Archive for the ‘drafting’ Category

Bankruptcy and Divorce

Sunday, November 30th, 2008

When your ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, all efforts to collect any debts have to stop unless they fit within one of the exceptions in the bankruptcy statute. This is known as the “automatic stay.” One exception to the automatic stay is the one that allows the commencement or continuation of a proceeding to establish or modify a support award or collect support from property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(2).

Current support debts survive a bankruptcy without the need for you to have to go to bankruptcy court. Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, among the changes in creditor priority is that unpaid child support and alimony has priority over any other creditor, including taxes owed. If you are owed back support it is very important that you file a “proof of claim” with the bankruptcy court to receive payment.

The bankruptcy law requires the trustee in bankruptcy, if there is a claim for a domestic support obligation in a case, to provide written notice to the party to whom the domestic support obligation is owed, and to the state’s Child Support Enforcement Agency. A notice at the time of filing and a second notice at the time of discharge are required. In the notice to the creditor, the trustee must provide contact information for your state’s Child Support Enforcement Agency.

The new bankruptcy law made non-support obligations from a divorce or separation non-dischargeable in a chapter 7 bankruptcy, if the discharge of the obligation would harm the spouse to whom the obligation is owed more than it would harm the person who owes it, your ex-spouse. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(15). A debt that is non-dischargeable means that your ex-spouse is still responsible for it. You would need to file a complaint in bankruptcy court to get the property settlement debt excepted from discharge. If you don’t file a claim with the bankruptcy court, the debt may be wiped out and you won’t be able to collect it later.

The discharge in a chapter 13 case is somewhat broader than in a chapter 7 case. Debts dischargeable in a chapter 13, but not in chapter 7, include debts arising from property settlements in divorce or separation proceedings.

How do bankruptcy courts decide what’s a support obligation and what’s a property settlement? The courts have based their decisions on such questions as:

Does the obligation terminate or reduce with the occurrence of certain events, like remarriage or a child turning 18?
Is the obligation in installments or a lump sum?
Are there minor children?
What is the relative health and education of the parties?
Was there a need for support at the time of the divorce?

The way in which the judgment of divorce is drafted can reduce the chance that the bankruptcy court will discharge the debt. The likelihood that the debt will not be discharged by labeling the debt payments as either support or alimony in the decree.

If you’re listed as a creditor on your ex-spouse’s bankruptcy petition, you should receive notice from the bankruptcy court of the filing and information about the date and time of the first meeting of creditors (known as a “341 meeting”). You should also receive information on the deadline for filing a claim and a proof of claim form for filling out.

“Cohabitation” and Interpretation of Separation Agreement’s Provisions Applicable to Maintenance

Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008

A typical separation agreement that provides for post-divorce maintenance will have a number of provisions describing circumstances under which such maintenance can be terminated. One of the more common clauses speaks of the spousal maintenance being terminated where the former spouse is cohabitating with another adult of opposite sex for a period of time. Most separation agreements do not define cohabitation, but the courts have held that in order for cohabitation to take place, there must be a sexual relationship, as well as a degree of economic partnership between the former spouse and the unrelated adult of the opposite sex. In Graev v. Graev, __ N.Y.3d __ (October 21, 2008) the Court of Appeals had to decide whether the term “cohabitation” as included in the parties’ separation agreement was unambiguous, and whether the prior standard utilized by the courts was still valid. In a 4-3 opinion, a divided Court of Appeals ruled yesterday that “cohabitation” is an ambiguous term whose definition for purposes of potential violations of separation and divorce agreements depends on what the parties understood it to mean when making their settlements. While all of the judges agreed that a couple need not share household expenses or function as a single economic unit to be cohabitating, the Court was divided over how to resolve the dispute between Linda and Lawrence Graev and the $11,000 in monthly maintenance fees he contends she forfeited by living with a boyfriend for at least 60 straight days in violation of their separation agreement. Since the Court of Appeals held that the term “cohabitation” as contained in the parties’ separation agreement was ambiguous, it remanded the case back to the trial court to hold a fact-finding hearing to determine what the parties’ understanding of this term was at the time the separation agreement was executed. As the Court of Appeals pointed in the footnote, “[t]he wisest rule, of course, is for parties in the future to make their intentions clear by careful drafting.”

Child Support In Shared Custody Situations

Monday, October 20th, 2008

Child support under Domestic Relations Law §240 or Family Court Act §413 is not difficult to calculate in situations where there is a parent who clearly has a primary physical residence of the child. However, where the child spends equal time with both parents, these issues become a lot more complicated. Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b](f) requires that “The court shall calculate the basic child support obligation, and the non-custodial parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation”. Therefore, which parent becomes the non-custodial parent in shared custody situation? This question was addressed in the 1998 case of Baraby v. Baraby, 250 A.D.2d 201 (3rd Dept. 1998).

In Baraby, the Appellate Division held that:

where, as here, the parents’ custodial arrangement splits the children’s physical custody so that neither can be said to have physical custody of the children for a majority of the time, the parent having the greater pro rata share of the child support obligation, determined after application of the three-step statutory formula of the CSSA, should be identified as the “noncustodial” parent for the purpose of support.

Since the statute is silent as to joint custody arrangements, the court ruled that for purposes of complying with the statute, one parent must be deemed “custodial” and the other “non custodial.” This step must be taken before a deviation from the support guidelines could be made under Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b](f) and (g). The parent with higher income is declared to be the non-custodial parent for child support calculations. This result problematic in situations where the parents’ incomes are close to each other.

For parents who are contemplating true shared custody, the issues of child support must be carefully addressed in the separation agreement to provide language explaining the contemplated child support arrangement and the reasons the parents are entering into such arrangement. Baraby does not stand for the proposition that the parent with the higher income must pay full child support. The parents are still free to opt out of the Child Support Standards Act, provided that at least minimum statutory child support is being paid, and the reasons for the opt-out are clearly stated.

If the court is deciding these issues in the contest of child support modification, then the party with the higher income should present information allowing the court to make a deviation from the child support guidelines pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §240[1-b](f) and (g).

Temporary Maintenance and Prenuptial Agreements

Thursday, August 28th, 2008

While a pre-nuptial agreement might restrict or waive a spouse’s right to maintenance and equitable distribution, it may not bar temporary relief, including temporary maintenance, interim counsel fees, and a temporary injunction against the disposing of marital property. Solomon v. Solomon, 224 A.D.2d 331 (1st Dept. 1996). In cases where the parties’ pre-nuptial agreement specifically provides that no maintenance will be awarded pendent lite, however, courts have held that no temporary maintenance should be awarded. See, e.g., Arzin v. Covello, 175 Misc.2d 453 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1998).

In Forsberg v. Forsberg, 219 A.D.2d 615 (2d Dept. 1995), the Second Department upheld the validity of the parties’ pre-nuptial agreement. Nevertheless, the appellate court found that Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding the wife $200.00 per week in temporary maintenance. The Second Department noted that, “Generally, the remedy for any seeming inequity in the award of temporary maintenance is a speedy trial at which the rights of the parties may be fully determined.” Id. at 617.

Thus, any pre-nuptial agreements must be carefully drafted to specifically prohibit any claims for temporary maintenance.