Archive for the ‘Domestic Relations Law’ Category

Multiple Child Support Orders and Change In Circumstances Warranting Modification of Child Support

Saturday, January 29th, 2011

One of the issues that I periodically see in child support cases is that a party who is already paying child support has another child or children with a different party, resulting in additional child support orders.  Usually in those circumstances, the child who is the subject of the first order is receiving support on the entire income of the payor.  The subsequent children receive child support on the basis of payor’s income after child support payable pursuant to the first order is deducted.  As a result, the child who is the subject of the first order will always receive higher child support amount than the child or children receiving child support under the subsequent orders.  In addition, the payor’s income is subject to multiple orders and can pay half or more of his gross income in child support.

The above approach has been traditionally applied in Family Court cases.  In a recent decision, Demetrius D. v. Lori T., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21025 (Fam. Ct. Clinton Co. 2011), the court questioned the logic of this approach.  The court noted that:

From the children’s perspective, the fact that one child receives more child support than another child based solely upon which custodial parent obtains the first support order is unfair and irrational. Obviously, the children cannot control which parent applies for support first nor can the child control the speed of litigation. Nevertheless, this is the statutory law of the State of New York. It should be noted that it is not the age of the children, but rather the order in which the children receive a child support order that determines which children will receive preference under the law[FN4]. Of course, it would also be unfair and irrational to give preference to one child over another based solely upon birth order.

Id. at 3.

Further, the court stated that creation of these additional support order may be grounds for modifying the original child support obligation under Family Court Act § 413(1)(b)(5)(vii)(D):

Subdivision D also raises multiple issues with respect to modification petitions. There is no express provision in the Family Court Act which limits the Subdivision D deduction in modification cases to court orders issued prior to the original order sought to be modified. In other words, in the event that a parent demonstrates a material change of circumstances which warrants the re-application of the Child Support Standards Act, there is no language that excludes new orders issued between the date of the original order and the date of the hearing on modification petition from Subdivision D. Thus, the Court concludes that if there is a material change of circumstances that warrants the new application of the Child Support Standards Act, the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a deduction under Subdivision D for all child support actually paid pursuant to Court orders for other children, whether or not the Court orders for other children were issued before or after the original order for the subject child.

But in Demetrius D., what the court gave with one hand, it took with the other.  The more flexible approach as stated in the decision, was subject to application of general child support modification standards, including a determination that the hardship came as a result of payor’s voluntary actions and was self-inflicted. The court found that having additional children was a self-inflicted hardship that came as a result of his voluntary actions that does not warrant downward modification of payor’s child support obligation.

What is the lesson here for the family law lawyers? If the payor can establish that somehow the act of having more children was involuntary, then the payor may be entitled to a modification of the original child support obligation on the basis of subsequent orders.  It is hard to see the circumstances where it would be remotely possible. On the other hand, under appropriate circumstances, the above approach may help a payor dealing with multiple child support orders.

Update of Recent Cases Involving Enhanced Earnings

Friday, November 19th, 2010

I have recently written about a trend in court decisions involving enhanced earnings toward reducing non-titled spouse’s interest to less than a 50% share.  A recent decision, Haspel v. Haspel, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 08530 (2nd Dept. 2010) illustrates this issue very well.

In Haspel, the trial court granted to the wife 50% of the husband’s enhanced earnings which resulted from his acquisition of several professional licenses, including, several securities dealer’s licenses and a real estate broker’s license.  The trial court’s decision was appealed, and the Appellate Division modified the trial court’s decision.

Specifically, the Appellate Division held that the wife was entitled to 25% of husband’s enhanced earnings.  While the court did not provide specific reasons for this reduction, the parties were married for nearly 23 years before the divorce action was commenced, they had two children, and at the time of trial, the plaintiff was 52 years old and the defendant was 49 years old.  The wife was also going to receive spousal maintenance, however, this issue was remanded to the trial court for recalculation since the lower court’s decision improperly engaged in double counting of the same income for enhanced earnings calculations and maintenance calculations.

As I have written previously, the trend toward unequal division of enhanced earnings is continuing.  Divorce lawyers and their clients would be well advised to review evidence related to non-titled spouse’s contribution carefully, if an argument is being made that the non-titled spouse should receive more than 25% of such enhanced earnings.

New Temporary Maintenance – How Does It Work?

Saturday, November 13th, 2010

Among recent changes to New York’s divorce laws, the legislature amended provisions of the Domestic Relations Law that deal with temporary spousal maintenance.  DRL §236(B)(5-a)(c) presently includes a formula which, if applied according to the statute, results in the presumptively correct amount of temporary maintenance. DRL §236(B)(5-a)(c)(1) describes how those provisions are applied:

(a) the court shall subtract twenty percent of the income of the payee from thirty percent of the income up to the income cap of the payor.
(b) the court shall then multiply the sum of the payor’s income up to and including the income cap and all of the payee’s income by forty percent.
(c) the court shall subtract the income of the payee from the amount derived from clause (b) of this subparagraph.
(d) the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the lower of the amounts determined by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph; if the amount determined by clause (c) of this subparagraph is less than or equal to zero, the guideline amount shall be zero dollars.

According to the legislative documents, the legislature intended that the temporary maintenance guidelines would only result in an award when there is an income gap between the two parties such that the less-monied spouse’s income is less than two thirds of the more-monied spouse’s income. For instance, if the payor’s annual income is $60,000 per year, the guidelines will only result in an award if the payee’s annual income is less than $40,000. The numerical guideline is only applied to the payor’s income up to $500,000 of her/his income, with a set of factors to be applied by the court to determine any additional amount of temporary maintenance on the payor’s income above this $500,000 cap.

Here are some examples of how the statute works:

Example 1

Step # 1: Determine Respective and Combined Income:
Payor‘s Income $60,000
Payee‘s Income $30,000
Combined Income $90,000
Step # 2: Perform Calculation # 1: (Subtract twenty percent of the income of the payee from thirty percent of the income up to the income cap of the payor.):
30% of Payor‘s Income (30% x $60,000) = $18,000
Minus
20% of Payee‘s Income (20% x $30,000) = $6,000
Result of Calculation # 1: $12,000
Step # 3: Perform Calculation # 2: (Multiply the sum of the payor’s income up to and including the income cap and all of the payee’s income by forty percent):
Payor‘s Income = $60,000
Plus
Payee‘s Income = $30,000
Combined Income Equals $ 90,000
Multiplied by 40% ($ 90,000 x 40%) = $36,000
Subtract Payee‘s Income from Product:
($36,000 minus $30,000 = $6,000)
Result of Calculation # 2: $6,000

Because paragraph (d) provides that the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the lower of the amounts determined by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph; if the amount determined by clause (c) of this subparagraph is less than or equal to zero, the guideline amount shall be zero dollars, and because Calculation # 2 is the lesser amount, specifically, $6,000, Calculation # 2 controls, and the temporary maintenance award would be $6,000.

Example 2

Step # 1: Determine Respective and Combined Income:
Payor‘s Income $120,000
Payee‘s Income $80,000
Combined Income $200,000
Step # 2:
Perform Calculation # 1: (Subtract twenty percent of the income of the payee from thirty percent of the income up to the income cap of the payor.):
30% of Payor‘s Income (30% x $120,000) = $36,000
Minus
20% of Payee‘s Income (20% x $80,000) = $16,000
Result of Calculation # 1: $20,000
Step # 3: Perform Calculation # 2: (Multiply the sum of the payor’s income up to and including the income cap and all of the payee’s income by forty percent):
Payor‘s Income = $120,000
Plus
Payee‘s Income = $80,000
Combined Income Equals $200,000
Multiplied by 40% ($ 200,000 x 40%) = $ 80,000
Subtract Payee‘s Income from Product:
($80,000 minus $80,000 = $0)
Result of Calculation # 2: $0

Because paragraph (d) provides that the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the lower of the amounts determined by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph; if the amount determined by clause (c) of this subparagraph is less than or equal to zero, the guideline amount shall be zero dollars, and because Calculation # 2 is the lesser amount, specifically, zero, Calculation # 2 controls and the temporary maintenance award would be zero.

Example 3

Step # 1: Determine Respective and Combined Income:
Payor‘s Income $100,000
Payee‘s Income $20,000
Combined Income $120,000
Step # 2: Perform Calculation # 1: (Subtract twenty percent of the income of the payee from thirty percent of the income up to the income cap of the payor.):
30% of Payor‘s Income (30% x $100,000) = $30,000
Minus
20% of Payee‘s Income (20% x $200,000) = $4,000
Result of Calculation # 1: $26,000
Step # 3: Perform Calculation # 2: (Multiply the sum of the payor’s income up to and including the income cap and all of the payee’s income by forty percent):
Payor‘s Income = $100,000
Plus
Payee‘s Income = $20,000
Combined Income Equals $120,000
Multiplied by 40% ($120,000 x 40%) = $48,000
Subtract Payee‘s Income from Product $100,000
($48,000 minus $20,000 = $28,000)
Result of Calculation # 2: $28,000

Because paragraph (d) provides that ―the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the lower of the amounts determined by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph; if the amount determined by clause (c) of this subparagraph is less than or equal to zero, the guideline amount shall be zero dollars,and because Calculation # 1 is the lesser amount, specifically, $26,000, Calculation # 1 controls and the temporary maintenance award would be $26,000.

There are several issues that are not addressed by the new statute. Initially, prior to its enactment, judges had discretion to set temporary awards based upon the actual needs of the parties. Under the prior statute, temporary maintenance was awarded to allow the non-monied spouse to preserve his or her financial circumstances and maintain the prior lifestyle during the divorce. While the goal of the prior statute was laudatory, unfortunately, the temporary maintenance awards varied greatly from case to case.

Since the new statute creates uniformity by using a formula, temporary maintenance awards are going to be consistent as far as their amount is concerned. At the same time, the new statute doe snot address duration of the maintenance and length of the marriage of the parties. For temporary maintenance purposes, a spouse in a long term marriage would receive the same temporary maintenance award as a spouse in a short term marriage. This is likely to create an incentive for parties in a short term marriage and their lawyers to extend the divorce action as long as possible.

Another problem with the new statute is that it applies to the first $500,000 of income, someone married to person who earns well in excess of that figure would receive less under the new statute than he or she would be entitled to receive under the old law, when the full income was used for determining temporary maintenance.

Finally, the temporary maintenance statute creates certain expectations on part of both litigants and judges. For litigants, there is now an expectation that any maintenance will be at the level set by the temporary maintenance formula. For judges, it is an easy way to set the final maintenance award.

Major Changes in New York’s Family Law Are Now In Effect

Wednesday, October 13th, 2010

Today is the day when New York’s family law begins a new era. The no-fault divorce law is now in effect and grounds for divorce will no longer preclude someone from obtaining a divorce.    In addition to the new no-fault divorce legislation, three new laws applicable to divorces and child support proceedings became effective including:

1.   a new procedure and formula for setting awards of temporary maintenance while a divorce is pending;
2.  a presumption toward grating attorneys fees to the less monied spouse during the divorce; and
3.   new circumstances for reviewing and modifying child support awards.

Here is the summary of the most important provisions of the new laws:

No-Fault Divorce

There is a new no-fault cause of action for divorce that can be granted if the spouse filing for divorce makes a sworn statement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down for a period of six months preceding the commencement of the divorce action.

Temporary Maintenance

The new law provides that maintenance is to be awarded during the divorce when one parties’ income is less than 2/3of the other spouse’s income.

The amount of maintenance is determined by the following formula as the lesser of a) 30% of the payor’s income minus 20% of the non-payor’s income or b) 40% of the combined income minus the non payor’s income.

Attorneys Fees

The  attorneys fee bill creates a  presumption that the “monied”  spouse should pay to the “non-monied” spouse interim attorneys fees in all divorce or family law case.  The purpose of the law is to make both spouses to be able to litigate their divorce case on equal basis.

Modification of Child Support

The Family Court Act (“FCA”) and matching provisions of the Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”) were amended to allow modification of an order of child support due to “substantial change in circumstances” which is now defined in a change in either party’s gross income by 15% or more.  Also, if three years have passed since the last order was entered, modified, or adjusted, the court can modify an order entered after October 13, 2010 order, unless the parties specifically opt-out of that provisions.  Additionally, a reduction in a party’s income shall not be considered as a ground for modification, unless it was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment.

As I have written previously, these are important development in New York’s family law and I think that it will take some time to assess their impact.  At the same time, I think that they will be welcomed by divorce lawyers in this state and will make divorce easier for the divorcing spouses. With respect to the bill establishing the formula for temporary maintenance, it is highly likely that any such temporary maintenance award is going to be used by the courts as a basis for a permanent maintenance award.

Equitable Distribution of Businesses and Enhanced Earning Capacity Does Not Always Mean Equal Distribution

Sunday, October 10th, 2010

I have previously written about equitable distribution issues here and here.  One of the most important issues that divorce attorneys have to address in dealing with equitable distribution is division of businesses or enhanced earning capacity arising as a result of acquisition of a professional degree or a license by one of the spouses.

In distributing marital property of almost every variety, the courts have focused on the relative significance of the non-titled spouse’s contribution toward the marriage, which would almost always result in equal or almost equal distribution.  However, with respect to distribution of business interests and enhanced earning capacity, as of late, the courts have focused on the degree to which the non-titled spouse’s efforts contributed toward the acquisition of each specific asset.

In the past, the non-titled spouse’s contributions to the other party’s business, career or degree, usually resulted in equal distribution of those assets.  However, the recent trend in court decisions has been to grant the non-titled spouse less than one half of the asset.

The courts have described their reasoning as follows: “[a]lthough in a marriage of long duration, where both parties have made significant contributions to the marriage, a division of marital assets should be made as equal as possible. . . there is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis.”  Kaplan v. Kaplan, 51 A.D.3d 635, 637 (2d Dept. 2008). In equitably distributing a spouse’s business interest, the court must consider the direct contributions the non-titled spouse made to the business as well as the indirect contributions to the ma-rital partnership, including homemaking, parenting, and providing the necessary emotional and moral support to sustain the titled spouse in carrying on the business.  Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 15 (1986).
Unlike other marital assets, in valuing a non-titled spouse’s share in a spouse’s business interest, the trend has been toward awards between 25% and 35% to the non-titled spouse. Chalif v. Chalif, 298 A.D.2d 348, 349, (2d Dept. 2002)(25% award to wife of husband’s medical practice and enhanced earning capacity); Granade-Bastuck v. Granade-Bastuck, 249 A.D.2d 444, 445 (2d Dept. 1998)(25% award to plaintiff of defendant’s law practice); Giokas v. Giokas, 73 A.D.3d 688 (2d Dept. 2010)(10% award to wife of husband’s business); Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 71 A.D.3d 737 (2d Dept. 2010)(35% award to wife of the husband’s business); Ciampa v. Ciampa, 47 A.D.3d 745, 747 (2d Dept. 2008)(35% award to wife of husband’s business); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 51 A.D.3d 635, 637 (2d Dept. 2008)(30% award to wife of the husband’s dental practice).

This has been a trend state-wide and has been followed by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which is located here in Rochester, New York, and to which decisions from Allegany, Cattaraugus, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Livingston, Monroe, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Orleans, Oswego, Seneca, Steuben, Wayne, Wyoming and Yates Counties are appealed to.

As a result, the non-titled spouses and their divorce lawyers have an uphill fight if they try to obtain a substantial share of such assets as a spouse’s business, educational degrees or professional licenses.

Upcoming Changes to New York’s Child Support Law and Social Services Law

Wednesday, September 8th, 2010

When New York’s Legislature finally passed the no-fault divorce law and made changes to temporary maintenance and attorneys fees awards, it also passed a number of less publicized changes to the Child Support Standards Act, and related laws, which govern child support in New York. The new legislation modified the Family Court Act, Domestic Relations Law and the Social Services Law, substantially altering the parties’ ability to modify child support awards. It also gave the Family Court additional powers in situations where the party paying child support is unemployed.

The following will describe the most significant changes included in the new legislation.

Family Court Act (FCA) §451 was amended to conform the language of the FCA provision governing the modification of child support orders to the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) so that both provisions provide for a “substantial change in circumstances” as a basis for modification of an order of child support.

This section further provides two new bases for modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party’s income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section would provide that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions and also would clarify that retroactive support is paid and enforceable as provided under FCA §440.

DRL §236B(9)(b) was amended to separate out the “substantial change of circumstances” basis for modification of child support orders into its own section for clarity and would provide two new bases for the modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party’s income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section provides that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions.

The bill also added a new FCA §437-a to authorize the Family Court to require the non-custodial parent of a child to seek employment, or to participate in job training, employment counseling or other programs designed to lead to employment, where such programs are available, if he or she is unemployed at the time the court is establishing the support order unless he or she is in receipt of supplemental security income (SSI) or social security disability (SSD) benefits.

Another section of the bill amended Social Services Law (SSL) §111-h to provide that if the respondent is required to participate in work programs or activities, and if the order of support is made payable on behalf of persons in receipt of public assistance, the support collection unit may not file a petition to increase the support obligation for twelve months from the date of entry of the order if the respondent’s income is derived from the work activity or program. FCA §461 was also amended to reflect the two new bases for modification of an order of child support.

Sections of the bill dealing with modification of child support only apply to child support orders which incorporate but do not merge stipulations or settlement agreements if the stipulation or agreement was executed on or after the effective date of the bill. The amendments, with exception of certain sections of the Tax Law, become effective 90 days after the passing of the bill.  The effective date of the amendments is October 14, 2010.

This bill represents a substantial change to the prior statutory provisions and case law dealing with modification of child support.  While New York’s child support orders were always subject to modification, these changes will make modification of child support easier. I do not know at this time how these provisions will apply to the orders already in place and whether the party seeking modification of child support will be able to use some of the new provisions to modify existing child support orders.

No-Fault Divorce Becomes Law In New York

Sunday, August 15th, 2010

The no-fault divorce bill has been signed by the Governor Patterson and will go into effect in 60 days.  That means that starting on October 13, 2010, someone who wants to be divorced in New York will no longer be required to make allegations of martial fault by the other spouse and will only be required to swear that the relationship between husband and wife has  broken  down  irretrievably  for  a period of at least six months.  The new law will apply to the divorce actions commenced on or after such effective date.

In addition, the Governor signed legislation that will revise the process for setting awards of temporary maintenance while a divorce is pending, by creating a formula and list of factors that would presumptively govern such awards. This would allow for speedy resolution of the maintenance issue, and prevent less well-off parties to divorce proceedings from falling into poverty during litigation, because they lack the resources to obtain a temporary maintenance order. Another bill would create a presumption that a less monied spouse in a divorce case is entitled to payment of attorneys’ fees. Under current law, a party that cannot afford to secure representation in a divorce proceeding must make an application for fees at the end of the process, which can force a poor individual to proceed without a lawyer, or to surrender on important issues due to lack of means. Provisions of the Domestic Relations Law related to temporary maintenance and attorneys fees will go into effect in 60 days as well.

These are important development in New York’s family law and I think that it will take some time to assess their impact.  At the same time, I think that they will be welcomed by divorce lawyers in this state and will make divorce easier for the divorcing spouses. With respect to the bill establishing the formula for temporary maintenance, it is highly likely that any such temporary maintenance award is going to be used by the courts as a basis for a permanent maintenance award.

A Brief Summary of Collaborative Law – A Way Toward Amicable Divorce

Sunday, July 18th, 2010

I have previously written about Collaborative Family Law as an alternative to traditional litigation methods of resolving family disputes. Here is some additional information that describes the process and the goals of Collaborative Law.

Collaborative Law is a method for conflict resolution in which the participants focus their efforts on reaching a mutually agreeable resolution. Attorneys and other professionals are retained during the collaborative process for the sole purpose of assisting their clients in reaching this goal.

The client and their lawyers agree to work respectfully and in good faith to gather all information needed to reach an agreement, including developing the interests of each client. The participants do not engage in traditional discovery process since it tends to be expensive and lengthy. The clients and their collaborative attorneys agree from the beginning that they will produce and exchange all necessary information and documents voluntarily and in a timely fashion. Non-legal professionals are usually retained as joint neutrals and work together with the participants to define the scope of their assignment and to gather information.

The process typically includes various meetings at which the clients and their attorneys, as well as other professionals meet together to discuss the issues, make any necessary interim arrangements, and to plan for information gathering (not every professional will be present at every conference.) These conferences continue to be utilized to exchange and clarify information and to brainstorm possible options for resolution. The clients and their lawyers focus on educating everyone regarding the underlying information, each client’s interests and possible solutions. Out of this process, a settlement which meets the approval of all clients can be fashioned. Negotiations are based upon efforts to find options that will serve the interests of all clients and other affected persons, and if applicable, create the possibility for a positive continuing relationship.

The clients and their collaborative attorneys agree that they will not go to court during the time they are working towards settlement. If the clients are unable to reach an agreement, the collaborative attorneys and other professionals withdraw and litigation attorneys take the dispute to court.

Collaborative family law started with one attorney in Minnesota in 1990 and is now practiced across the United States, Canada, and internationally. Collaborative family law was started in Rochester, New York, and Monroe County, a few years ago as an attorney centered method in family law. However, more recently, other affiliated professionals including financial analysts, psychologists, counselors and coaches also became involved.  Here in Rochester, collaborative professionals belong to Collaborative Law Association of the Rochester Area, Inc. (“CLARA”) which includes among its members attorneys, child specialists, coaches, mediators and financial professionals.

Here are some questions and answers about Collaborative Law.

1. What is Collaborative Law?

Collaborative Law is a way to resolve disputes between people in a fair, open and respectful manner. In Collaborative Law, the goal is to reach a mutually acceptable settlement of a dispute that both parties will be able to abide by. The parties retain Collaborative professionals such as attorneys, accountants, financial planners, and therapists, who agree to work in good faith to gather and share all information needed to reach an agreement. The parties and their Collaborative attorneys agree in advance that they will not go to court to ask a judge to resolve their dispute for them during the collaborative process. If they are unable to reach an agreement, and one of the parties decides to go to court, the Collaborative professionals withdraw from the case. Another set of attorneys is then retained by the parties to represent them in court.

2. How does Collaborative Law differ from other methods of dispute resolution?

There are many ways to resolve disputes. Litigation is the traditional legal approach. In litigation, lawyers work hard to convince a judge (or jury) that the lawyer’s client’s version of facts is correct. Often, this includes challenging the other party’s version of the facts. Trial is often compared to a battle, in which the best side wins. However, all lawyers understand that the “best side” doesn’t always win and that in many disputes, the party who “wins” at trial still loses in other ways. In some circumstances, litigation is the only appropriate option. For example, if a party consistently hides information or is abusive, the formal procedures used in litigation may be necessary. If a party is unwilling to negotiate in good faith, a third party decision may be needed. Litigation usually costs more than other forms of dispute resolution and the outcome is typically less satisfactory.

In mediation, a neutral professional assists the parties in settling the dispute. Generally, the parties agree that all information will be shared and that they are seeking a “win-win” solution. The mediator does not represent either party and the parties do not go to court. In some forms of mediation, attorneys serve only in a consulting or reviewing capacity. In other situations, attorneys participate in the mediation. Mediation can work well for parties who have the ability to communicate their needs directly to the other person and who have similar understanding of the financial and other information being presented.

Collaborative Law combines the positive qualities of litigation and mediation. As in litigation, each party has an independent lawyer who will give her or him quality legal advice and will assist in putting forward his or her interests. Similarly to mediation, the parties and their Collaborative attorneys commit to both an open information gathering and sharing process and to resolve their differences without going to court. In addition, the parties can mutually agree to engage other professionals such as child specialists, financial specialists, coaches, vocational counselors or other neutral consultants to provide them with specialized assistance. The parties acknowledge that the best result for each of them will occur when they reach the best result for all of them.

3. How is information gathered in Collaborative Practice?

The parties do not engage in expensive legal procedures to obtain information. The parties and their Collaborative attorneys agree from the beginning that they will share all necessary information and documents voluntarily and in a timely fashion. Hiding documents or unnecessary delays are not permitted. If a party is not acting in good faith and “hides the ball”, it is the duty of the attorney to work with the client to change his or her behavior and to withdraw if the behavior continues. If a party continues to refuse to act in good faith, the Collaborative process can be terminated.

The parties decide what type of additional assistance is needed in the information gathering process and jointly engage consultants. For example, the parties can jointly hire a financial specialist to assist them in gathering and organizing financial information and to create projections for future financial possibilities. Or, they can jointly engage an appraiser to provide them with an opinion regarding the value of a particular asset.

4. How are questions relating to children addressed in Collaborative Practice?

One of the most important aspects of Collaborative Practice in a divorce dispute is the opportunity to resolve the divorce in a manner which creates a healthy co-parenting relationship so that the children’s interests and family relationships are protected. Sometimes, the parties have developed a working co-parenting relationship prior to entering the Collaborative Process. However, in many cases, the parents need assistance in transitioning from parenting in one household to parenting in two households. Divorce coaches and child specialists can assist parents in developing effective communication and in creating a parenting agreement. The Collaborative attorneys assist as needed in working out an agreement and preparing the necessary final legal documents.

5. How do the parties and professionals work together?

After initial meetings with their own Collaborative attorneys, the typical process is to start the case with a 4-way conference — the parties and Collaborative attorneys, and sometimes coaches, meet together to discuss the issues, make any necessary interim arrangements regarding children or finances, and to plan for information gathering. In addition, the parties can work individually and jointly with coaches to develop effective communication techniques and to manage the intense emotions that often accompany conflict. Additional consultants such as financial specialists, child specialists, or appraisers can also be hired to assist in other aspects of information gathering and processing. The multi-person conferences continue to be the normal means of exchanging and clarifying information and to brainstorm possible options for resolution. The Collaborative professionals work together and with their clients to plan each meeting. The parties and Collaborative attorneys focus on educating everyone regarding the underlying information, each party’s interests and possible solutions. Out of this process, a settlement which meets the approval of the parties can be fashioned.

6. Does it work to have everyone together in the same room in the middle of a conflict?

The job of the Collaborative professionals is to establish positive communication. People in a legal dispute often feel vulnerable and emotional and can be less aware of how their patterns of communication can cause problems. The Collaborative professionals help each client to present his or her interests and needs in a positive manner that will be heard by the other participants. Meeting together can help everyone to be “on the same page”, which ultimately facilitates reaching an agreement. The focus of the meetings is to find a solution, not attack each other.

7. Must an agreement be reached in Collaborative Practice?

No. All parties must voluntarily agree to the solution. No party is forced to accept a solution that does not meet his or her interests and needs. The parties understand that the goal is to fashion a solution that comes as close as possible to a “win-win” agreement, while recognizing that they won’t receive everything on their “wish list.”

8. If the parties reach an agreement through Collaborative Practice, what happens next?

The Collaborative attorneys will draft the necessary legal documents to memorialize the parties’ agreement. This paperwork is then submitted to the court for approval. A court hearing is not required.

9. What happens if a settlement cannot be reached?

If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the parties can explore other options for settlement such as mediation, arbitration, private judging and neutral case evaluation, some of which may allow them to stay within the collaborative framework. If court hearings are required, the Collaborative attorneys withdraw and each party retains a new attorney for trial.

10. Why is it necessary for the Collaborative attorney to withdraw if an agreement is not reached?

Attorneys are typically trained to approach cases with the underlying assumption that a court will make the ultimate decision. Cases are analyzed with this foundation and are settled with the backdrop being “what will happen if we go to court.” “Going to court” can often become a threat that makes communications difficult and pushes the parties apart rather than moving them toward a settlement. Since settlement has not been the focus from the very beginning, cases often do not settle until the parties are “at the courthouse steps,” after incurring substantial attorney’s fees and depleting their emotional resources.

The agreement by both the parties and Collaborative attorneys that their Collaborative attorneys will not go to court focuses everyone on creative means of settling the case in a way that is acceptable to all parties. The focus of the process stays on reaching an agreement rather than preparing a case for trial since the Collaborative attorneys will not be representing the parties in court. The tendency to “drift” to court as the default decision-making method is reduced.

11. Who should consider the Collaborative approach for their dispute?

Collaborative Practice works best for parties who wish to settle without going to court and are willing to commit to a good faith effort to do so. In Collaborative Practice, you maintain control over your decision making rather than letting a judge decide. You can also control the amount of information that becomes a part of the public record (normally, the entire divorce file is open to the public, including any allegations made by either party in obtaining temporary orders or at trial.)

People in conflict often have continuing relationships with each other, as co-parents, business colleagues, or through their circle of friends and relatives. Collaborative Practice will increase the possibility of maintaining a civil or even cordial relationship with the other person after the resolution of your conflict.

You should also consider Collaborative Practice if you wish to dramatically reduce your legal fees. A dispute that goes through the entire legal process including a trial can cost tens of thousands of dollars for each party. The formal legal procedures take much more attorney time (and your money) than the informal process used in Collaborative Law. The focus on settlement moves the case to resolution faster than the typical court-directed case, which also reduces your fees.

12. What do I do if I want to use Collaborative Practice for my dispute?

You will need to find a Collaborative attorney whom you can trust to provide you with both quality legal advice and the skills needed to work towards a settlement. You can discuss with the Collaborative attorney the ways of approaching the other parties about the collaborative process, which can include you discussing the idea with him or her, your attorney contacting the other party, or your attorney discussing it with the other party’s attorney(s), if one has been retained. In the alternative, you can contact coaches or other professionals who may be involved in the collaborative approach and discuss the process with them.

Another Update On No-Fault Divorce In New York

Monday, July 5th, 2010

I have previously written about the slow progress of no-fault divorce legislation though New York’s Senate and Assembly here and here. Finally, it appears that New York is on the cusp of passing no-fault divorce law and joining the rest of the country.

On July 1, 2010, the Assembly passed no-fault divorce bill, which previously was approved in the Senate. If signed by Gov. David Paterson, New York would no longer be the only state that doesn’t allow no-fault divorce.

Under no-fault divorce, couples would be allowed to divorce after six months and the resolution of all financial issues. They would not have to prove fault, such as abandonment or adultery, or develop a separation agreement and live apart for at least a year in order to get divorced. Proponents said the changes would save time and money and court resources.

The Assembly and Senate previously approved two other bills related to no-fault divorce. One would require counsel fees to be awarded at the beginning of a divorce process and the other would address issues related to spousal support. The measure dealing with spousal support would establish temporary spousal maintenance while the divorce proceeding is pending, revise factors for final maintenance awards and require the Law Revision Commission to study the economic consequences of divorce and maintenance actions.

While the elimination of marital fault is extremely important and would greatly benefit people seeking divorce here in Rochester and elsewhere in New York State, it is the bill dealing with temporary spousal support that is likely to present some significant legal issues if it becomes law.

The bill is interesting since unlike the existing law regarding temporary spousal support, it utilizes a formula to calculate a temporary spousal support award. The amount of spousal support and its duration are calculated on the basis of a formula as follows:

3 5-A. TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE AWARDS. A. EXCEPT WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE
4 ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION THREE OF THIS PART
5 PROVIDING FOR MAINTENANCE, IN ANY MATRIMONIAL ACTION THE COURT SHALL
6 MAKE ITS AWARD FOR TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
7 THIS SUBDIVISION.
8 B. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SUBDIVISION, THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS SHALL
9 BE USED:
10 (1) “PAYOR” SHALL MEAN THE SPOUSE WITH THE HIGHER INCOME.
11 (2) “PAYEE” SHALL MEAN THE SPOUSE WITH THE LOWER INCOME.
12 (3) “LENGTH OF MARRIAGE” SHALL MEAN THE PERIOD FROM THE DATE OF
13 MARRIAGE UNTIL THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION.
14 (4) “INCOME” SHALL MEAN:
15 (A) INCOME AS DEFINED IN THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND CODIFIED
16 IN SECTION TWO HUNDRED FORTY OF THIS ARTICLE AND SECTION FOUR HUNDRED
17 THIRTEEN OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT; AND
18 (B) INCOME FROM INCOME PRODUCING PROPERTY TO BE DISTRIBUTED PURSUANT
19 TO SUBDIVISION FIVE OF THIS PART.
20 (5) “INCOME CAP” SHALL MEAN UP TO AND INCLUDING FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
21 DOLLARS OF THE PAYOR’S ANNUAL INCOME; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, BEGINNING JANU-
22 ARY THIRTY-FIRST, TWO THOUSAND TWELVE AND EVERY TWO YEARS THEREAFTER,
23 THE PAYOR’S ANNUAL INCOME AMOUNT SHALL INCREASE BY THE PRODUCT OF THE

EXPLANATION–Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD17166-10-0
A. 10984–B 2

1 AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR ALL
2 URBAN CONSUMERS (CPI-U) AS PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
3 LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS FOR THE TWO YEAR PERIOD ROUNDED TO THE
4 NEAREST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS. THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION SHALL
5 DETERMINE AND PUBLISH THE INCOME CAP.
6 (6) “GUIDELINE AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE” SHALL MEAN THE SUM
7 DERIVED BY THE APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH C OF THIS SUBDIVISION.
8 (7) “GUIDELINE DURATION” SHALL MEAN THE DURATIONAL PERIOD DETERMINED
9 BY THE APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH D OF THIS SUBDIVISION.
10 (8) “PRESUMPTIVE AWARD” SHALL MEAN THE GUIDELINE AMOUNT OF THE TEMPO-
11 RARY MAINTENANCE AWARD FOR THE GUIDELINE DURATION PRIOR TO THE COURT’S
12 APPLICATION OF ANY ADJUSTMENT FACTORS AS PROVIDED IN SUBPARAGRAPH ONE OF
13 PARAGRAPH E OF THIS SUBDIVISION.
14 (9) “SELF-SUPPORT RESERVE” SHALL MEAN THE SELF-SUPPORT RESERVE AS
15 DEFINED IN THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND CODIFIED IN SECTION TWO
16 HUNDRED FORTY OF THIS ARTICLE AND SECTION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTEEN OF THE
17 FAMILY COURT ACT.
C. THE COURT SHALL DETERMINE THE GUIDELINE AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY MAINTE-
19 NANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PARAGRAPH AFTER DETER-
20 MINING THE INCOME OF THE PARTIES:
21 (1) WHERE THE PAYOR’S INCOME IS UP TO AND INCLUDING THE INCOME CAP:
22 (A) THE COURT SHALL SUBTRACT TWENTY PERCENT OF THE INCOME OF THE PAYEE
23 FROM THIRTY PERCENT OF THE INCOME UP TO THE INCOME CAP OF THE PAYOR.
24 (B) THE COURT SHALL THEN MULTIPLY THE SUM OF THE PAYOR’S INCOME UP TO
25 AND INCLUDING THE INCOME CAP AND ALL OF THE PAYEE’S INCOME BY FORTY
26 PERCENT.
27 (C) THE COURT SHALL SUBTRACT THE INCOME OF THE PAYEE FROM THE AMOUNT
28 DERIVED FROM CLAUSE (B) OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH.
29 (D) THE GUIDELINE AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE SHALL BE THE LOWER
30 OF THE AMOUNTS DETERMINED BY CLAUSES (A) AND (C) OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH;
31 IF THE AMOUNT DETERMINED BY CLAUSE (C) OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH IS LESS THAN
32 OR EQUAL TO ZERO, THE GUIDELINE AMOUNT SHALL BE ZERO DOLLARS.
33 (2) WHERE THE INCOME OF THE PAYOR EXCEEDS THE INCOME CAP:
34 (A) THE COURT SHALL DETERMINE THE GUIDELINE AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY MAIN-
35 TENANCE FOR THAT PORTION OF THE PAYOR’S INCOME THAT IS UP TO AND INCLUD-
36 ING THE INCOME CAP ACCORDING TO SUBPARAGRAPH ONE OF THIS PARAGRAPH, AND,
37 FOR THE PAYOR’S INCOME IN EXCESS OF THE INCOME CAP, THE COURT SHALL
38 DETERMINE ANY ADDITIONAL GUIDELINE AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE
39 THROUGH CONSIDERATION OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:
40 (I) THE LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE;
41 (II) THE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE INCOMES OF THE PARTIES;
42 (III) THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE PARTIES ESTABLISHED DURING THE
43 MARRIAGE;
44 (IV) THE AGE AND HEALTH OF THE PARTIES;
45 (V) THE PRESENT AND FUTURE EARNING CAPACITY OF THE PARTIES;
46 (VI) THE NEED OF ONE PARTY TO INCUR EDUCATION OR TRAINING EXPENSES;
47 (VII) THE WASTEFUL DISSIPATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY;
48 (VIII) THE TRANSFER OR ENCUMBRANCE MADE IN CONTEMPLATION OF A MATRIMO-
49 NIAL ACTION WITHOUT FAIR CONSIDERATION;
50 (IX) THE EXISTENCE AND DURATION OF A PRE-MARITAL JOINT HOUSEHOLD OR A
51 PRE-DIVORCE SEPARATE HOUSEHOLD;
52 (X) ACTS BY ONE PARTY AGAINST ANOTHER THAT HAVE INHIBITED OR CONTINUE
53 TO INHIBIT A PARTY’S EARNING CAPACITY OR ABILITY TO OBTAIN MEANINGFUL
54 EMPLOYMENT. SUCH ACTS INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO ACTS OF DOMESTIC
55 VIOLENCE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE-A OF THE SOCIAL
56 SERVICES LAW;

In some respects, having a formula creates some predictability with respect to temporary spousal support awards that has been missing in the present law. At the same time, the blind application of the formula is likely to cause a different set of problems. If the bill passes, how these provisions are going to be interpreted by the courts is somewhat uncertain. As far as the divorce lawyers are concerned, this is likely to force divorce lawyers to spend even more time counseling clients with respect to temporary spousal support and post-divorce spousal support issues.

Parental Interference, Parental Alienation and Available Sanctions

Sunday, June 13th, 2010

Parental interference and parental alienation are very common problems.  Unfortunately, the courts are reluctant to punish parties responsible for such conduct and rarely sanction parties for engaging in such behavior.  However, in a recent decision, Ted R. v. Lauren R., 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50931(U) (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2010), the court made a civil contempt finding based on the mother’s violation of the parties’ Stipulation of Settlement where the mother attempted to undermine the relationship between the children and the father and replace him with her new husband, manipulated the father’s parenting access, engaged in “unfettered vilification” of the father with the children, falsely reported sexual misconduct, and has caused the children to fear her tirades and punishment if they embrace the relationship they want to have with their father. The Court sentenced the mother to a period of incarceration of six weekends.

In addition, while noting that the father’s request during the contempt hearing for a change in custody has provided adequate notice to the mother, the Court amends the father’s application to conform to the evidence presented at the hearing and ordered a hearing regarding modification of custody.

The court went into great detail describing the mother’s behavior toward her ex-husband. The factual findings concerning the mother’s behavior as stated in the decision are extensive and in view of the mother’s behavior, I will quote them in order to demonstrate the mother’s conduct.  The mother’s behavior included the following:

“Plaintiff intentionally scheduled their child’s (N.’s) birthday party on a Sunday afternoon during defendant’s weekend visitation, and then refused to permit defendant to attend. She demanded that N. be returned home early, in order to “prepare” for her party, but D., the other child, was enjoying the time with her father and wished to remain with him until the party began. Plaintiff castigated N. for “daring” to invite her father to take a picture of her outside her party. According to the plaintiff, “this doesn’t work for me!” Plaintiff threatened to cancel N.’s party, and warned her that her sister, too, would be punished “big time” for wanting to spend time with her father. Plaintiff’s taped temper tantrum, offered into evidence, vividly detailed one instance of how D. and N. have been made to understand that enjoying time with their father will be met with their mother’s wrath and threat of punishment.”

Mother consistently lied about father’s custody rights, including to third parties.  Specifically:

“Plaintiff conceded that when she completed N.’s registration card for XXX., she wrote that defendant is “not authorized to take them. I have custody. Please call me.” At trial, she claimed to fear that defendant would retrieve the girls directly from school. However, she later admitted that defendant had never even attempted to pick them up at school. Her testimony at trial sharply contradicted her sworn affidavit dated January 23, 2008, in which she stated that “the defendant consistently attempts to pick up the girls unannounced from their schools and activities, which disrupts not only the girls, but those in charge of the aforementioned.” In her sworn affidavit, plaintiff claimed that she completed the registration card because defendant sought to attend the end of D.’s art class and then had the audacity to drive his daughter home. The art class “incident” occurred well after the registration card was completed by the plaintiff. Moreover, nothing in the parties’ agreement prohibits the defendant from visiting the children at extra-curricular events or from driving them to or from such events. In point of fact, there was no dispute that D.’s Friday art class in Huntington ended as defendant’s alternate weekend visitation commenced.”

“Plaintiff wrote to Dr. L.1 (then the XXX. principal) and Ms. T. (N.’s fifth grade teacher), demanding that they restrict their conversations with the defendant to N.’s academics, as plaintiff is “solely responsible for her academic progress and emotional well being. Notwithstanding the nature of their joint legal custody plaintiff insisted before me that, “I have custody, he has visitation.”"

“The plaintiff made/completed an application for admission to XXX on behalf of N. in October, 2007. On the application, she checked the box “Mother has custody,” rather than the box directly below which says “Joint custody.” She identified her new husband, R. L., as N.’s “parent/guardian,” and she failed to mention the defendant. During cross examination, plaintiff insisted that she only omitted reference to the defendant for fear that his financial circumstances would adversely impact N.’s chances for acceptance. However, no financial information was requested anywhere on the application. Moreover, plaintiff acknowledged that none was required until after an applicant was invited to attend.”

“By applying to XXX without defendant’s knowledge – - but with N. completely involved in the process, plaintiff orchestrated the decision to be made, as well as alienating the child. Had the defendant not consented to N.’s attendance at XXX, after the fact, N. would be angry with him for purportedly interfering with the enrollment, even if defendant’s objections to a private school placement were sound. In no event was he consulted as to this educational decision.”

“When asked how she might handle things differently now, plaintiff did not indicate that she would first discuss the possibility of a private school with the defendant, as she is obligated to do pursuant to the Stipulation.”

“In a similar pattern of being advised “after the fact,” defendant testified that there were countless times when plaintiff deliberately scheduled theater tickets, family events and social activities for the girls during his visitation, and he was compelled to consent or risk disappointing the girls. These occurrences continued even during the time span of proceedings before me.”

Mother claimed that children didn’t want to see father, specifically:

“Plaintiff was forced to concede at trial that the defendant was prevented from enjoying his visitation rights after he returned with the girls from his niece’s Bat Mitzvah until this Court granted defendant’s emergency application to compel the plaintiff to allow the defendant to take D. and N. for the ski trip he had scheduled for his half of the Christmas recess. Plaintiff insisted that it was D. and N. who refused to see their father, because they were angry with the ‘choices” he had made on their behalf, including his objection to N. attending XXX. Defendant was made aware of the children’s position because they parroted their mother’s demands on several occasions. D. even read from a script during the brief dinners he was permitted. As plaintiff wrote in one e-mail when she was describing her role with respect to the children: “I am in charge here, not them. What I [sic] say goes. They may bring their shoes. You are responsible for the rest. End of story.”"

“In vivid testimony, the defendant recalled how the plaintiff willfully prevented him from exercising his rights to visitation with the children from November 4, 2007 through December 21, 2007. I observed the plaintiff smirk in the courtroom as defendant emotionally related how he was deprived of spending Hanukkah with his children, and was relegated to lighting a menorah and watching his daughters open their grandparents’ presents in the back of his truck at the base of plaintiff’s driveway on a December evening.”

“The fact that the children were as angry as they were with the defendant in November and December, 2007, demonstrates, in my view, that efforts to alienate the children and their father were seemingly effective. The children demanded that defendant meet “their” demands before they would permit him to visit with them again. They demanded that defendant permit N. to attend F. A., that he withdraw his objection to their participation in therapy with their mother’s therapist, and that he pay for 75% of D.’s Bat Mitzvah but limit his invitations to a handful of guests and have no role in the planning of the event. Plaintiff’s contention that she had no involvement in these children’s “demands” was belied by the very fact that the children had intimate knowledge of their mother’s position on all of these issues. The children, in effect, were evolved into plaintiff’s sub-agents and negotiators, having specific details of the financial demands of the plaintiff, and information as to the marital agreement.”

“The mother alluded to the ambivalence of the children in seeing the defendant. But such abrogation to the children’s wishes, under these circumstances, was in violation of the agreement. It was wholly improper for the mother to adhere to the children’s wishes to forego visitation with their father (see, Matter of Hughes v. Wiegman, 150 AD2d 449).”

“Plaintiff half-heartedly testified that she wants the children to have a relationship with the defendant. Her view of the defendant’s role was a numbing, desired nominality, evident by her actions that were without any semblance of involvement by the defendant – - notwithstanding the clear joint custodial provisions. At critical points in the cross-examination, plaintiff was noticeably off balance – - hesitating and defensive – - with answers that dovetailed to either narcissism, or, a poor grasp of the affects of her conduct. The plaintiff was dispassionate, sullen, and passively resistant to the alienating efforts of the plaintiff. The continued litany of instances of alienating conduct, turned repression of the defendant’s joint custodial arrangement into farce. The endurance in recounting instance upon instance of alienating conduct herein, was as daunting as it was indefensible.”

Mother’s behavior toward father in front of the children included the following:

“Plaintiff relegated the defendant to waiting endlessly at the bottom of her long driveway. When defendant drove up her driveway on October 26, 2007, so that the children would not have to walk down with their heavy bags in a torrential rain, plaintiff ran down the driveway where she had left her car, drove up the driveway and blocked defendant’s vehicle. The children watched as the police listened to their mother angrily demand that their father be arrested and, when the police refused, heard their mother scream that she is a taxpayer and the police work for her. She frequently disparaged the defendant in the presence of the children, calling him a “deadbeat,” “loser,” “scumbag,” and “f——-g asshole.” On one particular occasion, while holding N. and D. in her arms, plaintiff said to the defendant, “We all hope you die from cancer.” Just this past summer, when defendant insisted that D. retrieve her clothes from plaintiff’s home in preparation for their visit to N. on her camp visiting day, plaintiff urged to defendant that “Judge Ross will not be around forever, d___.” Before the beginning of each of defendant’s vacations with the children, the plaintiff staged prolonged and tearful farewells at the base of the driveway, during which plaintiff assured the children that they will return to “their family soon,” and if “things get too bad, they can always tell Daddy to bring them home.”"

Mother accused father of sexual abuse:

“The crescendo of the plaintiff’s conduct involved accusations of sexual abuse. Plaintiff falsely accused defendant of sexual misconduct in June, 2008, shortly after defendant moved to Huntington and the children’s friends were enjoying play dates at defendant’s home. Plaintiff testified that D. shared that she was uncomfortable when the defendant tickles her, and conceded that she knew there was nothing “sexual” involved. Undaunted by the lack of any genuine concern for D.’s safety, plaintiff pursued a campaign to report the defendant to Child Protective Services. To facilitate this, she spoke with W. M, the psychologist at the school D. attended. Plaintiff also “encouraged” D. to advise Dr. C. (the chidren’s pediatrician) that defendant inappropriately touched her – - but he saw no signs of abuse. Plaintiff also advised Dr. A., Ms. M., Dr. R. (the children’s prior psychologist) and family friends of the allegations and, ultimately, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services opened a file on June 3, 2008, and began an investigation.”

“According to the Case Narrative contained in the New York State Case Registry, a complaint was made that “On a regular basis, father inappropriately fondles 13 year old D.’s breasts. This makes D. feel very uncomfortable. Last Sunday, Father hit D. on the breast for unknown reason… ” When the caseworker and Suffolk County detectives interviewed D. on June 3, 2008, she reported only that her father tickles her on her neck and under her arms, and she categorically denied her father ever fondled her breasts. She admitted that her father was not attempting to make her uncomfortable, but that he still regards her to be a tomboy. The detectives closed their investigation.”

“Thereafter, and significantly, when the CPS caseworker met with plaintiff on August 19, 2008, plaintiff was quick to state that her ex-husband “did it again.” Plaintiff claimed that the defendant hugged D. too hard. According to the caseworker’s notes, the caseworker repeatedly cautioned the plaintiff not to bring the children into her disputes with the defendant. This warning was contained in CPS records.”

“Although unfounded child abuse reports are required to be sealed (see, Social Services Law §422[5]), such reports may be introduced into evidence,”by the subject of the report where such subject… is a plaintiff or petitioner in a civil action or proceeding alleging the false reporting of child abuse or maltreatment” (Social Services Law §422[5][b][1]). Allegations that defendant had injured the child were found to be baseless and, by making such allegations, plaintiff needlessly subjected the child to an investigation by Child Protective Services, placing her own interests above those of the child. This report was not made in “good faith” – - rather, the investigating agency warned the mother not to re-utilize the allegations and her children in her custodial litigation with the defendant.”

Mother’s behavior was not affected by pending contempt proceeding:

“The concern of a pending contempt proceeding did not affect the plaintiff’s conduct. For example, knowing that defendant had parenting access with D. on July 3, 2009, plaintiff invited D.’s close friend, C. C., to a country club for a fireworks display and advised D. of this invitation. She then instructed D. to tell her father she was invited to a friend’s party on that date. Another example occurred on June 13, 2009, when plaintiff quietly escorted D. from Alice Tulley Hall during the intermission, ignoring the instructions from the G. Y. Orchestra staff that everyone remain until the conclusion of the entire program. Plaintiff purported she was unaware that defendant attended this special program in Lincoln Center. Defendant, who was in attendance at the concert, was left waiting at the stage door with flowers for D. Plaintiff ignored his text messages questioning where his daughter was. The plaintiff, when confronted with the notion that she may have precipitously ushered her daughter away before her father was able to give her flowers, retorted to the Court that “it was not her responsibility to make plans for T.”"

In view of the mother’s behavior described above, the court held:

“The evidence before me demonstrates a pattern of willful and calculated violations of the clear and express dictates of the parties’ Stipulation of Settlement, incorporated but not merged into their Judgment of Divorce. The extensive record is replete with instances of attempts to undermine the relationship between the children and their father and replace him with her new husband, manipulation of defendant’s parenting access, utter and unfettered vilification of the defendant to the children, false reporting of sexual misconduct without any semblance of “good faith,” and her imposition upon the children to fear her tirades and punishment if they embrace the relationship they want to have with their father. The unfortunate history here also reflects the plaintiff’s hiring and firing of three different counsel, expressed disdain towards the children’s attorney, and utter disregard for the authority of the Court.”

With respect to parental alienation, the court stated:

“Differing “alienation” theories promoted by many public advocacy groups, as well as psychological and legal communities, have differing scientific and empirical foundations. However, interference with the non-custodial parent’s relationship with a child has always been considered in the context of a “parent’s ability to encourage the relationship between the non-custodial parent and a child,” a factor to be considered by the Court in custody and visitation/parental access determinations. See, Eschbach v. Eschbach, supra. Our Appellate Courts recognize such factor, as they have determined that the “interference with the non-custodial parent and child’s relationship is an act so inconsistent with the best interests of a child, as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent.”

“Where, as in the instant case, there is a finding of a willful violation of a court order demonstrated by a deliberate interference with a non-custodial parent’s right to visitation/parental access, the IAS Court, as a general rule, must schedule an evidentiary hearing before making any modification of custody.”

Judge Ross found Lauren R. in civil contempt of court and ordered her to spend every other weekend in the Nassau County Correctional Facility during June, July and August.

Judge Ross acknowleged that “An imposition of sentence upon a finding of contempt should contain a language permitting the contemnor an opportunity to purge.” However, in this case, a jail sentence was the only option available because it is no longer within the power of the plaintiff (mother) to purge since the violation was of a past court order. Furthermore, remedial intervention through counseling and parental training during the course of the trial was unsuccesful and if re-utilized, the “Court cannot release from imprisonment upon future compliance.”

The matter of approximately $165,000 in attorney fees will be the subject of another hearing.

What can we learn from this case? We can learn that it took years of inappropriate conduct, $165,000 in attorneys fees, and unquantifiable amount of damage to the relationship between the father and his daughter, before the court would punish this type of behavior. In view of the mother’s conduct, 6 weeks of weekends in jail seems inadequate. I do not know whether the court will change the residence of the children, however, it is clear that the joint custodial arrangement did not work in this situation. My guess would be that the court would likely to change custody to sole custody and grant the residence of the children to the father. The court is also likely to impose tight restrictions on the mother’s access to the children and her conduct toward the children and the father.