Posts Tagged ‘equitable estoppel’

Child Support, Equitable Estoppel and Same-Sex Relationship

Monday, June 15th, 2009

I have previously written about issues of equitable estoppel, which may result in non-biological parent being treated as a biological parent of the child. Recently, I came across a case, H.M. v. E.T., 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 04240 (2nd Dept. 2009) that dealt with applicability of equitable estoppel to child support in a same-sex relationship situation.

In October of 2006, H.M., an Ontario resident, and the birth mother of a 12-year-old child, filed a “Support Application” with a Canadian agency, seeking to have E.T., a Rockland County resident, and H.M.’s former same-sex partner, adjudicated a parent of the child. H.M. also sought an award of child support retroactive to the date of the child’s birth.  In support of her application, H.M. alleged that in August 1989, the parties lived in New York, entered into a monogamous relationship, and started cohabitating. H.M. alleged that the parties then agreed that she would attempt to become impregnated via artificial insemination, and that after a child was born, they would parent that child together. H.M. alleged that pursuant to this agreement, and with E.T.’s assistance and encouragement, she became impregnated by sperm from an anonymous sperm donor. In September 1994, H.M. gave birth to the child. H.M. alleged that over the next few months, E.T. acted as a parent to the child by nurturing and caring for him. However, H.M. alleged that in January 1995, E.T. ended the parties’ relationship. H.M., who subsequently relocated with the child to Canada, alleged that after the relationship ended, she made numerous requests of E.T. for child support, all of which were refused.

After the child support proceeding was commenced in Canada, the case was transmitted to the Family Court, Rockland County pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Family Ct Act art 5-B (hereinafter “UIFSA”).  Initially, the Support Magistrate found that under the present law of New York, there was no basis upon which the Family Court could adjudicate E.T. a parent of the subject child and require her to pay child support. In this regard, the Support Magistrate noted that E.T. was not the birth mother of the child or an adoptive parent of the child, never executed an official acknowledgment of parentage of the child, and was not in a legally recognized same-sex marriage or civil union with H.M. when she gave birth to the child. The Support Magistrate, pointing out that the Family Court is a court of law with limited subject matter jurisdiction, found no provision in Family Court Act Article 5, or in any other article of the Family Court Act, applicable to a controversy between a birth mother and another female concerning the other female’s parentage of a child. Finally, the Support Magistrate, deeming all of H.M.’s factual allegations to be true, and observing that equitable considerations might suggest that E.T. be adjudicated a parent of the child and required to pay child support, noted that the Family Court cannot grant equitable relief.

Subsequently, after the objections to the Support Magistrate’s Order were filed, the Family Court overturned the Support Magistrate’s Order citing cases where courts “held individuals responsible for the support of a child even though they were not related to the child by biology or adoption.” The Family Court observed that in those cases, the courts applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel which, the Family Court noted, will be applied in order to protect the best interests of a child born out-of-wedlock. Thus, the Family Court concluded that “a paternity proceeding [can] proceed against a same sex partner if circumstances are established justifying the [doctrine's] application.” Then, the Family Court, noting that the subject child was born as a result of E.T.’s “promises,” concluded that H.M.’s allegations, if true, could support a finding that E.T. “should be estopped [from denying] her role as a person responsible to provide support for [that] child.” Accordingly, the Family Court directed a hearing to determine whether E.T. “should be equitably estopped [from denying] her responsibility to provide support to the subject child.”

E.T. appealed from the order of the Family Court. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the Family Court’s order and reinstated the order of the Support Magistrate dismissing the petition. The Appellate Division stated that the basic premise of the petition was that  H.M. who was never married to or in a civil union with E.T., sought to have E.T., a woman having no biological or legal connection to the subject child, adjudicated a parent of that child and required to pay child support. Since the Family Court received H.M.’s support application pursuant to UIFSA, it was authorized to determine “parentage” (Family Ct Act § 580-301[b][6]; § 580-701). UIFSA provides that in deciding such a proceeding, the Family Court is required to apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to a “similar” proceeding originating in this State, and may only exercise whatever “powers” and provide whatever “remedies” that are “available” in such a proceeding.

The only proceeding in this State “similar” to a proceeding for a determination of “parentage” is a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 5. Yet, as the Support Magistrate recognized, Family Court Act article 5, entitled “paternity proceedings,” only provides a vehicle for resolving controversies concerning a man’s fatherhood of a child.  After analyzing the language of the Family Court Act, the court concluded that a paternity proceeding requires “the male party” to be “the father” of the child.

The court further held that although the doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act  Article 5, when the Family Court applies the doctrine, the Family Court is merely precluding a party from “denying a certain fact”.  This is not the same thing as the Family Court granting equitable relief, something the Family Court lacks the power to do. Therefore, when the Family Court applies the doctrine, the Family Court is doing so as a means of granting relief specifically authorized by the Constitution or statute. That is, the Family Court is applying the doctrine as a means of adjudicating a “male” “the father” of a child. However, H.M. has demanded certain relief the Family Court is not specifically authorized by the Constitution or statute to grant. Under these circumstances, the Family Court could not apply the doctrine, and could not reach the issues of whether E.T. should be estopped from denying her parentage of the subject child, and whether estopping E.T. from denying her parentage of the child would be in the child’s best interests. If the Family Court applied the doctrine as a means of granting relief not specifically authorized by the Constitution or statute, that would be tantamount to the Family Court granting equitable relief.

The logic of the Appellate Division’s decision, its heavy emphasis on the language of the Family Court Act, and especially the use of the term “male”, raise the question of whether a different result would have been reached on these facts if both parties to this litigation were male. Since recent decisions in this area of family law have been gender neutral, it seems likely that the Court of Appeals, if the case is appealed, will likely focus on on whether any such applications should be considered on a gender neutral basis and also, even more importantly, whether the courts will move away from “paternity by estoppel” toward “parentage by estoppel” as a matter of equity. I believe that we may learn the answer to this question in the foreseeable future.

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Posted in Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, UIFSA, child support, court orders, jurisdiction, paternity | No Comments »

Basics of Paternity in Family Court

Monday, March 9th, 2009

Paternity is the term which describes a father’s legally enforceable rights and responsibilities to his child. Determination of paternity in New York is governed by the Article 5 of the Family Court Act. In accordance with the Family Court Act, paternity may be established in one of three ways; by presumption, by an acknowledgment, or by court order. If the parties are married at the time of the child’s birth, New York presumes that the husband is the father of any children of the marriage. While this presumption is rebuttable, the concept of equitable estoppel, previously discussed on this blog, may also be applicable and even if the presumption is rebutted, may preserve the parties’ initial positions with respect to paternity.

If the parties were not married at the time of birth of a child, legal paternity may only be established by signing an Acknowledgment of Paternity (either at the hospital or at the local Department of Social Services, pursuant to Family Court Act §516-A) or by the Family Court entering an Order of Filiation. Once an Acknowledgement of Paternity is signed, it may not be vacated after six months of signing, unless it brought about by fraud, duress or material mistake of fact. Under those circumstances, the time is extended to one year.

If the parties are not married, and paternity is challenged, the determination of paternity will be made by the Family Court. A paternity proceeding is commenced in Family Court by the filing of a verified petition from the party seeking to establish paternity. If the woman is married, and is claiming that her husband is not the father of her child, her husband must usually be named as a party to the proceeding. Once the parties are in court, they have the option to consent to an order of paternity. If the issue of paternity is resolved by consent, i.e., agreement of the parties, DNA testing does not take place. If paternity is consented to, it becomes extremely difficult to overturn a consent order of paternity in the future.

If there is no consent order of paternity, the court will generally order a DNA test. See Family Court Act §522. Once the results of the DNA test are know, the parties once again will generally have the option to consent to an order of paternity, or request a hearing. If the case goes to a hearing, it is the party seeking to establish paternity who has the burden to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence. If, however, the probability of paternity in the DNA test is 95% or higher, New York law presumes the man is the father, and it is now his burden to overcome this presumption. At the end of the hearing, the court will consider all properly introduced evidence, and either issue an order of paternity or dismiss the paternity petition.

Parties are not required to accept the results of the tests, and the party may challenge DNA testing by attacking either the chain of custody of the samples, or the underlying mathematics of the statistical analysis. Such challenges are very difficult, and can be very expensive.

However, as noted above, under appropriate circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel may prevent the child and the parent from being tested and prevent the father from denying paternity. For example, if the party has alleged paternity in some other court proceeding or document, that party may be prevented from denying paternity. Similarly, if a man has held himself out to be the father of a child, he may be estopped from denying paternity in court.

The time to commence a paternity proceeding under the Article 5 of the Family Court Act is at any time during the pregnancy of the mother, or after the child is born, but not after twenty one years, unless paternity is somehow acknowledged by the father, or he paid support.

When a DNA test is ordered, the court may direct that either party pays, both parties pay or the state pays for the costs of these tests, all depending on the resources of all parties. If the father is determined to be the father, and he is the one who filed the petition, the court will likely direct that he pays the cost of the DNA test.

Having one’s name on the birth certificate, providing emotional and/or financial support, or holding oneself as the father makes one the “putative” father. That person will be named in the New York State Putative Father Registry and requires notice to such father in the event someone tries to adopt the child, the child is placed in foster care, or if someone is seeking child custody or guardianship. However, signing the Acknowledgement of Paternity, having an Order of Filiation or having been married to the mother at the time of birth makes one the “legal” father. And although the rights and responsibilities are similar, there is a legal difference between the two.

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Posted in DNA testing, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, court orders, paternity, procedure | 1 Comment »

Paternity and Equitable Estoppel

Monday, November 24th, 2008

Equitable estoppel typically arises as a defense in situations where a person, typically a nonbiological father, seeks to avoid child support obligations or the biological father belatedly seeks recognition of his parental rights.

DNA testing is a way to guarantee that non-custodial parents provide financial support for their children and make it possible to accurately determine a child’s paternity in a quick and inexpensive manner. The widespread availability of reliable genetic testing has reduced the need for extensive fact finding hearings and protracted litigation in the court system and can essentially ensure that the presumptive father is really the child’s biological father. However, in New York, not every putative father entitled to a DNA test.

Consider a scenario where a presumptive father files a paternity petition in a New York family court, together with a petition for custody of a child he believed to be his own. The child’s mother concedes paternity and acknowledges that her son refers to the putative father as his father and that the putative father has had some involvement with the child. Lets assume farther that during the paternity hearing, however, the putative father requests that the Court order a DNA test to confirm that he is indeed the child’s biological father. Must the Court issue an order subjecting the child to DNA testing?

In New York, the answer is no. Under what is known as the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Court may deny an application for a DNA test in a paternity proceeding on the principle of fairness and in the best interests of the child. Equitable estoppel precludes a presumptive father from speaking out against his own acts, commitments or representations if they are reasonably relied upon by the child.

If a substantial parent-child relationship has developed between the putative father and the child and no biological father has come forward to contribute to the costs of the child’s upbringing, New York courts may find that it is not in the child’s best interests to admit DNA evidence that disproves the presumptive father’s paternity. The doctrine of equitable estoppel has often been applied to protect the child from an untimely assertion or denial of paternity, which, if permitted, would damage an existing parent/child relationship.

In Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320 (2006), the Court of Appeals directly addressed the application of equitable estoppel in paternity and support proceedings. In that case, the court found that the respondent, who never married the mother and was not the biological father of the woman’s child, was equitably estopped from denying paternity. The child was believed to be the product of a brief liaison between the respondent and the mother. The respondent initially acknowledged paternity and provided some financial support. He had intermittent visitation with the child, although he was often not even in the same country as the mother and child. Four years after the child’s birth, it was determined that he was not the biological father. The court found that the respondent was equitably estopped from raising the issue of paternity, both by statute (Family Court Act § 418 [a]; § 532 [a]) and at common law. The court concluded that both the statute and case law required that the best interests of the child controlled whether a person was required to continue support payments, even if it was belatedly determined that he was not the biological parent. “The potential damage to a child’s psyche caused by suddenly ending established parental support need only be stated to be appreciated. Cutting off that support, whether emotional or financial, may leave the child in a worse position than if that support had never been given. . . . [T]he issue does not involve the equities between the two adults; the case turns exclusively on the best interests of the child.”

The doctrine of equitable estoppel evolved as a balancing test between the best interests of the child and the rights of the parent. Where there has been a bond formed between the parent and child, the interest of the child in preserving that relationship and the obligations of the parent toward that child, outweigh the putative father’s interest in establishing whether he is really the child’s biological father.

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Posted in DNA testing, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, Uncategorized, best interests of the child, court orders, paternity | 1 Comment »