Family Court Referees and Their Authority to Hear Cases

September 18th, 2011

Most of the cases in Family Court are decided by Family Court Judges who preside over most Family Court hearings. The Family Court Judges, here in Monroe County and elsewhere in New York State, typically hear child custody, visitation, adoption, juvenile delinquency and other cases. However, here in Monroe County, Court Attorney Referees hear custody, visitation, and order of protection cases. Family Court Attorney Referees are appointed pursuant to the Family Court Act and CPLR.

One of the first things that takes place in a case before a Family Court Attorney Referee is that the parties and their attorneys will be asked if they will agree to the Referee’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. If the parties agree, the Referee will asked them to sign a stipulation confirming their consent. If the parties do not consent, the case is usually removed and heard by the Family Court Judge.

It is critical for the Referee to make sure that the parties consent to his jurisdiction to hear the case. A recent case, Gale v. Gale, 2011 NY Slip Op 06490 (2nd Dept. 2011), demonstrates what happens if the referee fails to obtain that consent. In Gale, the mother filed a petition seeking to modify provisions of the parties’ judgment of divorce. The case was assigned to a Family Court Attorney Referee who heard the case and ultimately modified custody provisions of the judgment of divorce, granting the petitioner sole custody of the children. The father appealed, arguing that the referee lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since the referee had failed to have the parties sign the stipulation or otherwise establish that the parties consented to her jurisidiction. The Appellate Division agreed with the father and reversed.  Specifically, the Appellate Division stated that

Upon review of the record, we find that the parties did not stipulate to a reference in the manner prescribed by CPLR 2104. In any event, there is no indication that there was an order of reference designating the referee who heard and determined the petitions at issue here. Contrary to the mother’s contention, the father did not implicitly consent to the reference merely by participating in the proceeding without expressing his desire to have the matter tried before a judge. Furthermore, a stipulation consenting to a reference to a specified referee, executed by the parties in connection with the father’s previous petition to modify the visitation schedule, expired upon completion of that matter and did not remain in effect for this matter.

Accordingly, the referee had no jurisdiction to consider the father’s petitions related to custody and visitation and the mother’s petition to modify custody, and the referee’s order determining those petitions must be reversed. (citations omitted)

While the parties cannot choose the person who will decide their case, they do not have to agree to the Family Court Attorney Referee to hear and decide it. Sometimes there are reasons to have the case heard by a Family Court Judge, and the parties should consider not agreeing to the referee’s jurisdiction under appropriate circumstances.

Interference with Visitation May Result in Change in Custody

September 4th, 2011

In Keefe v. Adams, 85 A.D.3d 1225 (3d Dept. 2011), the Appellate Division, Third Department, had to address issues related to interference with visitation which were raised by the father who brought a petition to modify existing  custodial and residential arrangement.  The parties had a custody and residential arrangement on the basis of May 2007 consent order which provided for joint custody, with mother having primary physical custody and father having visitation. In August 2009, father sought a modification of custody, alleging that mother moved out of county without his consent and is consistently late in exchanging child at drop-off location.

The court held that a significant change in circumstances occurred which reflected real need to modify parties’ stipulated custody order. The court found that mother admitted to moving with child to different county, 42 miles away from father, without informing him, and parties’ relationship deteriorated to point of inability to discuss important matters concerning their child. Further, mother also consistently arrived between 15 minutes to 2 hours late in dropping child off or picking child up. Mother interfered with father’s visitation rights by arriving late for dropping off and picking up child. The court also held that evidence showed as well that mother promoted her boyfriend as substitute for child’s father and that her relocation both required the child to change schools and hindered the father’s involvement in the child’s life. The father, on the other hand, manifests a markedly greater ability to control his behavior in front of the child, as well as a willingness to foster the relationship between the mother and child. The court noted that while custody with the father will unfortunately separate the child from his half brother, with whom he has a close relationship, the father testified that the half brother would be welcome in his home.

In view of the above circumstances, the court held that an award of sole custody to father with visitation to mother in child’s best interests. The court’s decision to modify existing custodial arrangement is not a common one. In most cases, courts are likely to fashion a less drastic remedy.

Step-Parent Adoption and Consent of Biological Father

August 6th, 2011

Step-parent adoptions are generally simple if the biological parent provides his/her consent to the adoption. However, such consent may not be obtainable in every situation. Under some circumstances, consent of the biological parent will not be required by the court. Generally, for adoption purposes, the court qualifies biological parents into two categories: consent parent and notice parent.

If a parent is deemed to be a consent parent, that parent’s consent is required in order for the adoption to proceed. If a parent is deemed to be a notice parent, that parent receives a notice of adoption but his/her consent is not required.

The consent of a parent to the adoption of his child will not be required if the parent has abandoned the child. The child will be deemed abandoned if the parent evinced an intent to forego his parental or custodial rights and obligations by failing for a period of six months prior to the filing of an adoption petition to visit the child and communicate with the child or person having legal custody of the child although able to do so”. Domestic Relations Law §111(2)(a). The courts presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ability to visit and communicate with a child or person having custody of a child. DRL § 111(6)(a).

DRL §111(6)(b) states that, “evidence of insubstantial or infrequent visits or communication by the Father shall not, of itself, be sufficient as a matter of law to prevent a finding that the consent of the Father to the child’s adoption shall not be required”. Insignificant expressions of parental interest will not by themselves prevent a finding of abandonment.

Further, DRL § 111(6)(c) states that, “the subjective intent of the Father whether expressed or otherwise unsupported by evidence of acts specified in DRL § 111(2)(a) manifesting such intent, shall not prevent a determination that the consent of the Father to the child’s adoption shall not be required”.

In Matter of Ethan, 32 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Monroe Co. Fam. Ct. 2009), the birth father opposed proposed step-parent adoption and argued that his consent was necessary. Judge Joseph G. Nesser held a hearing and determined that the biological father has abandoned the child for a period of six months or longer, preceding the filing of the adoption petition.

Specifically, the court found that Father had not seen the child in well over one year before the adoption petition was filed nor did he speak to the child within that six month period. It was also uncontroverted that there were no cards, gifts, financial assistance or child support forwarded by father to mother for the child at least six months prior to the adoption petition being filed. Father’s letters postmarked May 13, 2008 and June 20, 2008 were forwarded to mother concerning the child. The court found that this was the only contact in over one year prior to the adoption petition being filed. Further, father knew members both in his family and in mother’s family to contact, but never had them contact mother to communicate with the child within six months prior to the filing of adoption petition.

The court also found that father was able to contact mother, knew her address; her telephone number; and her mother’s address and telephone number which were published but failed to contact her within six months prior to filing the adoption petition.

Just as important was the court’s finding that the father, for more than one year prior to the filing of the adoption petition, never provided any child support to Mother or any type of financial assistance whatsoever. Mother’s last child support payment was received on November 7, 2005, and the last financial assistance she received from father was in February of 2006.

Based on the above facts, the court determined that father evidenced an intent to forego his parental rights and obligations that was manifested by his failure for a period of six months to visit the child and communicate with the child or with mother, although able to do so, and of his failure to provide fair and reasonable child support according to his means for the child. Thus, the court dispensed with the father’s consent and allowed step-parent adoption to proceed.

Can a Parent Travel with Young Child Abroad Over Custodial Parent’s Objections?

July 26th, 2011

One issue that may come up in custody cases is whether a nonresidential parent has ability to take a child abroad during his or her period of visitation. It is not uncommon for a residential parent to object to such request, and sometimes parties wind up in court seeking a determination whether such travel can be permitted.

In a recent case, Russo v. Carmel, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 05889 (4th Dept. 2011), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, permitted the father to travel to Italy with his two year old child for a period of not more than 15 days on 60 days’ notice to the mother. The mother opposed the request, arguing that the child was never away from the mother for longer than 48 hours, that the father’s visitation was limited to 48 hour periods and that the child would be in an unfamiliar environment with relatives who were unknown to the child.  The court held that the record established that, although the father’s visitation with the child was limited, the father has a close bond with her and, during visitation, he prepared her meals, bathed her, administered medication as necessary and took her on outings. Further, the mother did not express any concerns that the father would abscond with the child. The court concluded that it is in the best interests of the child to travel with the father to Italy to meet her extended family.

While in most cases the court is unlikely to allow a parent to travel abroad with a very young child, in this case, the father was able to present convincing evidence that the trip was intended to introduce the child to her relatives abroad. Further, the mother was unable to present any evidence of the father’s inability to take care of the child and was not afraid that the father would refuse to come back to the United States. In view of these facts, the trial court’s decision and the Appellate Division’s decision were clearly correct.  While the residential parent may have a significant measure of control over non-residential parent’s ability to travel with the child, the residential parent should not raise objections unless there is specific evidence that such travel would be inappropriate and not in the best interests of the child.

Same Sex Marriage Bill Passes in New York

July 4th, 2011

On June 24, 2011, New York Senate voted, 33-29, to give final approval to a bill, A-08354, that recognizes same sex marriage in New York. Govenor Andrew M. Cuomo immediately signed the bill which will become effective in 30 days.

The bill, codified as the Marriage Equality Act amends the Domestic Relations Law to provide:

• A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex

• No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being the same sex or a different sex

• All relevant gender-specific language set forth in or referenced by New York law shall be construed in a gender-neutral manner

• No application for a marriage license shall be denied on · the ground that the parties are of the same or a different sex

Under the bill, the rights under same-sex marriage will include:

• Employer-sponsored health insurance.

• Equitable property distribution, maintenance, custody and visitation if the couple divorces.

• A presumption that a child in a dissolved marriage is the child of both parents.

• Statutory inheritance rights.

• The right to bring a claim for the wrongful death of a spouse.

• The right to seek Workers’ Compensation death benefits.

• The spousal privilege in legal proceedings.

Can a Child Bring Petition Seeking Modification of Custody?

June 18th, 2011

While the vast majority of cases petitions seeking to modify custody are brought by parents, can any one else bring a petition seeking to modify custody? I have written previously about petitions brought by non-parents, such as grandparents or someone who has a relationship with a child. A recent decision brought forth yet another party who can bring a petition seeking to modify custody – a child himself. In a recent decision, Trosset v. Susan A., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21151 (Fam Ct. Otsego Co. 2011), the court held that a child had standing to bring a petition seeking modification of present custodial arrangement. In Trossett, the child’s attorney filed a petition to modify prior court order. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition arguing that child’s attorney lacks standing to file petition concerning custody on behalf of child. The court held that  ”[w]hile absence of specific authority regarding custody and visitation is problematic, absence of statute granting child standing, such standing depends upon whether party has alleged facts showing disadvantage to himself or herself.” (citations omitted).  According to the decision, the attorney for child made allegations that directly relate to child’s desire to live with father. The court opined that the child has stake in outcome sufficient to confer standing upon him to file petition, or by child’s attorney on child’s behalf.

The decision does not provide much in a way of facts or legal authority for the court’s decision, however, I would guess that the child was older and, therefore, would have an opportunity to have input on any custody decisions. In addition, I would think that the parties were involved in court proceedings previously since the child had an attorney representing him.

Since the decision dealt with procedural issues related arising out of petition being filed by attorney for the child, we may never know how the case was resolved. However, I suspect that this issue may be appealed in the future and we may learn of further developments in the case.

Statute of Limitations and QDROs

June 11th, 2011

One of the questions that I was asked several times during the last year was whether there is a statute of limitations applicable to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs)? This question usually come up in situations where one former spouse was entitled to a portion of the other former spouse’s retirement benefits, however, the QDRO was never done, and a substantial period of time has passed. If there was an applicable statute of limitations, the former spouse who has failed to act would lose his or her right to collect a portion of the former spouse’s retirement.

However, a couple of recent decisions made it clear that with respect to QDROs, there is no applicable statute of limitations and a QDRO can be submitted to the court at any time. In Denaro v. Denaro, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 04409 (2nd Dept 2011), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that “the statute of limitations does not bar issuance of the QDRO.”  Relying on Bayen v Bayen, 81 A.D.3d 865 (2nd Dept. 2011), the court held that ”[M]otions to enforce the terms of a stipulation of settlement are not subject to statutes of limitation… [B]ecause a QDRO is derived from the bargain struck by the parties at the time of the judgment of divorce, there is no need to commence a separate action in order for the court to formalize the agreement between the parties in the form of a QDRO”. Id. (citations omitted.)

While I would not recommend to anyone delaying preparing and submitting a QDRO, any such submission is not going to be barred by a statute of limitations. At the same time, any late submission is likely to cause another set of problems if the retirement asset is in pay status  and payments are being made to the other spouse.

Tax Implications in Divorce – Need for Trial Evidence

June 5th, 2011

One of the issues that frequently comes up in divorce is cases has to do with tax implications of the divorce action.  Tax issues may involve dependency exemptions, or may involve issues dealing with allocation of taxes on income or assets subject to equitable distribution.  The courts have addressed these issues in the past and have always required some admissible proof with respect to tax implications of the relief sought in the divorce action. However, some parties still fail to present admissible trial evidence that would allow the court to make decisions allocating tax liabilities, if any.

In Bayer v. Bayer, 80 A.D.3d 492 (1st Dept. 2011), the Appellate Division had to address whether the trial court properly disregarded the tax consequences impacting plaintiff’s receipt of fifty percent of monies which defendant had earned in the fiscal quarter preceding commencement of the divorce action.  The Appellate Division held that since defendant failed to present evidence from which the court could determine the amount of such taxes, the trial court acted properly.  The Appellate Division relied upon D’Amico v. D’Amico, 66 A.D.3d 951 (2nd Dept. 2009).  In D’Amico, the court held that “[W]hile this court has recognized that the value of a pension should be discounted by the amount of income tax required to be paid by a party, where the party seeking the discount fails to present any evidence from which the court could have determined the dollar amount of the tax consequences, the computation of the award without regard to tax consequences will be deemed proper”. (citations omitted)

Therefore, if there are tax issues associated with dependency exemptions, maintenance, retirement assets or equitable distribution, in order to have trial court consider those issues , a party must present admissible evidence of any tax consequences that may result. If a party fails to do so, the trial court will not consider any tax implications. As a result, a party seeking the court’s decision with respect to tax issues will have to present expert testimony of an accountant who would be able to present admissible evidence of any tax implications.

Downward Modification of Child Support, Scope of Job Search and Custody Issues

May 8th, 2011

I have previously written about downward modification of child support in a situation where the payor has lost his job or experienced a significant reduction in his income. Recently, I was personally involved in a case which also involved custody issues that directly impacted payor’s job search and were raised as a defense to an argument that the job search was insufficient. While I almost never write about cases while they are still pending, in this case, an article about the decision was published in the paper serving Rochester legal community, and I think that it is interesting one, because of the interplay between the child’s need for support and parent’s wish not to search for a job outside of his present community.

In Szalapski v. Schwartz n/k/a Szalapski, Justice Richard A. Dollinger had to decide whether an unemployed parent with support obligations must clearly make a diligent job search limited to the Rochester area, or expand it beyond Rochester. Mr. Szalapski, who lost his employment earning six-figure income a number of months ago, brought a downward modification obligation claiming that despite his diligent job search, he was unable to find a comparable job and his income for child support purposes should be reduced to $15,000 per year. Mr. Szalapski has a number of advanced science and engineering degrees, and has held both teaching and industry positions. When Ms. Schwartz raised an argument that Mr. Szalapski was obligated to search for a job outside of Rochester area, Mr. Szalapski claimed that because of the parties’ custodial and visitation arrangements, and his involvement in one of his children’s life, he did not have to search for employment beyond 60 mile radius from his present residence. As result, the court had to address the apparent tension between the children’s need for support and the parent’s wish to maintain existing relationship with his child. Mr. Szalapski argued that if he is forced to accept a job some distance away from Rochester, his relationship with his son would be negatively impacted.

The court ruled that a potentially high earning plaintiff such as Mr. Szalapski, who is seeking modification, should be required to examine the prospects of employment in another area before the court substantially reduces his child support obligation. “New York law is strangely silent on this issue and, based on this court’s research, the question of the ‘radius of a reasonable job search’ has been seldom analyzed in the Empire State,” Justice Richard A. Dollinger wrote in the decision. “In essence, the husband [plaintiff] must prove that the benefit of the increased support, occasioned by finding a job in a new location, would be outweighed by the deleterious impact on his relationship with his son and that no alteration in the visitation schedule could accommodate his visitation with his son.” The court suggested that a high paying job (in excess of $100,000) in a nearby city such as New York, Boston, Cleveland or Washington, D.C., may be able to accommodate a visitation schedule that requires a short airplane flight.

“The paramount importance of maintaining the child’s standard of living is what drives the need for a diligent job search when an obligated parent loses their employment,” Justice Dollinger wrote. “In this court’s view then, the scope of the job search should extend beyond the convenience of either parent, and reach to a point where the benefit of employment in a new more distant location outweighs the consequence s of distance on the relationship between the parent and child” the justice continued. The court noted that the burden of  establishing whether the job search was adequate rests with the plaintiff seeking modification to prove “diligent search for employment” and ordered a hearing on the adequacy of his job search.

I think that this is an interesting decision and that Justice Dollinger did an excellent job addressing both sides of this factual scenario. As far as hearing, it is still in the future.

Contempt and Enforcement of Court Orders

April 20th, 2011

One remedy to a failure of one party to abide by existing court orders that is available to the parties in divorce and other family law actions is contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt arises out of the inherent power of the court, which is limited by §753(A)(3) of the Judiciary Law. It provides, in part:

753. Power of courts to punish for civil contempts
A. A court of record has power to punish, by fine and imprisonment, or either, a neglect or violation of duty, or other misconduct, by which a right or remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the court may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced, in any of the following cases:
3. A party to the action or special proceeding, an attorney, counsellor, or other person, for the nonpayment of a sum of money, ordered or adjudged by the court to be paid, in a case where by law execution can not be awarded for the collection of such sum except as otherwise specifically provided by the civil practice law and rules; or for any other disobedience to a lawful mandate of the court.
8. In any other case, where an attachment or any other proceeding to punish for a contempt, has been usually adopted and practiced in a court of record, to enforce a civil remedy of a party to an action or special proceeding in that court, or to protect the right of a party.

The power of contempt is exists to punish the party who engages in an evasion or a violation of duty, or misconduct, which resulted in defeating or prejudicing the other party’s rights. There are a number of procedural requirements that have to be strictly followed in order for the court to find a party in contempt. A motion to punish for contempt will be dismissed unless on its face it contains both a notice that the purpose of the hearing is to punish for contempt and that such punishment may consist of a fine or imprisonment. Without this notice and warning, the court is without jurisdiction to punish for contempt.

The party must also be advised by the court of the right to counsel and assigned an attorney if financially unable to obtain counsel. In addition, DRL §245 requires a finding that payment cannot be enforced pursuant to DRL §243 or §244 or CPLR §5241 and §5242 and the exhaustion of these remedies or a finding that they would be ineffectual as a prerequisite to a contempt for disobeying an order requiring payment of money in a matrimonial action.  The court must find that the violation was willful and find expressly that the actions of the defaulting spouse were calculated to or actually did defeat, impair or impede or prejudice the other spouses rights or remedies. Nonpayment alone does not establish the requisite willfulness to support contempt. DRL §246(3) provides that financial inability to pay is a defense to a contempt proceeding under DRL §245. A person who asserts in an opposing affidavit financial inability to comply with the order is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he or she has an ability to pay.

The punishment for contempt for failure to make ordered payments is imprisonment until payment is made. The defaulting spouse may pay the money due and be released. If the court finds that the party committed the offense charged and that it was calculated to or actually did defeat, impair, impede or prejudice the rights or remedies of the other spouse, the court must make a final order directing fine, imprisonment or both, as it finds necessary.

Civil Rights Law §72 limits the length of imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony, maintenance, distributive award, special relief in a matrimonial action and counsel fees in a divorce case to three months for a default of less than $500, and to six months for $500 or more. Noticeably absent is any mention of child support. If a party has an actual loss or injury because of the proven other spouse’s misconduct, a fine must be imposed sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party and when collected, paid to the aggrieved party.

In contrast to the DRL, the Family Court Act (FCA) takes a tougher approach by providing for commitment as one of the remedies for nonpayment of support. Section 454(2) provides that where a respondent is brought before the court for failure to obey any “lawful order” of the Family Court for support and following a hearing the court is satisfied that the respondent has failed to obey the order, it may enter a money judgment, make an income deduction order, require an undertaking, make a sequestration order or suspend the respondent’s driving, professional or business license.

Here is an example of how a contempt application will be viewed by the court. In a recent case, H.S.M. v J.T.M., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50069(U) (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2011), the court was asked to hold defendant in contempt of Court for his willful failure to comply with the Judgment of Divorce entered in this action , and for his willful refusal to pay the sum of $43,351.87, together with interest. The parties’ marriage was dissolved pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce, entered June 24, 2008, which incorporated but did not merge with a Stipulation of Settlement, dated December 19, 2007. The Stipulation stated in pertinent part that:

The Husband shall pay to the Wife, as and for child support, the sum of One Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-five ($1,785.00) Dollars per month … The parties agree that the child support payments will be made through the Nassau County Support Collection Unit. [Article XXVI]

Pursuant to the Order of the Hon. Denise L. Sher, J.S.C., dated October 4, 2006, the Court ordered pendente lite relief awarding to the Wife the sum of One Thousand Four Hundred ($1,400.00) Dollars per month temporary maintenance, as well as child support in the sum of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars per month. The award was retroactive to the date of service, which was July 18, 2006. [Article XXVII]

The Husband agrees that arrears for child support and maintenance as of the date of execution of this Agreement amount to Thirty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred ($38,200.00) Dollars, and agrees to the entry of judgment for said arrears. Said arrears shall be liquidated by the Husband paying to the Wife the sum of Three Hundred ($300.00) Dollars per month until all arrears are paid. The Father further agrees that in order to liquidate arrears, the Father shall remit to the Mother his income tax return refunds that he receives commencing with the tax year 2007 and shall pay over to the Mother the entire refund by June 1, 2008, and by June 1st every year thereafter until such time as his arrears have been liquidated. [Article XXII]

The Husband shall pay to the Wife, as and for spousal maintenance, the sum of Four Hundred ($400.00) Dollars per month…through support collection. [Article XXXVI]

Pursuant to the “So-Ordered” Stipulation of the parties dated May 19, 2010, “Def[endant] agrees to pay to Pl[aintiff] as and for child support arrears the minimum sum of $1,000.00 (One Thousand and no/100) by May 26, 2010.

Wife claimed that Husband has willfully failed to i) comply with the Judgment of Divorce dated August 6, 2008, which incorporates the Stipulation; ii) comply and pay the money judgment entered on February 3, 2010, in the sum of $49,746.27; and iii) comply with the “So-Ordered” Stipulation entered into by the parties on May 19, 2010. Wife claimed that subsequent to the entry of the money judgment, she contacted the Nassau County Office of Child Support Enforcement to seek payment of the child support obligation for the parties’ three children, as well as maintenance for herself. She claimed that notwithstanding the attempts of the Child Support Enforcement Bureau, no payments have been received from the defendant or his employer. She further alleged that the total sum now due and owing is $87,864.01, and that none of it has been paid.

In February of 2010, husband testified that he has no assets nor property which could be sequestered. In support of her application, wife claimed that nothing less than a fine and incarceration will persuade the husband to comply with the Court orders and judgments. She argued that other enforcement devices, including income deduction orders, income executions or sequestration will be unsuccessful in view of husband having made himself judgment proof; moving out of the State of New York; and failing to comply with any judgment or stipulation entered into by the parties.

Wife claimed that she is attending graduate school but that in the interim, she is completely dependent on her family for her support and the support of the parties’ three children. She claimed that the last time she received any funds from husband was in March of 2010, and that since that time she has received no support payments or maintenance. She argued that based upon those facts, husband’s intentional non-compliance with the judgment, orders and “So-Ordered” Stipulation has defeated, impaired and prejudiced her rights.

The court stated that a contempt citation is a drastic remedy which should not be granted absent a clear right to such relief.  Further, to prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party charged with contempt willfully violated a clear and unequivocal mandate of a court’s order, with knowledge of that order’s terms, thereby prejudicing the movant’s rights.  The court further held that pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §245, before a defaulting party can be held in contempt for the non-payment of a sum of money, it must appear “presumptively, to the satisfaction of the Court,” that the movant exhausted the less drastic enforcement remedies available under Domestic Relations Law §§ 243, 244 and 245, CPLR §§ 5241 and 5242, or such other enforcement mechanisms that would be ineffectual.  Once the movant has made a prima facie showing that the party against whom a contempt citation is sought has failed to pay a sum of money as ordered, the burden then shifts to the obligor to adduce some competent, credible evidence of his inability to make the required payments, in order to show that the failure to pay was not willful. The court determined that wife has satisfactorily demonstrated the existence of a clear and unequivocal mandate of the court, and that husband has knowingly violated the order’s terms, thereby prejudicing her rights. The court also found that other methods of enforcement would prove ineffective in light of husband having made himself judgment proof. The court, however, determined that it must conduct a hearing to determine husband’s willfulness in violating the subject orders. In order for a non-compliant party be incarcerated for his willful violation of the court’s mandates, the movant must prove such willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The above decision illustrates that while contempt is a remedy, it may require a substantial motion practice and, most likely, a hearing.  Thus, contempt motions should not be brought unless all other remedies were exhausted.