Posts Tagged ‘Child Support Standards Act’
Sunday, September 27th, 2009
New York’s child support statute has been long criticized for its its $80,000.00 cap on the basic economic child support. The critics have argued that since the statute was enacted approximately 20 years ago, the basic economic child support cap figure was too low. New York Legislature apparently heard those concerns. Laws of 2009, Chapter 343 enacted the “child support modernization act” which amended the provisions of the Child Support Standards Act to raise the cap on combined parental income to $130,000.00, effective January 31, 2010, and to provide for the adjustment of the $130,000.00 cap every two years to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. The child support percentages of payments that non-custodial parents are obligated to make toward child support were not modified by the amendments. Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b) (2) and Family Court Act §413 (1) (c) (2) were each amended to provide that the court shall multiply the combined parental income up to the amount set forth in Social Services Law §111-i, (2) (b). Social Services Law §111-i (2)(b) provides that the combined parental income amount to be reported in the child support standards chart and utilized in calculating orders of child support in accordance with Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b) (2) and Family Court Act §413 (1) (c) (2) shall be one hundred thirty thousand dollars; and that beginning January 31, 2012 and every two years thereafter, the combined parental income amount shall increase by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. These amendments take effect on January 31, 2010.
While I view the changes as necessary to keep up with economic changes, once the two year recalculation provision takes effect, it is going to make more difficult for family law lawyers to calculate the appropriate child support figures.
Tags: amendment, attorney, child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, county, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Court Act, Family Law, lawyer, Livingston, Monroe, new york, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, Supreme Court, Wayne
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, procedure, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Sunday, July 12th, 2009
I frequently see child support petitions in Family Court seeking to modify child support provisions of either judgments of divorce, or stipulations or settlement agreements incorporated in the judgments of divorce. Sometimes these petitions argue that the child support provisions of the judgment of divorce, stipulation or settlement agreement are invalid as violating the Child Support Standards Act. Unfortunately, if brought in the Family Court, these petitions suffer from certain jurisdictional defects as demonstrated in Savini v. Burgaleta, 34 A.D. 686 (2nd Dept. 2006).
In Savini, in 1996, the father entered into a stipulation with the mother which provided that the father would “pay to the [mother] as and for child support 29 percent of his gross salary as defined under the Child Support Standards Act on a weekly basis calculated on actual income.” That stipulation was later incorporated but did not merge into a judgment of divorce.
In a 1997 handwritten agreement, which was neither incorporated nor merged into the divorce judgment, the mother allegedly agreed, inter alia, to accept the sum of $200 per week from the father as child support and not to commence any proceeding to recover the difference between that amount and the percentage of gross salary specified in the prior stipulation.
Subsequently, a child support proceeding was commenced in the Family Court by the mother, and the Family Court Support Magistrate, sua sponte, determined that “the prior Judgment of Divorce and the stipulations did not comply with the Child Support Standards Act” and therefore informed the parties that she would consider the issue of child support de novo. She directed the father, in the interim, to pay child support in the amount $446.15 per week effective February 11, 2005. After a hearing, the Support Magistrate determined, in relevant part, that the father should pay $559.78 per week in child support until June 29, 2005, and $482.57 thereafter, and made the order retroactive to the date of the petition. The Support Magistrate also awarded the mother an attorney’s fee in the sum of $11,990.
The father filed various objections to the Support Magistrate’s findings and order. He claimed that the Support Magistrate was without jurisdiction to hold a de novo hearing on the issue of child support as if the judgment of divorce had never existed. By order entered February 8, 2006, the Family Court, inter alia, denied the father’s objections and father appealed.
The Appellate Division agreed with the father that the Family Court was without subject matter jurisdiction, in effect, to vacate as illegal so much of the judgment of divorce as directed the father to pay child support and, thereafter, to determine the issue of child support de novo. What is particularly interesting in this case was its reasoning. The Appellate Division made this determination on constitutional grounds, stating that New York Constitution, article 6, §13 (c) provides that the Family Court is vested with limited jurisdiction “to determine, with the same powers possessed by the [S]upreme [C]ourt, the following matters when referred to the [F]amily [C]ourt from the [S]upreme [C]ourt: . . . in actions and proceedings for . . . divorce, . . . applications to fix temporary or permanent support . . . or applications to enforce judgments and orders of support”. Similarly, Family Court Act §466 provides, in relevant part, that, unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise, the Family Court may entertain an application to enforce an order or decree of the Supreme Court granting support, or an application to modify such order or decree “on the ground that there has been a subsequent change of circumstances and that modification is required.” The Supreme Court’s judgment of divorce provided, in relevant part, that the Supreme Court “retain[ed] jurisdiction of the matter concurrently with the Family Court for the purpose of specifically enforcing such of the provisions of the stipulation of child support as are capable of specific enforcement, to the extent permitted by law”.
The Court held that “nowhere in the Constitution, in the Family Court Act, or in the judgment of divorce itself, is the Family Court empowered, in effect, to invalidate a stipulation incorporated into the judgment of divorce entered by the Supreme Court. Significantly, the purpose of the mother’s petition was to enforce the terms of the stipulation of October 29, 1996 – not to have it declared illegal. Had either party questioned the legality of the stipulation, the issue should have been determined by the Supreme Court, which had issued the judgment in which the stipulation was incorporated. Accordingly, the Family Court was without jurisdiction to invalidate the stipulation and determine the child support issue de novo.”
What makes this situation different from typical modification of child support, which I previously discussed, here and here, is that fact that the provisions of the judgment apparently violated the Child Support Standards Act. In those situations, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to vacate any child support provisions of the judgment and recalculate child support de novo, going back to the original date of the judgment or the parties’ agreement. The Family Court does not have the jurisdiction to do so. Accordingly, this is an important procedural point that should be familiar to most divorce and family law lawyers handling child support issues. If the provisions of the judgment of divorce dealing with child support violate the Child Support Standards Act, the proper venue to address such issues lies in the court that issued the judgment of divorce.
Tags: attorney, child support, Child Support Standards Act, county, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Court Act, Family Law, jurisdiction, lawyer, Livingston, Monroe, new york, New York family law, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, Supreme Court, Wayne
Posted in child support, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, jurisdiction, modification, New York Law, Settlement Agreements, Stipulations, Supreme Court, Uncategorized | No Comments »
Monday, May 25th, 2009
As the end of the school year approaches, parents usually begin to look at various activities their children may participate in during the summer. One such popular option is a summer camp, which may be a day camp or a sleep-away camp. I am often asked who is obligated to pay for it.
I have previously written that under New York’s Child Support Standards Act, the parent paying child support is typically obligated to pay a portion of child care and other expenses. In Micciche v. Micciche, 2009 NY Slip Op 03702 (2nd Dept. 2009), the Appellate Division affirmed the principle that the cost of the summer camp is considered to be a part of the child care expense, and as such, both parties are required to contribute their pro-rata share in accordance with their income.
If there are no contrary provisions in the parties’ separation agreement or judgment of divorce, and one of the parents refuses to contribute his or her share of summer camp, I recommend that the other party discuss this issue with an experienced family law lawyer. Sometimes, it only takes a letter from an attorney to resolve such disputes.
Tags: attorney, child care, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, county, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, expenses, Family Court, Family Court Act, Family Law, lawyer, Livingston, Monroe, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, summer camp, Supreme Court, Wayne
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, May 25th, 2009
Under New York law, child support consists of two elements: “basic” child support and the “add-ons.” Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §240, New York requires that basic child support be calculated in two parts: (a) the support based on the total combined income of both parents up to $80,000; and (b) the support based on the total combined income of both parents over $80,000. For both parents’ combined adjusted gross income over $80,000, the court has the discretion to apply the same statutory guidelines, and for all practical purposes will do so. See Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649 (1995). The result will be the total combined basic child support attributable to both parents for the combined income in excess of $80,000. From the combined basic child support as calculated under the statute, a pro-rata share of each parent’s income is calculated. Each parent’s pro-rata share is a ratio equal to that parent’s adjusted gross income divided by the combined adjusted gross income for both parents. That pro-rata share is used to calculate each parent’s share of child support add-ons.
The parent paying child support is also obligated to pay for his/her pro-rata share of the following add-ons.
Day Care
Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b)(c)(4) and Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b)(c)(6) provide that when a custodial parent is working, seeking work, or is in school or training which will lead to employment, reasonable day care expenses will be allocated in a ratio equal to the each parent’s income to the combined income. Reasonable day care expenses vary and each situation should be discussed with an experienced family law lawyer to determine each party’s rights and responsibilities.
Health Care Expenses
Domestic Relations Law §240 (1)(d) provides that the cost of health care insurance shall be allocated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. Domestic Relations Law §240 (1-b)(c)(5) provides that reasonable health care expenses not covered by insurance are allocated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. Obviously, the parties can opt-out of the CSSA’s provisions with respect to the add-ons. Any provisions with respect to the cost of health insurance are enforceable just like child support provisions.
In Rochester and Monroe County, as well as in surrounding counties, the Supreme Court and Family Court usually require the non-custodial parent to carry health care insurance for the children. However, similarly to child care, there may be situations where it is more beneficial financially for the custodial parent to pay for the cost of health insurance for the children and for the non-custodial parent to contribute his or her share. The parties should be mindful of the cost of health care coverage and should discuss these issues with a family law attorney before entering into a separation agreement or agreeing to a judgment of divorce.
Educational and Extracurricular Expenses
In addition, the parents may be obligated to pay for the cost of extracurricular expenses and educational expenses, such as a private school or college. I have previously discussed issues related to the college costs, and will address issues related to paying for a private school at a later date.
Tags: attorney, child support add-on, Child Support Standards Act, cost, day care, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, health care insurance, lawyer, Livingston, Monroe, new york, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, Supreme Court, unreimbursed medical expenses, Wayne
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law | No Comments »
Sunday, April 26th, 2009
I have previously written that a child support obligation can be suspended or terminated in situations where the court makes a finding that the child has deliberately severed his/her relationship with a parent, thereby abandoning that parent. However, in order for a court to make a finding of abandonment, the child must be of employable age.
Even if the child is not of employable age, the non-custodial parent’s child support obligation can be suspended or terminated, if the breakdown in the parent-child relationship came as a result of the actions of the custodial parent.
In Ledgin v. Ledgin, 36 A.D.3d 669 (2nd Dept. 2007), the Appellate Division held that interference with visitation rights can be the basis for the cancellation of arrears of maintenance and the prospective suspension of both maintenance and child support. However, such relief is warranted only where the custodial parent’s actions rise to the level of “deliberate frustration” or “active interference” with the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights.
In Frances W. v Steven M., 15 Misc.3d 839 (Fam. Ct. Queens Co. 2007), the court held that petitioner was not entitled to child support where she intentionally aided her sister in brainwashing the child, who is almost 20 years old, into falsely believing that the father had sexually abused her when she was an infant, and otherwise poisoned the child’s relationship with respondent from the time she was four years old. The court stated that since petitioner was an active participant in destroying her niece’s relationship with the father, “she was precluded from obtaining child support from respondent as a matter of fundamental fairness.”
In S.M.B. v D.R.B, 17 Misc.3d 1132(A) (Fam. Ct. Onondaga Co. 2007), petitioner father sought vacatur of order of support contained in parties’ divorce judgment, which incorporated their opt-out agreement. Father began his action after the mother engaged in pattern of active interference and deliberate frustration of child’s relationship with father. Mother was very angry that father paid no more child support than what’s been ordered by court. Mother has withheld father’s access to child since she moved to Florida and remarried. The court found that mother’s acts of alienation were not isolated incidents but a continuing pattern. The court further found that the child now shows no interest in having relationship with father because of mother’s unfortunate endeavors. Father’s support obligation vacated since father met his burden of establishing that mother unjustifiably frustrated his right to reasonable access.
If the child is not of employable age, and the custodial parent did not interfere with the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child, the non-custodial parent’s obligation to pay child support will not be terminated by the court. Foster v. Daigle, 25 A.D.3d 1002 (3rd Dept. 2006).
Since most of these cases are tried on the issue of parental interference, it is important that each such case, before it is brought, is carefully screened by an experienced family law lawyer. Because parental interference cases require a significant level of proof, it is important that a petitioner is represented by an attorney familiar with such cases.
Tags: attorney, change in circumstances, child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, county, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Court Act, Family Law, interference, lawyer, modification, Monroe, new york, New York family law, New York Law, Ontario, parental interference, rochester, Supreme Court, suspension, termination, visitation, Wayne
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, modification, New York Law, visitation | No Comments »
Monday, April 6th, 2009
I have mentioned last week that I have been seeing a significant increase in Family Court and Supreme Court filings seeking downward modification of child support. Most of these filings were brought on by a non-custodial parent after a loss of employment. In today’s economy, a loss of employment is not uncommon, so the courts are dealing with a significant rise in downward modification petitions.
There are two different situations that may arise when a non-custodial parent seeks downward modification of child support. First, if the child support was established by a stipulation or an agreement, that parent must establish that the loss of employment represents an unreasonable and unanticipated change in circumstances since the time of the stipulation to justify a modification, and that the alleged changes in that party’s financial position was not of his/her own making. See Connolly v. Connolly, 39 AD3d 643 (2nd Dept. 2007); Terjesen v. Terjesen, 29 A.D.3d 705 (2nd Dept. 2007). Additionally the party who lost employment will also have to establish that he/she used his/her best efforts to obtain employment commensurate with his/her qualifications and experience. Cox v. Cox, 20 A.D.3d 527 (2nd Dept. 2005). Further, allegations of a reduction in actual income are insufficient to support an application for a downward modification, as a matter of law, where contractual support obligations are based on a payor’s ability to earn rather than on his or her actual income at the time of the execution of such stipulation or agreement. Ellenbogen v. Ellenbogen, 6 A.D.3d 1026 (3rd Dept. 2004).
If the child support order was set by the court after a hearing, the parent seeking the modification of a child support obligation has the burden of establishing that there has been a substantial and unforeseen change in circumstances warranting a change in the support obligation. See Ketchum v. Crawford, 1 A.D.3d 359 (2nd Dept. 2003); Cadwell v. Cadwell, 294 AD2d 434 (2nd Dept. 2002). This standard is much easier to meet than the one applicable to the situations where child support was set by a stipulation or an agreement.
Depending on the circumstances, a downward modification case will fall in one of the two situations discussed above. Before commencing any proceeding, discuss your situation with an experienced New York family law lawyer to make sure that the proceedings are properly commenced and that you can meet the applicable legal standard.
Tags: agreement, attorney, child support, Child Support Standards Act, downward, Family Court, Family Law, judgment, lawyer, modification, new york, order, stipulation, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, Domestic Relations Law, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, imputed income, modification, New York Law, procedure, Settlement Agreements, Stipulations, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, March 16th, 2009
In general, the Child Support Standards Act includes all of the parties’ income for child support calculations, subject to appropriate child support limits and deductions. What happens in the situation when a party is receiving a tax refund for teh taxes paid during the previous year? In Shelby T. v. Michael L., 2009 NY Slip Op 29075 (Fam. Ct. Clinton Co. 2009), Judge Lawliss overturned the support magistrate’s decision which included the tax refund as income in the child support calculation. The court held that since the party obligated to pay child support receives a tax refund on the taxes paid in 2008, in 2009, if the court were to include the tax refund in the child support calculation, then the money earned, and taxed, in 2008, would count as income for child support purposes once again in 2009. Clearly, that was not the result contemplated by the Child Support Standards Act.
If engaged in child support litigation, a lawyer must make sure that his client’s income is counted only once and that the client receives all applicable deductions and variances.
Tags: alex korotkin, attorney, child support, Child Support Standards Act, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, lawyer, new york, rochester, Supreme Court, taxes
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, procedure, Supreme Court, taxes | No Comments »
Monday, January 26th, 2009
I am asked occasionally whether a parent’s child support obligation can be terminated on the grounds that the child stopped all contact with the parent in order to avoid parental control. My usual response is that it can be done, but the parent must establish either abandonment or constructive emancipation, and faces a substantial burden of proof.
The Family Court Act §413 mandates that parents support their children until they reach the age of 21. The courts in New York have held that a child’s right to support and the parent’s right to custody and services are reciprocal, and that a parent may impose reasonable regulations. Generally, where a minor of employable age and in full possession of her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, the child forfeits his/her right to demand support. Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971); Matter of Ontario County Department of Social Services (Christopher L.) v. Gail K., 269 A.D.2d 847 (4th Dept. 2000), leave denied, 95 N.Y.2d 760 (2000).
While the duty to support is a continuing one, the child’s right to support and the parent’s right to custody and services are reciprocal. Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971). Thus, a parent, in return for maintenance and support, may establish and impose reasonable regulations for his/her child. In Roe v. Doe, supra, the Court of Appeals explained:
Accordingly, though the question is novel in this State, it has been held, in circumstances such as here, that where by no fault on the parent’s part, a child “voluntarily abandons the parent’s home for the purpose of seeking its fortune in the world or to avoid parental discipline and restraint [the child] forfeits the claim to support” . . . To hold otherwise would allow, at least in the case before us, a minor of employable age to deliberately flout the legitimate mandates of her father while requiring that the latter support her in her decision to place herself beyond his effective control.
The doctrine of constructive emancipation is applicable to the non-custodial parent where the child unreasonably refuses all contact and visitation. Matter of Commissioner of Social Services (Jones) v. Jones-Gamble, 227 A.D.2d 618 (2nd Dept. 1996). In that case, the court held that the evidence clearly established that the child wanted no relationship with her father. Despite the father’s prior support payments, there was essentially no parent-child relationship between them. The appellate court held that, to require the father to provide reimbursement for the support of a daughter who had renounced and abandoned him would have clearly resulted in an injustice under the facts of that case.
In the Fourth Department case, Perez v. Perez, 239 A.D.2d 868 (4th Dept. 1997), appeal dismissed, 91 N.Y.2d 956 (1998), the record established that the parties’ 18 year old daughter had refused to visit with the father or to have any relationship with him. That child was found to be a minor of employable age and in full possession of her faculties, who had voluntarily refused to have a relationship with plaintiff. The child thereby forfeited her right to support from her father. Accordingly, the Fourth Department rejected the mother’s contention that the lower court erred in modifying the parties’ divorce decree by suspending father’s obligation to pay child support for the parties’ child until further order of the court.
Children of employable age and in full possession of their faculties who voluntarily and without cause abandon their home, against the will of their parents and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, forfeit their right to demand support, even if they are not financially self-sufficient. Guevara v. Ubillus, 47 A.D.3d 715 (2nd Dept. 2008). In that case, petition for child support was denied where the petitioner, without good cause, abandoned the mother’s home on her 18th birthday in order to avoid parental control and to gain independence from her mother’s restrictive household rules; the petitioner was found to have abandoned her mother’s home against the mother’s will and without cause.
In Rubino v. Morgan, 224 A.D.2d 903 (3d Dept. 1996), the Appellate Division held that the lower correct properly terminated the father’s support obligation on the grounds that his daughter’s refusal to visit with him and the child’s unprovoked rejection of him constituted abandonment. The Third Department noted that at the time of the hearing, the daughter was 17 years old, and she had refused to visit with the father since she was 14 years old. Even after the daughter refused to visit with her father, he continued for years to send letters and cards to her. The letters were never answered. He also attempted to talk with the child, without success. His actions and requests were not arbitrary, and there was no evidence of malfeasance, misconduct or neglect. The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s findings that the daughter chose to permanently breach her relationship with the father, notwithstanding her generalized claim of “emotional abuse”, and that the father did not contribute significantly to his daughter’s decision to distance herself from him.
Furthermore, where it can be established by the non-custodial parent that the custodial parent has unjustifiably frustrated the non-custodial parent’s right of reasonable access, child support payments may be suspended. Usack v. Usack, 17 A.D.3d 736 (3d Dept. 2005). In that case, the father had encouraged the children’s unbridled enmity toward, and total exclusion of, their mother through a course of conduct calculated to inflict the most grievous emotional injury upon her. The Appellate Division held that mother’s child support obligation should have been suspended due to the father’s deliberate actions in alienating the parties’ children from her.
Tags: abandonment, child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, constructive emancipation, emancipation, Family Law, new york, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, Domestic Relations Law, emancipation, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, modification, New York Law, Supreme Court, visitation | 1 Comment »
Monday, January 5th, 2009
If at the conclusion of the divorce action a party is to receive a stream of payments to pay that party’s equitable distribution award, does that money need to be included in the child support calculations? In Holterman v. Holterman, 3 N.Y.3d 1 (2004), the husband argued that the payment of $21,288 per year, the annual installment payment of wife’s distributive award of her share of enhanced earnings from his medical license, should be deducted from the computation of his income in determining his child support obligation under the CSSA and, concomitantly, that amount should be included as income attributable to wife. He claimed that the failure of the lower courts below to perform such reassignment of income results in “double dipping” from the same income stream–i.e., awarding both child support and equitable distribution of his future enhanced earnings from the same income source, his salary as a physician. Court of Appeals disagreed with the husband and held that his proposed reallocation formula, or any formula that required a deduction of a distributive award paid over a period of years from the licensed spouse’s income for purposes of calculating child support, is impermissible under the CSSA. The Court ruled that the CSSA does not provide for the deduction of distributive awards from income, whether based on enhanced earning capacity due to a professional license or otherwise. Nor does the CSSA authorize the inclusion of a distributive award as income to the parent receiving the award. This lack of inclusion in either the list of permissible statutory deductions or the definition of income is understandable because distributive awards “reflect, not income, but a property distribution” of the marital assets, regardless of whether such assets are being paid as an income stream.
Tags: child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, equitable distribution, Family Law, new york, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, equitable distribution, Family Law, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Monday, December 29th, 2008
If parties choose to deviate from the provisions of the Child Support Standards Act with respect to the child support paid, such deviation will be upheld by the court provided the parties complied with such formalities as including calculations of the presumptive child support amount and the reasons for deviating from the CSSA. However, the parties frequently choose not only to deviate from the child support amount calculations, and add-ons such as child care and health care costs, but also to make recalculations of child support an annual or semi-annual event, or to include other items not included within the scope of the CSSA.
In Fasano v. Fasano, 43 A.D.3d 988 (2nd Dept. 2007), the parties included an annual cost-of-living-adjustment (“COLA”), with respect to the child support paid by the non-custodial parent. The Second Department found that the parties to the agreement did not opt out of the CSSA standards with respect to basic child support, but that the COLA provision included in the agreement represented potential future deviations from the CSSA basic child support obligation. The agreement did not state the reasons for including the COLA provisions. The Appellate Division held that the COLA provision represented an opt-out from the CSSA and was directly related to the child support. Since the reasons for including the COLA provision were not included in the agreement, the opt-out was invalid. The court vacated the COLA provision, while the basic child support provision of the agreement was not vacated.
However, not all provisions dealing with financial support of the children are considered to be within the scope of the CSSA. In Cimons v. Cimons, 53 A.D.3d 125 (2nd Dept. 2008), the Second Department held that the obligation to provide for the future college expenses of the children was not part of the parties’ basic child support obligation and therefore was not subject to the CSSA requirement that any deviation from statutorily-mandated child support obligations must be recited and explained in a stipulation of settlement. While the parties’ agreement regarding basic child support violated the CSSA by failing to recite and explain the reasons for the deviation, the provision concerning future college expenses was enforceable. The court held that unlike the basic obligation to provide child support, payment for a child’s college education is not mandatory. Absent a voluntary agreement, a parent might be required to provide support for his or her child’s attendance at college, but the determination of that obligation is dependent upon the exercise of the court’s discretion in accordance with Domestic Relations Law §240(1- b)(c)(7). The court further noted that the determination as to which additional aspects, if any, of the parties’ stipulation must be vacated along with the basic child support provision depends on the circumstances of the particular case and the nature of the obligations addressed in the other provisions of a stipulation. Some provisions may be so directly connected or intertwined with the basic child support obligation that they necessarily must be recalculated along with the basic support obligation. It found that unlike child care expenses and unreimbursed health care expenses, education expenses were not directly connected to the basic child support calculation and did not require the appropriate opt-out language.
The above cases represent the dangers involved any time the parties attempt to either opt-out from the CSSA or attempt to include items outside of the scope of the CSSA in their agreement. Any such agreement must be carefully drafted to make sure that it is not subsequently challenged and invalidated.
Tags: child support, child support guidelines, Child Support Standards Act, cola, college expenses, Family Law, modification, new york, opt-out, Supreme Court
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, college expenses, court orders, divorce, drafting, Family Law, modification, New York Law, procedure, Settlement Agreements, Stipulations, Supreme Court | No Comments »