In order to obtain a reduction of maintenance, the party seeking the reduction bears the burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances. Lipow v. Lipow, 110 A.D.2d 756 (2d Dep’t 1985); Patell v. Patell, 91 A.D.2d 1028 (2d Dep’t 1983); Hickland v. Hickland, 56 A.D.2d 978 (3d Dep’t 1977). Some courts have held that an unanticipated medical condition which befalls a party after a judgment of divorce was entered, may be a basis for modifying that party’s maintenance obligation. Bischoff v. Bischoff, 159 A.D.2d 404 (1st Dep’t 1990); Wantuch v. Wantuch, 56 A.D.2d 866 (2d Dep’t 1977).
In Praeger v. Praeger, 162 A.D.2d 671 (2d Dep’t 1990), a husband agreed to certain maintenance obligations with knowledge that he had a history of heart disease, heart surgeries and several heart attacks. Thereafter, he suffered a stroke which he claimed rendered him permanently disabled and unable to perform his profession. The husband pointed to that stroke as a basis for modifying his maintenance obligation. In light of his condition at the time of the divorce, the court refused even to grant a hearing, absent additional medical and financial evidence that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred.
If after the judgment of divorce is entered, the party paying maintenance develops a health condition that impairs his/her ability to pay maintenance, any application seeking modification of maintenance must be supported with admissible medical evidence and an evidentiary showing must be made that the health condition has impaired that party’s financial situation.
New York has recently made changes to its child support enforcement statutes to comply with the new federal requirements. Changes to the fee for child support enforcement services followed a new federal requirement. The states are required to charge an annual fee of $25 in every child support case in which $500 is collected during the federal fiscal year. The fee applies only to those for whom the support is being collected and who never received public assistance. For those who have received pubic assistance, the statute increases the pass-through charge from $50 to $100, as of Oct. 1, 2008, and to $200 as of Jan. 1, 2010, when two or more children are involved.
In New York State, a parent’s obligation to pay child support terminates when the child reaches the age of 21. However, in situations where a parent is charged with the financial responsibility of paying for the child’s college education, this support obligation may extend well beyond the age of 21. In the case of Lamb v. Amigone, 12 A.D.3d 1165 (4th Dept. 2004), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that unless the parties’ Separation Agreement made a specific reference to parental contribution toward college expenses terminating at the age of majority, the parental college expense contribution continued beyond the age of 21.
That result was also reached by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Schonour v. Johnson, 27 A.D.3d 1059 (4th Dept. 2006), where the Court held that where “[i]n their stipulation, the parties did not place any age limitation on their mutual promises to contribute to the costs of their daughters’ undergraduate college educations”, the appellant was obligated to pay for his daughters’ four years of college education regardless of their age.
Similarly, the court can order payment of college expenses even where the child reaches the age of majority if special circumstances exist. See Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] ; also, Krouner v. Urbach, 267 A.D.2d 575 (3rd Dept. 1999); Smith v Smith, 174 AD2d 818, 819 (3rd Dept. 1991).
Thus, both stipulations of settlement and settlement agreements must be carefully prepared and reviewed to make sure that they conform with the parties’ intent. Otherwise, the parties may find themselves in court, relitigating provisions of their settlement many years later.
New York has recently amended two sections of the Penal Law, §260.05 and §260.06, which make it a crime for a parent to voluntarily reduce his or her income, terminate employment or fail to seek employment to circumvent an order of child support. Specifically, §260.05, non-support of a child in the second degree, provides that:
A person is guilty of non-support of a child when:
1. being a parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or custody of a child less than sixteen years old, he or she fails or refuses without lawful excuse to provide support for such child when he or she is able to do so, or becomes unable to do so, when, though employable, he or she voluntarily terminates his or her employment, voluntarily reduces his or her earning capacity, or fails to diligently seek employment; or
2. being a parent, guardian or other person obligated to make child support payments by an order of child support entered by a court of competent jurisdiction for a child less than eighteen years old, he or she knowingly fails or refuses without lawful excuse to provide support for such child when he or she is able to do so, or becomes unable to do so, when, though employable, he or she voluntarily terminates his or her employment, voluntarily reduces his or her earning capacity, or fails to diligently seek employment.
Penal Law §260.06 makes such failure to support a felony if a person was convicted of violating Penal Law §260.05 within the last 5 years. Such charges are available in conjunction with other remedies available to the recipient of child support under the Family Court Act, the Domestic Relations Law and the Judiciary Law. Both sections take effect on November 1, 2008.
Governor Paterson has recently signed a law which expands access to Civil Orders of Protection, allowing a person who is, or was, in an intimate relationship with an abuser – even though not related to that person – to seek an order of protection in Family Court. This substantially expands protections for victims, who for a variety of reasons may be unwilling to press charges in criminal court. Family Court Act §812 (1) (c) was amended to include in the list of persons who the court has jurisdiction to grant an order of protection to: (1) persons formerly married to one another, “regardless of whether they still reside in the same household” and (2) persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity. Subdivision (e) was added to Family Court Act §812 to include in the list of persons who the court has jurisdiction over for the purpose of granting an order of protection, “persons who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time”. For purposes of subdivision (e), neither a casual acquaintance nor ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute an “intimate relationship”. Factors the court may consider in determining whether a relationship is an “intimate relationship” include, but are not limited to: the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship. Laws of 2008,, Ch 325, § 10, effective July 21, 2008). This significantly enlarges the number of situations where a party can obtain an order of protection from the Family Court.
In a recent decision, Spencer v. Spencer, the New York Court of Appeals has finally clarified issues related to application of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”).
Prior to Spencer, in situations where a party had a child support order from a state where the age of emancipation was less than 21, the child support order expired due to the age of the child, and if New York courts had jurisdiction over the party, the custodial parent could bring a new child support petition in New York. Since the petition was treated as a new filing, and not a modification of the out-of-state order, the New York courts then could order child support to continue until the age of 21. This was highly inequitable to parties who had child support orders from the states where the age of emancipation was 18, such as Ohio, or 19, such as California.
Spencer was decided under the following facts. The parties in dispute were married and had several children while living in Connecticut. Following divorce, the mother moved to New York while the father continued to reside in Connecticut. When the eldest son turned 18, the Connecticut support order expired. In 2004, the alimony obligation also expired and the father, as the court noted, “began working three days a week as a consultant.” The mother brought a new child support petition in New York. The New York Family Court issued a new order in 2005 directing payment of child support lasting until age 21.
The Court of Appeals held that the New York order was a modification of the Connecticut support order under the one-order policy of the UIFSA. The Court of Appeals stated that the New York Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state order, and child support terminated pursuant to the terms of the initial order. As a result of the decision, prior orders entered under similar circumstances should be vacated. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not address whether recoupment of the child support paid under a new New York order is available to the parent who was paying child support.