Archive for the ‘court orders’ Category

Changes in Temporary Maintenance and Child Support Statutes

Sunday, March 18th, 2012

Because of the language in the statute providing for cost of living adjustments, temporary maintenance guidelines income cap was raised from $500,000 to $524,000. The “cap” on each spouses annual income, to be utilized in calculating temporary maintenance orders, has increased from $500,000 to $524,000 effective January 31, 2012 in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5-a][b][5]. The statute provided that:

Beginning January 31, 2010 and every two years thereafter, the income cap increases by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the united states department of labor bureau of labor statistics for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. The office of court administration is required to determine and publish the income cap. See Domestic Relations Law § 236[B], [5-a][b][5].

Similarly, the child support cap was modified as well. The “combined parental income amount” utilized in calculating child support orders has increased from $130,000 to $136,000 effective January 31, 2012. The amount of the “combined parental income” is established by Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (2) as the amount set forth in Social Services Law § 111-I (2) (b). Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (2) provides that the amount established shall be multiplied by the appropriate child support percentage and such amount shall be prorated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. Social Services Law § 111-I (2)(b) provides that the $130,000 cap is increased automatically on January 31, 2012 and on January 31 every two years thereafter by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars.

While the change in the temporary maintenance cap is not likely to be applicable in vast majority of divorce cases, the change in the basis economic support amount applicable to child support cases is likely to be significant in a large number of cases in Family Court and Supreme Court.

Violation Petition Must Be Sufficiently Specific to Provide Notice of Alleged Violation

Saturday, February 4th, 2012

In Miller v Miller, 90 A.D.3d 1185 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) the parties were the parents of two children, born in 2004 and 2005. A custody order entered in March 2008 granted sole legal custody to mother with visitation to father as agreed between the parties. The order, among other provisions, required that the children be properly supervised at all times, and that neither parent smoke or permit a third party to smoke in a vehicle in which the children are passengers.

In June 2010, the father filed a violation petition alleging that the mother was in contempt of this order by failing to properly supervise and discipline the children, since she had permitted the older child to be violent towards others and to smoke. Finding that the petition lacked sufficient specificity to provide the mother with proper notice and failed to outline how the father’s rights had been prejudiced, Family Court dismissed the petition without a hearing, but ordered a child neglect investigation by the local Department of Social Services.

The Appellate Division held that the petition was subject to the requirements of CPLR §3013, and it was required to “be sufficiently particular” as to provide notice to the court and opposing party of the occurrences to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action. Since petition only included generalized allegations of the petition, even liberally construed, it had failed to provide the mother with notice of a particular event or violation such that she could prepare a defense.

Further, according to the Appellate Division, the father failed to assert how the mother’s alleged failings defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced his rights, as required to warrant a civil contempt finding. While Family Court ordered an investigation to determine whether a neglect or abuse proceeding should be initiated, the investigation did not fix the defects in the father’s petition. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the petition without a hearing.

The rule for sufficiency of petitions is simple: a party must alleging facts with sufficient particularity so that notice of events and elements of legal issues is given to the opposing party and the court. If petition is insufficient, it will be dismissed.  Alternatively, the court may give a party an opportunity to amend the petition.

Parent’s Obligation to Pay for College Is Not Limited To Cost of SUNY Education Unless Proven Otherwise

Sunday, November 13th, 2011

In Pamela T. v. Marc B., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21355 (N.Y.Sup.2011), the court had to decide whether the parent’s obligation to pay for college should be limited to the so-called “SUNY cap”. The Supreme Court concluded that parent’s argument that before a parent can be compelled to contribute towards the cost of a private college, there must be a showing that a child cannot receive an adequate education at a state college, has no basis in the law.

The parties were divorced on December 23, 2008 and have two sons, 18 and16 years old. Their judgment of divorce was silent as to the payment of the children’s college tuition and expenses.

In 2007, the older child was diagnosed with emotional and learning/anxiety disorders, which resulted in certain educational accommodations. Despite his disabilities, he graduated in 2011 from a selective public high school in Manhattan. He was accepted at Syracuse University, SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Buffalo, as well as other schools. The costs of college education varied from Syracuse at approximately $53,000 a year to attend, to SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Buffalo that cost about $18,000 a year. The child decided to attend Syracuse which he is now attending as a freshman.

The both parents are practicing attorneys in New York City. Plaintiff’s 2010 federal income tax return reported adjusted gross income of $109,896. Defendant’s 2010 federal income tax return reported adjusted gross income of $105,135. Plaintiff’s net worth statement showed she had assets of approximately $1,230,000. Defendant’s net worth statement showed he had assets of approximately $580,000. Both plaintiff and defendant went to private undergraduate colleges and law schools.

Defendant did not oppose an order directing him to contribute to his older child’s college education, but he requested that the court to apply the SUNY cap and limit his responsibility to a percentage of the costs of a state university education rather than to a percentage of a private college education. Defendant’s position was based on his claim that he was unable to meet the financial demands of paying for private college and on his belief that his son could receive as good an education at SUNY Binghamton as he could at Syracuse.

The court stated that Domestic Relations Law 240(1- b)(c)(7) gave the courts of this state the authority to “direct a parent to contribute to a child’s private college education, even in the absence of special circumstances or a voluntary agreement. The statute provides that when a court exercises its discretion to direct such a contribution from a parent, it is to do so “having regard for the circumstances of the case and the parties, the best interests of the child, and the requirements of justice.” The courts interpreted the provisions of DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) by setting forth specific factors that are to be considered in determining whether to award college expenses. These factors include the educational background of the parents and their financial ability to provide the necessary funds, the child’s academic ability and endeavors, and the type of college that would be most suitable for the child.

The Court stated that DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) does not provide for a SUNY cap. The SUNY cap appeared in a number of decisions rendered since the enactment of the statute. These cases have not provided an explanation as to when a SUNY cap might be properly applied over the objection of the parent who is seeking an award for college expenses.

The court found that Berliner v. Berliner, 33 A.D.3d 745, 749 (2d Dept. 2006) was instructive because in that case the Second Department stated that there “is no basis in this record” for imposing the SUNY cap implied that the burden falls on the proponent of the cap to demonstrate that it is warranted. The inference to be drawn is that there is no presumption that a parent’s obligation to pay for college is to be limited to the cost of a SUNY education unless proven otherwise; if anything, the presumption goes the other direction. It was also instructive because the decision’s reference to the “so-called SUNY cap” implied that even the Second Department views the SUNY cap as something less than an established doctrine.

The court rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff be required to prove that Syracuse was a better school than SUNY Binghamton, in order for him to be required to pay Syracuse’s higher expenses. The decision noted that it is difficult to conceive of a workable procedure, let alone a methodology, for a court to make a finding that one college is “better” than another. The court found that there was sufficient showing to support the child’s choice of Syracuse, irrespective of whether it is ranked lower, higher or the same as SUNY Binghamton or any other SUNY school. If there are funds are available to finance the child’s education, the fact that Syracuse was a private school and cost more than a public school was not a reason to interfere with the child going to the school he chose and he wanted to attend.

The court further held that one of the factors to be considered when making a determination under DRL 240(1-b)(c)(7) is the parents educational background. Inasmuch as plaintiff attended Northwestern and defendant attended Columbia, the court could reasonably assume that there would exist an expectation in the family, and in the child himself, that he too could attend a private college.

Having found that defendant had to contribute to his son’s education at Syracuse University, the court had to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. It was defendant’s position that even though plaintiff may have the means to pay the high cost of their son attending Syracuse, he lacked the means to do so. Consequently, he argued that he should have to pay no more than $9,000 a year towards his son’s education, an amount that is roughly 50% of the present annual cost of a SUNY school.

The court rejected defendant’s contention as to his inability to pay a significant share of the child’s actual educational expenses being incurred at Syracuse. The court held that the parties’s incomes and assets would allow them to pay for their child’s education at Syracuse.

The court further held that there was no basis to impose the SUNY cap, to the extent that it should be imposed at all, where the party seeking to invoke the cap has the financial ability to contribute towards the actual amount of his or her child’s college expenses. Although defendant’s contribution should be less than plaintiff’s, based on the difference between their net assets, and in particular what each of them had available for eventual retirement, that contribution should not be subject to some artificial construct like the SUNY cap. On this basis, the court held that defendant shall be obligated to contribute 40% of the total cost of the older child attending Syracuse University, with those costs to include tuition, room and board, fees and books.

Thus, this decision confirms that if a parent is hoping to place a limit on future college costs, it is very important to include provisions in the parties’ separation agreement or settlement stipulation placing an upper limit on such costs.

Interference with Visitation May Result in Change in Custody

Sunday, September 4th, 2011

In Keefe v. Adams, 85 A.D.3d 1225 (3d Dept. 2011), the Appellate Division, Third Department, had to address issues related to interference with visitation which were raised by the father who brought a petition to modify existing  custodial and residential arrangement.  The parties had a custody and residential arrangement on the basis of May 2007 consent order which provided for joint custody, with mother having primary physical custody and father having visitation. In August 2009, father sought a modification of custody, alleging that mother moved out of county without his consent and is consistently late in exchanging child at drop-off location.

The court held that a significant change in circumstances occurred which reflected real need to modify parties’ stipulated custody order. The court found that mother admitted to moving with child to different county, 42 miles away from father, without informing him, and parties’ relationship deteriorated to point of inability to discuss important matters concerning their child. Further, mother also consistently arrived between 15 minutes to 2 hours late in dropping child off or picking child up. Mother interfered with father’s visitation rights by arriving late for dropping off and picking up child. The court also held that evidence showed as well that mother promoted her boyfriend as substitute for child’s father and that her relocation both required the child to change schools and hindered the father’s involvement in the child’s life. The father, on the other hand, manifests a markedly greater ability to control his behavior in front of the child, as well as a willingness to foster the relationship between the mother and child. The court noted that while custody with the father will unfortunately separate the child from his half brother, with whom he has a close relationship, the father testified that the half brother would be welcome in his home.

In view of the above circumstances, the court held that an award of sole custody to father with visitation to mother in child’s best interests. The court’s decision to modify existing custodial arrangement is not a common one. In most cases, courts are likely to fashion a less drastic remedy.

Can a Parent Travel with Young Child Abroad Over Custodial Parent’s Objections?

Tuesday, July 26th, 2011

One issue that may come up in custody cases is whether a nonresidential parent has ability to take a child abroad during his or her period of visitation. It is not uncommon for a residential parent to object to such request, and sometimes parties wind up in court seeking a determination whether such travel can be permitted.

In a recent case, Russo v. Carmel, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 05889 (4th Dept. 2011), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, permitted the father to travel to Italy with his two year old child for a period of not more than 15 days on 60 days’ notice to the mother. The mother opposed the request, arguing that the child was never away from the mother for longer than 48 hours, that the father’s visitation was limited to 48 hour periods and that the child would be in an unfamiliar environment with relatives who were unknown to the child.  The court held that the record established that, although the father’s visitation with the child was limited, the father has a close bond with her and, during visitation, he prepared her meals, bathed her, administered medication as necessary and took her on outings. Further, the mother did not express any concerns that the father would abscond with the child. The court concluded that it is in the best interests of the child to travel with the father to Italy to meet her extended family.

While in most cases the court is unlikely to allow a parent to travel abroad with a very young child, in this case, the father was able to present convincing evidence that the trip was intended to introduce the child to her relatives abroad. Further, the mother was unable to present any evidence of the father’s inability to take care of the child and was not afraid that the father would refuse to come back to the United States. In view of these facts, the trial court’s decision and the Appellate Division’s decision were clearly correct.  While the residential parent may have a significant measure of control over non-residential parent’s ability to travel with the child, the residential parent should not raise objections unless there is specific evidence that such travel would be inappropriate and not in the best interests of the child.

Statute of Limitations and QDROs

Saturday, June 11th, 2011

One of the questions that I was asked several times during the last year was whether there is a statute of limitations applicable to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs)? This question usually come up in situations where one former spouse was entitled to a portion of the other former spouse’s retirement benefits, however, the QDRO was never done, and a substantial period of time has passed. If there was an applicable statute of limitations, the former spouse who has failed to act would lose his or her right to collect a portion of the former spouse’s retirement.

However, a couple of recent decisions made it clear that with respect to QDROs, there is no applicable statute of limitations and a QDRO can be submitted to the court at any time. In Denaro v. Denaro, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 04409 (2nd Dept 2011), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that “the statute of limitations does not bar issuance of the QDRO.”  Relying on Bayen v Bayen, 81 A.D.3d 865 (2nd Dept. 2011), the court held that ”[M]otions to enforce the terms of a stipulation of settlement are not subject to statutes of limitation… [B]ecause a QDRO is derived from the bargain struck by the parties at the time of the judgment of divorce, there is no need to commence a separate action in order for the court to formalize the agreement between the parties in the form of a QDRO”. Id. (citations omitted.)

While I would not recommend to anyone delaying preparing and submitting a QDRO, any such submission is not going to be barred by a statute of limitations. At the same time, any late submission is likely to cause another set of problems if the retirement asset is in pay status  and payments are being made to the other spouse.

Downward Modification of Child Support, Scope of Job Search and Custody Issues

Sunday, May 8th, 2011

I have previously written about downward modification of child support in a situation where the payor has lost his job or experienced a significant reduction in his income. Recently, I was personally involved in a case which also involved custody issues that directly impacted payor’s job search and were raised as a defense to an argument that the job search was insufficient. While I almost never write about cases while they are still pending, in this case, an article about the decision was published in the paper serving Rochester legal community, and I think that it is interesting one, because of the interplay between the child’s need for support and parent’s wish not to search for a job outside of his present community.

In Szalapski v. Schwartz n/k/a Szalapski, Justice Richard A. Dollinger had to decide whether an unemployed parent with support obligations must clearly make a diligent job search limited to the Rochester area, or expand it beyond Rochester. Mr. Szalapski, who lost his employment earning six-figure income a number of months ago, brought a downward modification obligation claiming that despite his diligent job search, he was unable to find a comparable job and his income for child support purposes should be reduced to $15,000 per year. Mr. Szalapski has a number of advanced science and engineering degrees, and has held both teaching and industry positions. When Ms. Schwartz raised an argument that Mr. Szalapski was obligated to search for a job outside of Rochester area, Mr. Szalapski claimed that because of the parties’ custodial and visitation arrangements, and his involvement in one of his children’s life, he did not have to search for employment beyond 60 mile radius from his present residence. As result, the court had to address the apparent tension between the children’s need for support and the parent’s wish to maintain existing relationship with his child. Mr. Szalapski argued that if he is forced to accept a job some distance away from Rochester, his relationship with his son would be negatively impacted.

The court ruled that a potentially high earning plaintiff such as Mr. Szalapski, who is seeking modification, should be required to examine the prospects of employment in another area before the court substantially reduces his child support obligation. “New York law is strangely silent on this issue and, based on this court’s research, the question of the ‘radius of a reasonable job search’ has been seldom analyzed in the Empire State,” Justice Richard A. Dollinger wrote in the decision. “In essence, the husband [plaintiff] must prove that the benefit of the increased support, occasioned by finding a job in a new location, would be outweighed by the deleterious impact on his relationship with his son and that no alteration in the visitation schedule could accommodate his visitation with his son.” The court suggested that a high paying job (in excess of $100,000) in a nearby city such as New York, Boston, Cleveland or Washington, D.C., may be able to accommodate a visitation schedule that requires a short airplane flight.

“The paramount importance of maintaining the child’s standard of living is what drives the need for a diligent job search when an obligated parent loses their employment,” Justice Dollinger wrote. “In this court’s view then, the scope of the job search should extend beyond the convenience of either parent, and reach to a point where the benefit of employment in a new more distant location outweighs the consequence s of distance on the relationship between the parent and child” the justice continued. The court noted that the burden of  establishing whether the job search was adequate rests with the plaintiff seeking modification to prove “diligent search for employment” and ordered a hearing on the adequacy of his job search.

I think that this is an interesting decision and that Justice Dollinger did an excellent job addressing both sides of this factual scenario. As far as hearing, it is still in the future.

Automatic Orders and Contempt in Divorce Actions

Friday, February 18th, 2011

When the Domestic Relations Law was amended in 2009, it included additional requirements related to commencement of divorce actions.  Specifically, DRL §236(B)(2)(b) and 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §202.16-a included a requirement for the so-called automatic orders. Until recently, there was still a question of whether the automatic orders could be enforced using court’s contempt power since automatic orders are not signed by a judge but, instead, are signed by a divorce attorney.

In P.S. v. R.O., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21031 (Sup.Ct. New York Co. 2010), the court specifically addressed this issue.  The court held that violation of automatic orders can subject a party to civil contempt.

The wife commenced divorce on October 13, 2010, by filing summons with notice and notice of automatic orders setting forth the statutory automatic orders verbatim, which were served on husband. Parties owned joint vacation home in Vermont and had joint bank account. Upon separating, parties continued to deposit rental income from Vermont home into joint account to pay for Vermont home expenses, until December 15, 2010, when rental broker deposited $6,000 into joint account and wife transferred fund into her sole bank account. On January 4, 2011, wife transferred those funds back into joint account. Husband moved to hold wife in contempt, alleging that since May 2009, he has used funds in joint account to pay for Vermont home expenses. Wife contended that she transferred such funds out of account because she feared husband would not spend funds on Vermont home and dissipate such asset.

In addressing these issues, the court stated that to establish civil contempt, moving party must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that party charged with contempt violated clear and unequivocal court mandate which prejudiced moving party.

In analyzing whether the automatic orders amounted to a clear and unequivocal court mandate, the court reviewed the Court Rules, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §202.16-a, which requires service of a copy of the “automatic orders” on defendant, and contains language identical to that found in DRL §236(B)(2)(b). The Court Rules are promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts on behalf of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals under the authority vested in them by Judiciary Law Sections 211(1)(b) and 212(2)(b), and by Article Six, Section 30, of the New York State Constitution, to adopt rules to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. Thus, the court found that the Court Rules constitute lawful mandates of the court. It further found that the legislative history of Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(2)(b) makes clear that the legislature intended that a violation of the automatic orders would be redressed by the same remedies available for violations of any order signed by a judge.

Accordingly, the court found that civil contempt is available as a remedy for violation of the automatic orders, provided that the plaintiff has served the defendant with adequate notice of the automatic orders, as has been done in this case. However, the court in P.S. found that the wife did not violate the orders, or met the other requirements for imposition of contempt.

Multiple Child Support Orders and Change In Circumstances Warranting Modification of Child Support

Saturday, January 29th, 2011

One of the issues that I periodically see in child support cases is that a party who is already paying child support has another child or children with a different party, resulting in additional child support orders.  Usually in those circumstances, the child who is the subject of the first order is receiving support on the entire income of the payor.  The subsequent children receive child support on the basis of payor’s income after child support payable pursuant to the first order is deducted.  As a result, the child who is the subject of the first order will always receive higher child support amount than the child or children receiving child support under the subsequent orders.  In addition, the payor’s income is subject to multiple orders and can pay half or more of his gross income in child support.

The above approach has been traditionally applied in Family Court cases.  In a recent decision, Demetrius D. v. Lori T., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21025 (Fam. Ct. Clinton Co. 2011), the court questioned the logic of this approach.  The court noted that:

From the children’s perspective, the fact that one child receives more child support than another child based solely upon which custodial parent obtains the first support order is unfair and irrational. Obviously, the children cannot control which parent applies for support first nor can the child control the speed of litigation. Nevertheless, this is the statutory law of the State of New York. It should be noted that it is not the age of the children, but rather the order in which the children receive a child support order that determines which children will receive preference under the law[FN4]. Of course, it would also be unfair and irrational to give preference to one child over another based solely upon birth order.

Id. at 3.

Further, the court stated that creation of these additional support order may be grounds for modifying the original child support obligation under Family Court Act § 413(1)(b)(5)(vii)(D):

Subdivision D also raises multiple issues with respect to modification petitions. There is no express provision in the Family Court Act which limits the Subdivision D deduction in modification cases to court orders issued prior to the original order sought to be modified. In other words, in the event that a parent demonstrates a material change of circumstances which warrants the re-application of the Child Support Standards Act, there is no language that excludes new orders issued between the date of the original order and the date of the hearing on modification petition from Subdivision D. Thus, the Court concludes that if there is a material change of circumstances that warrants the new application of the Child Support Standards Act, the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a deduction under Subdivision D for all child support actually paid pursuant to Court orders for other children, whether or not the Court orders for other children were issued before or after the original order for the subject child.

But in Demetrius D., what the court gave with one hand, it took with the other.  The more flexible approach as stated in the decision, was subject to application of general child support modification standards, including a determination that the hardship came as a result of payor’s voluntary actions and was self-inflicted. The court found that having additional children was a self-inflicted hardship that came as a result of his voluntary actions that does not warrant downward modification of payor’s child support obligation.

What is the lesson here for the family law lawyers? If the payor can establish that somehow the act of having more children was involuntary, then the payor may be entitled to a modification of the original child support obligation on the basis of subsequent orders.  It is hard to see the circumstances where it would be remotely possible. On the other hand, under appropriate circumstances, the above approach may help a payor dealing with multiple child support orders.

Does Family Court Have Jurisdiction Over Family Offenses Committed Outside of New York?

Sunday, December 12th, 2010

In a recent case, the Appellate Division had to decide whether the Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction over family offense proceedings where the alleged acts occurred outside of the state and even outside of the country.  In Richardson v. Richardson, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 07943 (2nd Dept 2010), the court held that Family Court Act §812 grants the Family Court subject matter jurisdiction to hear such proceedings, and that the Family Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the parties’ petitions, despite the fact that the acts alleged occurred on the island territory of Anguilla.

On March 4, 2009, petitioners filed three separate family offense petitions seeking the entry of orders of protection. The alleged family offenses included, inter alia, assault, harassment, and menacing. The petitions detailed certain incidents which allegedly occurred on February 19, 2009, on the island of Anguilla.

The Appellate Division began its decision by stating that the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction constrained to exercise only those powers conferred upon it by the state Constitution or by statute.  Included within the actions and proceedings over which the Family Court has been given subject matter jurisdiction are family offense proceedings. Pursuant to the New York State Constitution, family offense proceedings are to determine “as may be provided by law . . . crimes and offenses by or against minors or between spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household” (N.Y. Const, art VI, § 13 [b] [7]). In light of the provision stating “as may be provided by law,” the grant of jurisdiction to the Family Court over family offense proceedings is permissive and requires legislative action to be implemented.

Family Court Act Article 8 delineates the parameters of the Family Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law provide the criminal court and the Family Court with “concurrent jurisdiction” over certain enumerated criminal offenses when allegedly committed by one family member against another. Thus, while a family member may choose to seek redress for a family offense in the Family Court, a parallel criminal proceeding also is available. Indeed, the Legislature has specifically authorized a petitioner to commence a family offense proceeding in either or both Family Court and criminal court. Moreover, each court has the authority to issue temporary or final orders of protection.

Family Court Act § 812(1) provides:

Jurisdiction. The family court and the criminal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct, harassment in the first degree, harassment in the second degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, sexual misconduct, forcible touching, sexual abuse in the third degree, sexual abuse in the second degree as set forth in subdivision one of section 130.60 of the penal law, stalking in the first degree, stalking in the second degree, stalking in the third degree, stalking in the fourth degree, criminal mischief, menacing in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, reckless endangerment, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree or an attempted assault between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household except that if the respondent would not be criminally responsible by reason of age pursuant to section 30.00 of the penal law, then the family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such proceeding. Notwithstanding a complainant’s election to proceed in family court, the criminal court shall not be divested of jurisdiction to hear a family offense proceeding pursuant to this section.

Furthermore, Family Court Act § 812(2)(b) provides: “[t]hat a family court proceeding is a civil proceeding and is for the purpose of attempting to stop the violence, end the family disruption and obtain protection.” There is no geographic limitation in Family Court Act § 812, or elsewhere in the Family Court Act, as to where a family offense is to have occurred in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Family Court. Family Court Act, Article 8, as enacted in 1962, was intended by the New York State Legislature to provide “practical help” to domestic violence victims through the use of civil proceedings in the Family Court.

The history of Family Court Act § 812, provides no indication that the Legislature intended to prohibit the Family Court from exercising jurisdiction over family offenses where the alleged acts occurred in another state or country. However, a question that arises is whether the geographic or territorial limitation on the jurisdiction of the criminal court also limits the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Criminal Procedure Law § 20.40(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person may be convicted in an appropriate criminal court of a particular county, of an offense . . . when conduct occurred within such county sufficient to establish [a]n element of such offense.”

The Appellate Division concluded “[t]hus, to the extent that the appellant contends that the geographic limitation on the jurisdiction of the criminal court also applies to limit the jurisdiction of the Family Court over family offense proceedings, we hold that contention to be without merit.”

Therefore, if an act that would give a rise to an order of protection takes place anywhere, the party against whom it is committed can seek an order of protection in New York’s Family Court, provided that other procedural requirements are met and personal jurisdiction is obtained.