cause abandon their home, against the will of their parents and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, forfeit their right to demand support, even if they are not financially self-sufficient. Guevara v. Ubillus, 47 A.D.3d 715 (2nd Dept. 2008). In that case, petition for child support was denied where the petitioner, without good cause, abandoned the mother’s home on her 18th birthday in order to avoid parental control and to gain independence from her mother’s restrictive household rules; the petitioner was found to have abandoned her mother’s home against the mother’s will and without cause.
In Rubino v. Morgan, 224 A.D.2d 903 (3d Dept. 1996), the Appellate Division held that the lower correct properly terminated the father’s support obligation on the grounds that his daughter’s refusal to visit with him and the child’s unprovoked rejection of him constituted abandonment. The Third Department noted that at the time of the hearing, the daughter was 17 years old, and she had refused to visit with the father since she was 14 years old. Even after the daughter refused to visit with her father, he continued for years to send letters and cards to her. The letters were never answered. He also attempted to talk with the child, without success. His actions and requests were not arbitrary, and there was no evidence of malfeasance, misconduct or neglect. The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s findings that the daughter chose to permanently breach her relationship with the father, notwithstanding her generalized claim of “emotional abuse”, and that the father did not contribute significantly to his daughter’s decision to distance herself from him.
Furthermore, where it can be established by the non-custodial parent that the custodial parent has unjustifiably frustrated the non-custodial parent’s right of reasonable access, child support payments may be suspended. Usack v. Usack, 17 A.D.3d 736 (3d Dept. 2005). In that case, the father had encouraged the children’s unbridled enmity toward, and total exclusion of, their mother through a course of conduct calculated to inflict the most grievous emotional injury upon her. The Appellate Division held that mother’s child support obligation should have been suspended due to the father’s deliberate actions in alienating the parties’ children from her.
Tags: abandonment, child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, constructive emancipation, emancipation, Family Law, new york, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, Domestic Relations Law, emancipation, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, modification, New York Law, Supreme Court, visitation | 1 Comment »
Monday, January 5th, 2009
If at the conclusion of the divorce action a party is to receive a stream of payments to pay that party’s equitable distribution award, does that money need to be included in the child support calculations? In Holterman v. Holterman, 3 N.Y.3d 1 (2004), the husband argued that the payment of $21,288 per year, the annual installment payment of wife’s distributive award of her share of enhanced earnings from his medical license, should be deducted from the computation of his income in determining his child support obligation under the CSSA and, concomitantly, that amount should be included as income attributable to wife. He claimed that the failure of the lower courts below to perform such reassignment of income results in “double dipping” from the same income stream–i.e., awarding both child support and equitable distribution of his future enhanced earnings from the same income source, his salary as a physician. Court of Appeals disagreed with the husband and held that his proposed reallocation formula, or any formula that required a deduction of a distributive award paid over a period of years from the licensed spouse’s income for purposes of calculating child support, is impermissible under the CSSA. The Court ruled that the CSSA does not provide for the deduction of distributive awards from income, whether based on enhanced earning capacity due to a professional license or otherwise. Nor does the CSSA authorize the inclusion of a distributive award as income to the parent receiving the award. This lack of inclusion in either the list of permissible statutory deductions or the definition of income is understandable because distributive awards “reflect, not income, but a property distribution” of the marital assets, regardless of whether such assets are being paid as an income stream.
Tags: child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, equitable distribution, Family Law, new york, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, equitable distribution, Family Law, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, December 29th, 2008
If parties choose to deviate from the provisions of the Child Support Standards Act with respect to the child support paid, such deviation will be upheld by the court provided the parties complied with such formalities as including calculations of the presumptive child support amount and the reasons for deviating from the CSSA. However, the parties frequently choose not only to deviate from the child support amount calculations, and add-ons such as child care and health care costs, but also to make recalculations of child support an annual or semi-annual event, or to include other items not included within the scope of the CSSA.
In Fasano v. Fasano, 43 A.D.3d 988 (2nd Dept. 2007), the parties included an annual cost-of-living-adjustment (“COLA”), with respect to the child support paid by the non-custodial parent. The Second Department found that the parties to the agreement did not opt out of the CSSA standards with respect to basic child support, but that the COLA provision included in the agreement represented potential future deviations from the CSSA basic child support obligation. The agreement did not state the reasons for including the COLA provisions. The Appellate Division held that the COLA provision represented an opt-out from the CSSA and was directly related to the child support. Since the reasons for including the COLA provision were not included in the agreement, the opt-out was invalid. The court vacated the COLA provision, while the basic child support provision of the agreement was not vacated.
However, not all provisions dealing with financial support of the children are considered to be within the scope of the CSSA. In Cimons v. Cimons, 53 A.D.3d 125 (2nd Dept. 2008), the Second Department held that the obligation to provide for the future college expenses of the children was not part of the parties’ basic child support obligation and therefore was not subject to the CSSA requirement that any deviation from statutorily-mandated child support obligations must be recited and explained in a stipulation of settlement. While the parties’ agreement regarding basic child support violated the CSSA by failing to recite and explain the reasons for the deviation, the provision concerning future college expenses was enforceable. The court held that unlike the basic obligation to provide child support, payment for a child’s college education is not mandatory. Absent a voluntary agreement, a parent might be required to provide support for his or her child’s attendance at college, but the determination of that obligation is dependent upon the exercise of the court’s discretion in accordance with Domestic Relations Law §240(1- b)(c)(7). The court further noted that the determination as to which additional aspects, if any, of the parties’ stipulation must be vacated along with the basic child support provision depends on the circumstances of the particular case and the nature of the obligations addressed in the other provisions of a stipulation. Some provisions may be so directly connected or intertwined with the basic child support obligation that they necessarily must be recalculated along with the basic support obligation. It found that unlike child care expenses and unreimbursed health care expenses, education expenses were not directly connected to the basic child support calculation and did not require the appropriate opt-out language.
The above cases represent the dangers involved any time the parties attempt to either opt-out from the CSSA or attempt to include items outside of the scope of the CSSA in their agreement. Any such agreement must be carefully drafted to make sure that it is not subsequently challenged and invalidated.
Tags: child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, cola, college expenses, Family Law, modification, new york, opt-out, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, college expenses, court orders, divorce, drafting, Family Law, modification, New York Law, procedure, Settlement Agreements, Stipulations, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, November 10th, 2008
There is a bill pending in New York Legislature that could, if passed, make significant changes to New York’s laws dealing with divorce and child support. Assembly Bill A10446 represents a comprehensive effort to reform New York`s divorce and child support laws. The bill contains four major elements: (1) simplifies the grounds for divorce by replacing current grounds with no-fault grounds; (2) adopts a new approach to maintenance, referred to as post-marital income, by establishing guidelines for determining awards of post-marital income; (3)
establishes the right to counsel for a spouse who cannot reasonably afford counsel where the other spouse has obtained or can reasonably afford counsel; and (4) increases the cap on combined parental income used to determine the amount of child support from $80,000 to $500,000, as adjusted annually for any change in cost of living.
It is the last provision that is particularly interesting since there is a significant body of law holding that the $80,000 is the presumptive cap, and in order to calculate child support on combined parental income beyond $80,000, the court must explain its reasoning and provide appropriate justification for its actions in the decision. Even under the present statute, the court can determine whether or not to exceed the cap, and may consider other factors in determining the full support amount. If the bill passes, it is possible that the child support in situations involving high parental income will significantly exceed the children’s needs or any expenses associated with raising the children.
The likelihood of the bill passing into law are difficult to estimate since the bill includes provisions that would amount to a no-fault divorce. Past efforts to pass legislation allowing no-fault divorce in New York State were unsuccessful in view of significant opposition from a variety of different groups.
Tags: child support, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, grounds, New York Law, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Sunday, November 9th, 2008
I am often asked whether there should be a reduction in child support in a situation where the child is residing away from home at college and the parent paying child support is also contributing to the cost of college expenses. Since the child support is generally paid to provide shelter and food for the child, if a parent is paying for a room and board at college, the payor parent should only be paying for shelter and food at a single location. The case law holds that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, any such reduction or credit is discretionary with the court.
In Pistilli v Pistilli, 53 A.D.3d 1138 (4 Dept. 2008) plaintiff moved to modify the judgment by “[d]istributing the actual and anticipated college education costs associated with the parties’ children,” specifically the parties’ daughter, between the parties. Pursuant to an oral stipulation of the parties that was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, the parties “agreed to contribute to [their children's college expenses] as they are then financially able.” The Appellate Division held that the court erred in failing to consider defendant’s maintenance obligation in calculating the percentage of defendant’s contribution to the daughter’s college expenses. After subtracting from defendant’s income the amount of taxable maintenance paid to plaintiff as indicated on the parties’ respective 2005 tax returns, which were used by the court in determining the parties’ respective incomes, it concluded that defendant’s percentage of the combined parental income was 64% rather than 80%, and thus defendant’s pro rata share of the daughter’s college expenses was reduced from 80% to 64%. The Appellate Division rejected defendant’s contention that the court erred in determining that he was entitled to a credit against his child support obligation only in the amount of his pro rata share of the daughter’s college meal plan, holding that a credit against child support for college expenses is not mandatory but depends upon the facts and circumstances in the particular case, taking into account the needs of the custodial parent to maintain a household and provide certain necessaries. Because plaintiff had to maintain a household for the daughter during the daughter’s school breaks and weekend visits, it could not be said that defendant was entitled to a credit for the daughter’s rooming expenses. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Appellate Division reduced defendant’s pro rata share of the daughter’s college expenses from 80% to 64%, defendant’s child support credit based on the college meal plan had to reflect that reduction and it modified the order accordingly.
Tags: child support, Child Support Standards Act, college expenses, divorce, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, Child Support Standards Act, college expenses, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, October 20th, 2008
Child support under Domestic Relations Law §240 or Family Court Act §413 is not difficult to calculate in situations where there is a parent who clearly has a primary physical residence of the child. However, where the child spends equal time with both parents, these issues become a lot more complicated. Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b](f) requires that “The court shall calculate the basic child support obligation, and the non-custodial parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation”. Therefore, which parent becomes the non-custodial parent in shared custody situation? This question was addressed in the 1998 case of Baraby v. Baraby, 250 A.D.2d 201 (3rd Dept. 1998).
In Baraby, the Appellate Division held that:
where, as here, the parents’ custodial arrangement splits the children’s physical custody so that neither can be said to have physical custody of the children for a majority of the time, the parent having the greater pro rata share of the child support obligation, determined after application of the three-step statutory formula of the CSSA, should be identified as the “noncustodial” parent for the purpose of support.
Since the statute is silent as to joint custody arrangements, the court ruled that for purposes of complying with the statute, one parent must be deemed “custodial” and the other “non custodial.” This step must be taken before a deviation from the support guidelines could be made under Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b](f) and (g). The parent with higher income is declared to be the non-custodial parent for child support calculations. This result problematic in situations where the parents’ incomes are close to each other.
For parents who are contemplating true shared custody, the issues of child support must be carefully addressed in the separation agreement to provide language explaining the contemplated child support arrangement and the reasons the parents are entering into such arrangement. Baraby does not stand for the proposition that the parent with the higher income must pay full child support. The parents are still free to opt out of the Child Support Standards Act, provided that at least minimum statutory child support is being paid, and the reasons for the opt-out are clearly stated.
If the court is deciding these issues in the contest of child support modification, then the party with the higher income should present information allowing the court to make a deviation from the child support guidelines pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b](f) and (g).
Tags: calculations, child support, Child Support Standards Act, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, new york, shared custody
Posted in child support, Child Support Standards Act, custody, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, drafting, Family Court, Family Law, Settlement Agreements | No Comments »
Monday, September 15th, 2008
There is a presumption, applicable to child support enforcement proceedings in Family Court that a party, against whom a child support order was issued, has sufficient means to support his/her minor children. See Family Court Act § 437. The evidence that the party directed to pay child support has failed to pay support as ordered, constitutes “prima facie evidence of a willful violation”. Family Court Act § 454(3)(a). Once the petition alleging willful violation of a child support order was filed in the Family Court, the burden then shifts to respondent to adduce some competent, credible evidence of his/her inability to make the required payments. If the requisite showing is not made, the party will be found to have willfully failed to pay child support. Once this finding is made, the party is liable to a range of penalties, including attorneys fees and possible incarceration.
This presumption does not apply to child support enforcement proceedings brought in Supreme Court under the Domestic Relations law. If an enforcement proceeding is brought in Supreme Court, the usual remedies sought are a judgment for any unpaid arrears, attorneys fees and, possibly, a finding of contempt. The burden of proof applicable to contempt proceedings is much higher than that applicable to the proceedings brought under Family Court Act § 437.
Tags: child support, contempt, enforcement, failure to pay, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, petition, presumption, willful
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, Domestic Relations Law, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, procedure, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, September 15th, 2008
The New York courts use a statutory guidelines to determine what child support amount the non-custodial parent is obligated to pay. The guidelines as applicable to the Supreme Court in actions for separation and divorce are contained in Domestic Relations Law §240 and its counterpart for the Family Court is contained in Family Court Act §413. New York child support amounts are based partly on the non-custodial parent’s adjusted gross income and partly on how many children are on the order. The court determines the non-custodial parent’s gross income, and then deducts from that amount Medicare, social security tax, New York City or Yonkers tax, and other allowable deductions to establish the non-custodial parent’s adjusted gross income. An identical calculation is performed with respect to the income of the custodial parent. The court then multiplies the combined adjusted gross income by the standard guideline percentage for the number of children. These percentages are 17% for one child, 25% for two children, 29% for three children, 31% for four children, and at least 35% for five or more children. Subsequently, that child support amount is multiplied by the ratio of non-custodial parent’s adjusted gross income to the combined adjusted gross income.
The standard guideline is applied to most parental earnings up to $80,000 (minus certain local and social security tax amounts). This includes any worker’s compensation, disability payments, unemployment benefits, social security payments, and many other forms of income. Beyond $80,000, the courts determine whether or not to use the percentage guidelines, and may consider other factors in determining the full support amount.
The State of New York provides for interest on missed payments and adjudicated arrears at a rate of 9% per year, but only on arrearages reduced to a money judgment by the courts.
Tags: calculations, child support, enforcement, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, presumption, Supreme Court
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Thursday, August 21st, 2008
It is not infrequent for the non-custodial parent to claim an annual income far less than he/she actually earns. In those situations, the courts can impute additional income to the party paying child support. As held by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Strella v. Ferro, the court “need not rely upon the party’s own account of his or her finances, but may impute income based upon the party’s past income or demonstrated earning potential.” The imputed income can be established in several different ways.
One way to establish that a party’s actual income is higher than his/her reported income is to demonstrate how his/her reported lifestyle could not be supported by the reported income.
In Strella, the father claimed that he had been unemployed and only recently begun to earn $500 per week despite having recently earned as much as $101,000 per year. The Court imputed an income of $96,000 to the father. In doing so, the Appellate Court noted that:
Here, the father’s claimed annual household expenses were approximately double his claimed annual income in 2004 and 2005. Additionally, his financial data did not indicate that he used money from his savings or that he incurred greater debt to pay the remaining amount of his annual expenses not covered by his average annual income. During the relevant period, he did not liquidate any of his investments, he had no outstanding balance on his home equity line of credit, and his credit card statements showed no unpaid balances of a size and nature to correspond to his household expenses.
In Barnett v Ruotolo, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that in exercising the discretion to impute income to a party, a Support Magistrate is required to provide a clear record of the source from which the income is imputed and the reasons for such imputation. In that case, the father did not testify and chose to rely on the financial documentation he had submitted. The father’s financial documentation indicated that his monthly income was only approximately one-third of his stated monthly expenses, and no evidence was submitted to show that these monthly expenses were not being paid in a timely manner. The Appellate Division held that lower court properly exercised its discretion in imputing income based upon the father’s self-reported financial affidavit for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation.
If the party’s expenses exceed his/her reported income, and there is no obvious diminution of the party’s assets, then the reported income is likely to be under-reported. Under those circumstances, the court should look beyond the filed tax return to calculate the appropriate child support amount.
The court can also impute income by averaging what was reported on most recent individual tax returns. In Y.W., v. T-T.J., the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed a child support order of $3,288 per month and remanded the case back for recalculation of the basic child support obligation. The Appellate Division held that since each party claimed that the income as reflected on the other’s tax return was not accurate, and the parties were unable to produce sufficient evidence to otherwise convince the support magistrate about their respective incomes, the magistrate properly decided to impute income to the parties by averaging what was reported on their most recent (2004 and 2005) individual tax returns.
Tags: child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, Family Law, imputed income, new york
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