Posts Tagged ‘Livingston’

No-Fault Divorce Becomes Law In New York

Sunday, August 15th, 2010

The no-fault divorce bill has been signed by the Governor Patterson and will go into effect in 60 days.  That means that starting on October 15, 2010, someone who wants to be divorced in New York will no longer be required to make allegations of martial fault by the other spouse and will only be required to swear that the relationship between husband and wife has  broken  down  irretrievably  for  a period of at least six months.  The new law will apply to the divorce actions commenced on or after such effective date.

In addition, the Governor signed legislation that will revise the process for setting awards of temporary maintenance while a divorce is pending, by creating a formula and list of factors that would presumptively govern such awards. This would allow for speedy resolution of the maintenance issue, and prevent less well-off parties to divorce proceedings from falling into poverty during litigation, because they lack the resources to obtain a temporary maintenance order. Another bill would create a presumption that a less monied spouse in a divorce case is entitled to payment of attorneys’ fees. Under current law, a party that cannot afford to secure representation in a divorce proceeding must make an application for fees at the end of the process, which can force a poor individual to proceed without a lawyer, or to surrender on important issues due to lack of means. Provisions of the Domestic Relations Law related to temporary maintenance and attorneys fees will go into effect in 60 days as well.

These are important development in New York’s family law and I think that it will take some time to assess their impact.  At the same time, I think that they will be welcomed by divorce lawyers in this state and will make divorce easier for the divorcing spouses. With respect to the bill establishing the formula for temporary maintenance, it is highly likely that any such temporary maintenance award is going to be used by the courts as a basis for a permanent maintenance award.

Acknowledgment of Paternity – Should It Be Signed By the Putative Father?

Monday, August 9th, 2010

During the last few months, I have been involved with a case that involved an acknowledgment of paternity that was signed by someone who was not the child’s biological father.  While most of the time the acknowledgment is signed without a great deal of consideration, I think that putative fathers should be careful and only sign the acknowledgment if they understand the full set of legal issues associated with this document.

Once the acknowledgment is signed, there is a limited period of time during which the acknowledgment can be vacated.  Usually this comes up in a situation where either the father or the mother discovers that the father of her child is not the biological father and wants to change his name to either hers, or that of the biological father. Unfortunately, it is not that simple.

Most of the time, a child, who has the father’s last name, has acquired it when the father signed the Acknowledgement of Paternity soon after the child was born, particularly where the parties were not married. In this situation, changing the child’s last name to either the mother’s name or the actual father’s name may require several steps in court, because the “notice” (the one who signed the acknowledgment) father can object to any proposed change.  In a situation where paternity needs to be established (or re-established), Family Court is the proper venue for filing a petition.  The mother can file a petition requesting that the Acknowledgement of Paternity be vacated based on the fact that the father is not the actual father, or; either she or the biological father, can file a Paternity petition.  In the first situation, assuming that the filing is timely, the court granting the mother’s request for vacating the Acknowledgement of Paternity does not automatically establish the real father of the child as the father for any purpose. Once the Acknowledgment is vacated, legally, there is no father that the court will acknowledge until there is someone that can be identified and brought to court.  Thus, a Paternity petition must be filed by either party to obtain an Order of Filiation, which establishes the father as the “legal” father, from the Court.  This is the legal document that is required by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (”DHMH”) to issue a new birth certificate with the new name on it, that of the father’s.

In second situation, if the either parent files a petition for Paternity, then the father can either consent to paternity or, if he does not, the court can order Genetic Marker (DNA) Test to confirm that he is actually the biological father.  However, before the DNA test is ordered by the court, it will have to address any equitable estoppel issues that may arise.  Assuming that equitable estoppel issues have been resolved, and the DNA test takes place, then the Court will issue an Order of Filiation, which is provided to the DHMH for the issuance of a new birth certificate.

Equitable estoppel in those situations may be raised both offensively and defensively by either the man initially believed to be the biological father or the man believed to be the true biological father.  Not all fathers cooperate since an Order of Filiation typically results in an order for child support and, possibly, a liability for birth expenses.  The courts are reluctant to vacate an Acknowledgement of Paternity where there is currently a child support order against the man, initially believed to be the biological father, unless the court can identify the actual father so that the child has someone to support him.

There are several good reasons for someone to establish paternity.  For example, although a father whose name is on the child’s birth certificate is considered the “notice” father, his rights with regards to adoption, termination of parental rights and abuse/neglect matters in Family Court are limited, until paternity is established.  A father whose paternity has been established is the “legal” father, on the other hand, has no limits with regards to his rights in any case in any court.

In almost all circumstances, it is wise to ascertain who the actual father is as soon as possible after the child’s birth, so as to limit any other legal issues that may arise, such as equitable estoppel.

Update on Dissolution of Out-of-State Civil Unions

Saturday, April 3rd, 2010

I have previously written regarding the problem posed by out-of-state civil unions.  Under New York law, while such unions are recognized through the principles of comity, New York does not have any legislation that addresses how these unions may be dissolved once one or both of the parties reside in New York.

The prior decision, made by the trial court, stated that the court would have jurisdiction to address dissolution of the civil union.  However, the court was searching for the way to accomplish this and suggested that the complaint be pled to seek dissolution of a civil union, as opposed to a divorce, as a complaint was plead initially.  As a trial court decision, B.S. v. F.B., did not carry a significant weight of authority and would not be binding on other trial courts.

Now we have the first appellate level decision to address this issue.  In Dickerson v. Thompson, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 02052 (3rd Dept. 2010), the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that New York court have subject matter jurisdiction “to entertain an action for equitable and declaratory relief seeking dissolution of a civil union validly entered into outside of this state.”  The court did not determine the scope of the relief that may be available in such action.

What is obvious from the decision is that the Appellate Division believed that the courts had authority to handle such cases, but was struggling come up with the way to accomplish the dissolution.  What makes it difficult, is the fact that when a divorce takes place, the court will address such issues as custody, child support, spousal maintenance, and equitable distribution.  All of the above issues are resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Domestic Relations Law.  What is unknown is how the courts will handle custody, child support, spousal maintenance and equitable distribution in dissolution of a civil union, something that apparently carries less weight in New York courts than a traditional marriage.  Does entering into a civil union create a potential entitlement to a spousal maintenance?  I don’t know the answer to that question, I suspect that the courts do not know the answer to it either.  It is quite likely that New York legislature will have to address these issues and, until then, the courts will try to come up with some ways of addressing these issues.

For a divorce lawyer, the above represents an excellent example of uncertainty created by the lack of uniformity in the states’ treatment of same-sex relationships. It also brings up a host of interesting legal issues that attorneys must recognize in handling similar situations.

Limitations on Child Support Arrears and Child Support Standards Act

Sunday, March 14th, 2010

One question that I am often asked with respect to child support arrears is whether there is a limit on the amount of child support arrears that can be accrued.  My usual response is that there is only one limitation in the Child Support Standards Act with respect to the limits on child support arrears and it exists solely in situations where the payor’s income is below the amount set by the poverty income guidelines for the single person, as reported by the federal Department of Health and Human Services.

Specifically, where the payor’s annual income is below the poverty income guidelines, then in accordance with the Family Court Act §413(1)(g), then payor’s child support arrears are limited to $500.00.  For 2009, the federal poverty guideline for a single person was set at $10,830.00.  This provision can be very helpful to family law lawyers and their clients since this provision allows for retroactive limitation on child support arrears, but it is limited to those situation where the party who owes child support has an extremely low level of income.

There are some limitations even in situations where the payor’s income was below the poverty guideline amount.  The party charged with paying child support couldn’t have voluntarily reduced his/her income, and must demonstrate inability to earn a higher amount (i.e., cannot have income imputed on the basis of ability to pay or other factors).  On practical level, the most likely situation where this provision becomes applicable is typically where a party becomes disabled and does not seek downward modification of the child support obligation until after child support arrears have accrued.

What is also interesting about the Family Court Act §413(1)(g), is that it directly contradicts Family Court Act §451, which prohibits the court from reducing or annulling arrears accrued prior to the filing of a modification petition unless the party shows good cause for failure to make the application sooner.  The courts were able to harmonize both sections by deciding that if the payor’s income is below the poverty level guideline, then by operation of section 413(1)(g) the arrears had never accrued.  Ronald F. v. Kathy Jo O., 25 Misc 3d 1229 (Fam.Ct. Erie Co. 2009)

Update on Progress of New York’s No-Fault Divorce Legislation

Sunday, March 14th, 2010

I have previously written about the lack of no-fault divorce in New York and the highly uncertain future of the bills creating no-fault divorce in New York.  Earlier this month, the New York State Senate Committee on the Judiciary advanced legislation (S.3890/A.9753), sponsored by Senator Ruth Hassell-Thompson and Assemblyman Jonathan Bing, that would allow a judgment of divorce to be granted to either a husband or a wife without assigning fault to either party.  The legislation now moves to the full Senate for consideration.

The legislation would allow for divorce when a marriage is irretrievably broken for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath.  A judgment of divorce can then only be granted if the following issues have been resolved: the equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and expert fees and expenses, and infant custody and visitation rights.  The bill is supported by the New York State Bar Association.

However, the fate of the legislation is still highly uncertain. The bill is opposed by New York State chapter of NOW, as well as other groups.

Child Support and Public Assistance

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

While I have repeatedly written about various issues involving New York’s Child Support Standards Act, here, here, here, and here, one issue that was not previously discussed and bears mentioning, is the interplay between the Child Support Standards Act and public assistance received by the parent receiving child support.  In Gregory v. Gregory, 68 A.D.3d 770 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept), the Appellate Division, Second Department decided the amount of child support payable by the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent was receiving public assistance.

In Gregory, the parents physically separated and the mother retained custody of the children.  Eventually, the parents agreed that the father would have primary custody of their two sons, and the mother would have primary custody of their daughter.  While there was no written agreement or court order concerning child support, the father claimed that he and the mother agreed that each parent would support the child or children in her or his custody, respectively.

Thereafter, the mother applied for and was awarded public assistance.  The mother received public assistance from August 1, 2004, until May 31, 2007, totaling $26,830.67, of which $13,415.44 was attributable to the support of the parties’ daughter, who was the child in mother’s custody.  In May 2007 the mother commenced a proceeding seeking child support for the parties’ daughter.  The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened in the proceeding, seeking payment of child support from the father, which sum included the money it had paid to the mother on behalf of the parties’ daughter.

After a hearing, the Support Magistrate calculated the father’s support obligation for his daughter for the period to be $26,006.26, and directed him to pay that amount to the DSS.  The Appellate Division held that Family Court’s directive that the father pay the DSS the sum of $26,006.26 was proper.  Since the support obligation of a parent of a child receiving public assistance is measured by the child’s needs and the parent’s means, not by the amount of public assistance paid on behalf of the child, the Family Court acted properly in declining to limit the amount required to be paid by the father to the DSS to the child’s share of the public assistance grant.  Contrary to the father’s contention, he was not entitled to offset alleged unpaid child support from the mother against the amount he owed to the DSS. During the relevant time period, there was no support obligation imposed upon the mother for the children who were in the custody of the father.

The lesson of this case is that whenever the DSS is involved in assisting the custodial parent, this assistance is likely to come at a high price to the non-custodial parent.  What is significant in the opinion is that the typical child assistance payment amounts to a few hundred dollars.  On the other hand, the amount of child support owed by the non-custodial parent and calculated on the basis of that parent’s income, can be several times higher.  The non-custodial parent will not receive the difference between the two figures since it would be retained by the DSS.  In similar situations, depending on the incomes involved, a family law lawyer may recommend to the non-custodial parent to pay the custodial parent the total amount of public assistance privately since it may cost a lot less.

Divorce, Separation and Selection of Tax Status for Filing

Saturday, February 27th, 2010

I have previously discussed some of the tax issues related to divorce, maintenance and dependency exemptions.  As the tax season approaches, here is some additional information that may be of assistance.

In a typical divorce, unless the parties have been legally separated prior to December 31, they are still able file a joint return.   By filing a joint return, both spouses will be jointly and separately liable for any errors, omissions or deficiencies on the tax return.   If the parties are going through divorce, the issues related to division of any tax refunds may also become complicated.

If you are legally separated from your spouse, you are able to file as a head of household if you provided more than half the cost of keeping up a home for a child, dependent parent, or other qualifying relative for more than half the year.  According to the IRS, to claim head of household, you must either be unmarried or considered unmarried on the last day of the year.  In addition, the Abandoned Spouse rule may be applicable.   In order to qualify under the rule, if you and your spouse lived apart for the last six months of the year, you would be considered unmarried for the purpose of this filing status under the Abandoned Spouse rule.  If you meet the other two requirements for this status, you would be eligible to file as Head of Household.  The other two requirements are as follows:  1) paying more than half of the cost of keeping up a home as of the last day of the tax year;  2) a dependent child or other relative lived with you for more than half the year or you have a dependent parent (dependent parents are not required to live with you).

A party is required to file as single if he or she was unmarried as of December 31, or if legally separated as of the end of the year and does not qualify for another filing status.

There are other tax advantages and disadvantages that depend on the filing status elected by the party.  Please note that the above discussion is not tax advice, and these issues should be discussed with your tax professional.

Divorce, Monetary Obligations and Statute of Limitations

Saturday, February 20th, 2010

It is is not uncommon for a party to obtain a right to receive a sum of money in the judgment of divorce.  That right usually comes in situations where there are assets that are subject to equitable distribution.  It is also not uncommon for the parties to make their own agreements following the judgment of divorce as to how such sums of money will be paid.  One issue that would raise a concern for me would be a situation where the payment is extended over a long period of time.  It is a concern because a statute of limitations may come into play and, possibly, bar recovery.

In Woronoff v. Woronoff, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 01479 (2nd Dept. 2010), the Appellate Division held that where a monetary award in the judgment of divorce is not reduced to a monetary judgment, such award is subject to a six year statute of limitations.  In Woronoff, the parties were divorced by judgment dated December 21, 1988, which provided, inter alia, that the plaintiff would pay the defendant the sum of $87,500 for her share of his businesses.  In 1990, the parties entered into an agreement which modified this portion of the judgment so as to, among other things, set forth a different payment schedule for the distributive award.  This agreement was not reduced to a court order.  The defendant never entered her distributive award as a money judgment nor sought to enforce collection thereof until 2007, when she obtained a clerk’s judgment against the plaintiff.  Thereafter, however, the plaintiff successfully moved to vacate the clerk’s judgment.

The plaintiff then commenced an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful procurement of the clerk’s judgment including the counsel fees he expended in moving to vacate the clerk’s judgment.  The defendant’s first counterclaim asserted that the plaintiff had failed pay her the full amount of her distributive award for her share of his business, and alleged damages resulting therefrom in excess of $150,000.

The Appellate Division held that contrary to the defendant’s contention, the distributive award made to her in the divorce judgment for her share of the plaintiff’s business was not a “money judgment” subject to a 20-year statute of limitations.  Instead, her claim to enforce this award was governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213(1) and (2).  Accordingly, since the defendant did not seek to enforce her distributive award nor reduce it to a money judgment until well beyond six years after the divorce judgment was entered, and even well beyond six years after the parties entered into their modification agreement, the Supreme Court properly dismissed this counterclaim as time-barred.

The lesson of the above case for divorce lawyers is that in the event there is a monetary award in the judgment of divorce, it is a good idea to reduce it to a monetary judgment.  Alternatively, if the parties agree to extend the payment of the amount due beyond six years, such agreement should be reduced to writing and should include a provision specifically waiting statute of limitations.

Custody, Visitation and Disclosure of Parent’s Psychological Records

Saturday, February 13th, 2010
In this action for divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant-husband (hereinafter “husband”) moves for an Order permitting him to depose the treating therapist of the plaintiff-wife (hereinafter “wife”), Dr. E.C., and authorizing the issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum to be served upon Dr. C. instructing her to disclose all of her notes to counsel for the husband regarding her treatment of the wife. The wife opposes the motion claiming that it has no basis in law or in fact. She also cross-moves for various relief which is addressed in this Court’s decision on Motion Sequence 003.
It is the husband’s position that given the wife’s allegations, which he contends are false, that he abused the parties’ son and repeatedly raped her, he has “no choice as a loving, responsible father but to ask that the Court order [the wife's] psychiatrist of 15 years, Dr. C., to turn over the notes and records of L’s extensive psychiatric treatment and that my attorneys be [*2]allowed to take Dr. C.’s deposition regarding her treatment of [the wife] prior to any trial in this case.” According to the husband, he does not seek to hurt the wife, but, rather, wants to help his son. He states that he could not in good faith agree to any final custody arrangement, nor should the Court make a custody determination, without more information regarding the wife’s psychological condition, which, he contends, has allowed her to level these vicious accusations at him. Moreover, Dr. C., the husband states, is the person with the most information about the wife’s medications and how her condition “can be kept in check and how it could potentially worsen over the next 16 crucial and formative years of [the child's] life.”
According to the husband, when he first married the wife he was unaware that she had a condition that required extensive psychological treatment. In fact, he claims that the wife would see Dr. C. 18 times per month and even spoke with the therapist regularly during the parties’ honeymoon. However, it was not until the parties went through the in vitro fertilization process that the husband says that he learned that the wife had been prescribed different types of medication throughout the years and was currently taking 5 milligrams of Valium twice a day. In addition, it is the husband’s belief that the wife has paranoid tendencies evidenced by her telling her attorney who then relayed it to the Court that she was being followed by a van and that a man was taking photographs of her in the park.
In opposing the husband’s motion, the wife points out that the husband has failed to provide any authority which supports his request. While she acknowledges that the parties have put their respective mental conditions at issue by contesting custody, she argues that this does not mean that either party is entitled to pretrial discovery regarding the other’s mental health history. Rather, she states that pretrial review of the parties’ mental conditions and parenting ability is precisely the reason why a neutral forensic evaluator is appointed for custody disputes as one has been appointed in this action.
The wife also contends that it was the husband who repeatedly lost touch with reality, “erupting into screaming tirades that our housekeeper was trying to poison him; he often repeatedly screamed that someone was trying to kill him in the shower through poisonous gas being fed through the water lines; he fired our baby nurse in the middle of the night. . ., claiming she was trying to hurt our son’s penis; he became hysterical when our son flushed the toilet without shutting the lid because poisonous vapors escaped through the toilet; he wrote notes about time travel; he insisted that someone was defecating on our towels even though they were clean; [and] he told our son in front of me that he was capable of killing me just as the character in a movie they were watching had killed his wife. . . .” Additionally, she annexes to her papers affidavits from two individuals who witnessed some of the acts of which she accuses the husband and which describe other allegedly idiosyncratic behavior on the husband’s part. She further alleges that during the marriage the husband sexually, verbally and emotionally abused her, causing her love for him to turn to fear. Notably, she does not controvert the husband’s allegations in connection with Dr. C.
It is well established that pretrial disclosure of privileged medical records is limited, especially in a custody litigation given the sensitive nature of the issues involved and the potential for the abuse of such discovery. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 2 Misc 3d 277 (Supreme Court, Nassau County 2003); Garvin v. Garvin, 162 AD2d 497 (2nd Dept. 1990); Coderre v. Coderre, 1990 WL 312774. As the Coderre, supra , court noted, since the wholesale pretrial discovery of the medical records of one party does not provide any mechanism to ensure that only relevant and [*3]material confidential information is disclosed, these records may contain communications that are “embarrassing, humiliating, potentially damaging and totally irrelevant to the issue of present and future parental fitness.”
However, privileged information may be disclosed “where it is demonstrated that the invasion of protected communications between a party and a physician, psychologist or social worker is necessary and material to a determination of custody. . . .” State ex rel. Hickox v. Hickox, 64 AD2d 412 (1st Dept. 1978) citing, Perry v. Fiumano, 61 AD2d 512 (4th Dept. 1978).Accordingly, this department has adopted a policy which requires that a party’s medical records be reviewed by the Court and that only portions of the records deemed to be relevant and material, if any, be disclosed. Hickox, supra . This policy was recently reaffirmed in the case of Penny B. v. Gary S., 61 AD3d 589 (1st Dept. 2009), wherein the court held on the father’s petition for an award of custody, that the court had acted properly when it conducted an in camera review of the notes of the husband’s therapist and determined that it was unnecessary to release them or for the therapist to testify since the court had sufficient information about the father from other sources.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that under the circumstances here an in camera review of Dr. C.’s notes and records concerning the wife is appropriate. Accordingly, Dr. E.C. is directed to produce to the Court all of her notes and records regarding the treatment of the wife for in camera inspection. Such production shall be made no later than January 8, 2010. Upon review, the Court shall disclose any portion of the material which it deems to be material and necessary for the purpose of determining custody of the parties’ child. The husband’s application to depose Dr. C and his request that the Court authorize the issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum to be served on her instructing that she disclose all of her notes to counsel for the husband regarding her treatment of the wife is denied.

One issue that often comes in divorce actions, as well as in custody actions, involves disclosure of a party’s psychological or counseling records.  The party seeking the records typically is aware of some damaging information that may contained in them and would like to force their disclosure to the court or the attorney for the children.  The party whose records are being sought typically opposes such demands on the grounds that such records are private and extremely sensitive.  Psychological records may contain information with respect to a party’s psychological condition or mental illness, or other information, that may have impact on the parent’s fitness for custody or visitation.

In a recent case, L.W. v. E.S., 2009 NY Slip Op 52718(U) (Sup. Ct. New York Co.), the court had to address issues dealing with the husband’s motion seeking to depose the treating therapist of the wife , and authorizing the issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum to be served upon the therapist, instructing her to disclose all of her notes toattorney for the husband regarding her treatment of the wife.  The wife opposed the motion.  The court engaged in a discussion of the parties’ positions and applicable legal principles.  The court stated that it is well established that pretrial disclosure of privileged medical records is limited, especially in a custody litigation given the sensitive nature of the issues involved and the potential for the abuse of such discovery.

Since the wholesale pretrial discovery of the medical records of one party does not provide any mechanism to ensure that only relevant and material confidential information is disclosed, these records may contain communications that are embarrassing, humiliating, potentially damaging and totally irrelevant to the issue of present and future parental fitness.  However, privileged information may be disclosed where it is demonstrated that the invasion of protected communications between a party and a physician, psychologist or social worker is necessary and material to a determination of custody.  Accordingly, in view of these concerns, the court has adopted a policy which requires that a party’s medical records be reviewed by the court and that only portions of the records deemed to be relevant and material, if any, be disclosed.  Instead of providing unlimited access to the records, the court would usually conduct an in camera review of the notes of the therapist and determine if it is necessary to release them or for the therapist to testify.

The husband alleged that he was not aware of the wife’s psychological issues when he married her and that her psychological condition caused her to accuse the husband of various forms of misconduct.  The husband also alleged that the wife’s condition impacted her ability to parent.  After reviewing each party’s allegations, the court found that under the circumstances here an in camera review of the therapist’s notes and records concerning the wife was appropriate.  Upon review, the court shall disclose any portion of the material which it deems to be material and necessary for the purpose of determining custody of the parties’ child.

The courts approach requests for disclosure of psychological or mental health records carefully since there are significant reasons to limit disclosure of such records.  If the party’s divorce or custody lawyer can demonstrate that such records contain information that likely to be relevant to the parties’ custody or visitation dispute, such records will be disclosed.

Order of Protection, Divorce and Surveillance

Sunday, February 7th, 2010

As a divorce attorney, I am periodically asked if hiring a private investigator to follow a spouse is acceptable and whether, if found out, it would result in any negative repercussions. I usually respond that surveillance is acceptable; however, there may be some evidentiary issues with the results that may make them inadmissible during the trial. A recent decision shed some light on these issues.

In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 20024 (Sup. Ct. Orange Co. 2010), the husband has brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the wife’s petition which alleged the husband violated an order of protection pursuant to a settlement stipulation in Family Court.  The order of protection, entered without any finding of fault against the husband, directed him to refrain from committing a family offense or criminal offense against the wife and to stay at least 1000 feet away from the residence and place of employment of the wife except for court-ordered child visitation or to attend church services on Sundays.  The wife’s violation petition alleged that the husband retained a private investigator who recorded on DVD the wife entering a motel and having an affair with a priest assigned to the Church, where the wife was employed.  The wife alleged that the husband furnished the DVD to her superiors at the Church resulting in the wife being forced to resign.  The wife contended that there was no legitimate purpose in the husband having her followed by a private detective and delivering the DVD to Church officials and that doing so was intended by the husband to cause her to lose her employment and cause her personal humiliation and suffering.  The wife claimed that such conduct constitutes a violation of the order of protection.

In opposition to the husband’s motion to dismiss the petition, the wife’s attorney alleges the husband hired the private detective after he filed his answer and counterclaims in the divorce action.  The wife’s attorney contended the husband was not legally bound to turn over the DVD to Church officials.  The wife’s attorney argued that the husband violated the order of protection by acting through an agent, the private detective he hired, to follow and record the wife’s activities, and then turning over the DVD to the church causing the wife to lose her employment.

The court held that it was not improper for the husband to retain the services of a private investigator since the hiring of a professional licensed private investigator in a matrimonial action to gather evidence is for a proper and legitimate purpose.  The husband had the right to gather evidence up to the date of trial in defense of the matrimonial action and in support of his own counterclaims.  Under the circumstances, the hiring of the private investigator, in and of itself, was not an unlawful intrusion upon the rights of the wife secured by the order or protection.

With respect to the question of whether delivering the DVD to the Church officials, which was not necessary for the husband to defend or prosecute the divorce action, raised a triable issue of fact that the husband in having the wife followed and recorded by a private investigator intended to inflict emotional and financial harm upon the wife which might constitute a violation of the order of protection.  Although harassment in the second degree often involves conduct which places a person in fear of their physical safety, the language of the statute does not limit itself to only physical threats. If the husband had the wife followed and recorded by a private investigator for the purpose of gathering embarrassing material to deliver to her employer with the intention to cause her to lose her employment such might qualify as conduct which alarms or seriously annoys another person, and serves no legitimate purpose, constituting harassment in the second degree.

The husband in his motion papers has prima facie demonstrated his entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the petition by evidence showing he did not retain the private investigator for an improper or illegitimate purpose such as harassment or stalking under the Penal Law or intend to make improper use of the private investigator’s work product DVD.  Upon the failure of the wife to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact that the husband committed a crime or family offense against her or otherwise violated the order of protection, the court granted the motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition.

So, the lesson of this case can be summarized as follows.  One, surveillance in divorce cases is a legitimate means of gathering evidence.  Two, surveillance alone will not amount to a violation of an order of protection.  Three, if results of surveillance are delivered to a third party, with possible negative consequences to the party under surveillance, such act may violate an order of protection, if there was no legitimate reason for such disclosure.  If you are seeking to involve a private investigator to follow and observe your spouse or significant other, I would urge you to consult with a divorce attorney before doing so.