Posts Tagged ‘modification’

Varying From Statutory Child Support Percentages

Sunday, May 9th, 2010

I have previously written about the court’s ability to consider not only the income one or both parties actually reported but the income as should have been reported.  What is not commonly known is that the court, whether Supreme Court or Family Court, can vary from the statutory percentages, by either increasing or reducing child support amounts.

In Irkho v. Irkho, 66 A.D.3d 682 (2d Dept. 2009), the Appellate Division held that Family Court properly denied the father’s objections to the order of the Support Magistrate, which departed from the numerical guidelines of the Child Support Standards Act and directed him to pay 50% of the child’s regular monthly expenses.  The Appellate Division held that a hearing court is not bound to apply the statutory percentage established in Family Court Act 413(1)(c), but may determine the child support obligation through the application of the percentage set forth in Family Court Act 413(1)(c), the factors delineated in Family Court Act 413(1)(f), or a combination of both (see Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649 (1995)).  Family Court providently exercised its discretion in departing from the prescribed percentage.

The above is fairly uncommon situation since in vast majority of the cases the courts will apply the CSSA.  It is unfortunate that the Appellate Division did not discuss the facts of the case in detail.  Whatever the circumstances were that resulted in the court’s decision may applicable in other cases.  If the child’s monthly expenses exceed the amount that the father would be obligated under the CSSA, family law lawyers would certainly appreciate knowing under what circumstances their clients may receive or be obligated to pay child support in excess of the CSSA amounts.

Return From Military Service and Reconsideration of Custody Orders

Sunday, December 20th, 2009
Laws of 2009, Ch 473, effective November 15, 2009, amended the Domestic Relations Law, the Family Court Act and the Military Law to provide that the return of a parent from activation or deployment by the military will automatically be considered a ’substantial change in circumstance’ for seeking reconsideration of a custody or visitation order. The amendment changes the law enacted last year which requires that all child custody orders issued when a parent is on active military duty be deemed temporary and subject to revision when the parent returns to civilian life.
Laws of 2009, Ch 473, § 1 amended Domestic Relations Law § 75-l ( entitled Military service by parent; effect on child custody
orders) to provide unless the parties have otherwise stipulated or agreed, if an order was issued under Domestic Relations Law § 75-l, the return of the parent from active military service, deployment or temporary assignment shall be considered a substantial
change in circumstances. Upon the request of either parent, the court shall determine on the basis of the child’s best interests whether the custody judgment or order previously in effect should be modified.
Laws of 2009, Ch 473, § 2 amended Domestic Relations Law 240, subdivision 1 to add a new paragraph (a-2) to read as follows:
(a-2) Military service by parent; effect on child custody orders.
(1) During the period of time that a parent is activated, deployed or temporarily assigned to military service, such that the parent’s ability to continue as a joint caretaker or the primary caretaker of a minor child is materially affected by such military service, any orders issued pursuant to this section, based on the fact that the parent is activated, deployed or temporarily assigned to military service, which would materially affect or change a previous judgment or order regarding custody of that parent’s child or children as such judgment or order existed on the date the parent was activated, deployed, or temporarily assigned to military service, shall be subject to review pursuant to subparagraph three of this paragraph. Any relevant provisions of the Service Member’s Civil Relief Act shall apply to all proceedings governed by this section.
(2) During such period, the court may enter an order to modify custody if there is clear and convincing evidence that the modification is in the best interests of the child. An attorney for the child shall be appointed in all cases where a modification is sought during such military service. Such order shall be subject to review pursuant to subparagraph three of this paragraph. When entering an order pursuant to this section, the court shall consider and provide for, if feasible and if in the best interests of the child, contact between the military service member and his or her child, including, but not limited to, electronic communication by e-mail, webcam, telephone, or other available means. During the period of the parent’s leave from military service, the court shall consider the best interests of the child when establishing a parenting schedule, including visiting and other contact. For such purposes, a “leave from military service” shall be a period of not more than three months.
(3) Unless the parties have otherwise stipulated or agreed, if an order is issued pursuant to this paragraph, the return of the parent from active military service, deployment or temporary assignment shall be considered a substantial change in circumstances. Upon the request of either parent, the court shall determine on the basis of the child’s best interests whether the custody judgment or order previously in effect should be modified.
(4) This paragraph shall not apply to assignments to permanent duty stations or permanent changes of station.
Laws of 2009, Ch 473, § 3 amended Family Court Act § 651 to add a new subdivision (f) which reads exactly the same as Domestic Relations Law 240, subdivision 1 (a-2).

On November 15, 2009, amendments to the Domestic Relations Law, the Family Court Act and the Military Law became effective that provide that the return of a parent from activation or deployment by the military will automatically be considered a “substantial change in circumstance” for seeking reconsideration of a custody or visitation order.  The amendments change the law enacted last year which requires that all child custody orders issued when a parent is on active military duty are deemed temporary and subject to revision when the parent returns to civilian life.

Specifically, Domestic Relations Law §75-l ( entitled Military service by parent; effect on child custody orders) provides that unless the parties have otherwise stipulated or agreed, if an order was issued under Domestic Relations Law §75-l, the return of the parent from active military service, deployment or temporary assignment shall be considered a substantial change in circumstances.  Upon the request of either parent, the court shall determine on the basis of the child’s best interests whether the custody judgment or order previously in effect should be modified.

Domestic Relations Law §240(1), was amended to add a new paragraph (a-2) as follows:

(a-2) Military service by parent; effect on child custody orders.

(1) During the period of time that a parent is activated, deployed or temporarily assigned to military service, such that the parent’s ability to continue as a joint caretaker or the primary caretaker of a minor child is materially affected by such military service, any orders issued pursuant to this section, based on the fact that the parent is activated, deployed or temporarily assigned to military service, which would materially affect or change a previous judgment or order regarding custody of that parent’s child or children as such judgment or order existed on the date the parent was activated, deployed, or temporarily assigned to military service, shall be subject to review pursuant to subparagraph three of this paragraph. Any relevant provisions of the Service Member’s Civil Relief Act shall apply to all proceedings governed by this section.

(2) During such period, the court may enter an order to modify custody if there is clear and convincing evidence that the modification is in the best interests of the child. An attorney for the child shall be appointed in all cases where a modification is sought during such military service. Such order shall be subject to review pursuant to subparagraph three of this paragraph. When entering an order pursuant to this section, the court shall consider and provide for, if feasible and if in the best interests of the child, contact between the military service member and his or her child, including, but not limited to, electronic communication by e-mail, webcam, telephone, or other available means. During the period of the parent’s leave from military service, the court shall consider the best interests of the child when establishing a parenting schedule, including visiting and other contact. For such purposes, a “leave from military service” shall be a period of not more than three months.

(3) Unless the parties have otherwise stipulated or agreed, if an order is issued pursuant to this paragraph, the return of the parent from active military service, deployment or temporary assignment shall be considered a substantial change in circumstances. Upon the request of either parent, the court shall determine on the basis of the child’s best interests whether the custody judgment or order previously in effect should be modified.

(4) This paragraph shall not apply to assignments to permanent duty stations or permanent changes of station.

The Family Court Act § 651 was amended to add a new subdivision (f) which contains identical language as Domestic Relations Law §240(1) (a-2).

If you are in the military service, the amendments provide some degree of comfort that any changes to the preexisting custody arrangements as a result of being called to the active duty can be reevaluated.  At the same time, in order to do so, the service person will be required to go to court and is likely to require assistance of a family law lawyer.

Modification of Visitation Based On the Age of the Child

Sunday, September 20th, 2009

It is no uncommon to see vistation arrangements involving very young child.  While family lawyers can plan for many different situations, not everything can be planned for or predicted.  What happens to such arrangements when the child gets older?

In a recent case of Sett v. Balcom, 64 A.D.3d 934 (3rd Dept. 2009), the Appellate Division, Third Department, had to address issues related to visitation arrangments put in place when the child was a year old.  Initially, the father was granted two-hour Sunday visitation the mother’s residence, and the mother received sole custody.  The order also permitted unsupervised and additional visitation but only at the mother’s sole discretion.  As the child was now 5 years old, the father brought a modification petition, prompted by the mother’s persistent refusals to permit expanded visitation, and sought joint custody and increased visitation, including overnight visitation.

Following a fact-finding hearing at which both parties testified, Family Court denied the father’s request for joint custody but granted him additional visitation, including overnight visitation.

The Applellate Division held that sound and substantial basis found in record to support Family Court’s decision to modify visitation on ground that petitioner made sufficient showing of change in circumstances warranting modification to promote child’s best interests.  Initial restrictions on father’s visitation stemmed from child’s young age at time and father not having meaningful contact with daughter.  At the time the modification petition was brought, the father was gainfully employed, involved in a stable relationship, lives in home with bedroom for child and enjoys cordial relationship with mother and extended family.  Moreover, when the mother was asked about her objections to increased visitation, the mother’s only stated concern was that the child might be uncomfortable. The mother never voiced any concern about the father’s ability to parent or the child’s safety in his presence. Moreover, again when asked, she raised only two minor concerns about his home, one of which was that it lacked toys. The mother also conceded that the child should have a close relationship with the father and that they played well together during visits.

According to the Appellate Division, nothing in the record—including potential reticence typical of a young child—revealed that expanded visitation would be harmful or detrimental to the child.

Therefore, if you are dealing with a custody and visitation arrangement that entered when the child was young, that arrangement might be ripe for modification. If you believe that a change would be appropriate, discuss your situation with an experienced family law attorney.

Making Deals in Divorce and Subsequent Change in Circumstances

Sunday, August 23rd, 2009

I am asked occasionally whether a separation agreement, which was perhaps incorporated in the subsequent judgment of divorce, entered into years ago can be vacated because of subsequent changes in the parties’ circumstances.  My usual response is no, since in order to have the agreement vacated, the party must show grounds sufficient to vitiate a contract.  The burden of proof in those situations is very high and may also be subject to time limitations.  Similarly, with respect to modification of a child support obligation included in a stipulation or a separation agreement, the party must show an unreasonable and unanticipated change in circumstances since the time of the stipulation to justify a modification, and that the alleged changes in that party’s financial position was not of his/her own making. A recent decision by a trial court, Debreau v. Debreau, 2009 N.Y. Slip. Op. 51750 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.), demonstrated a good illustration of the above principles, holding that if the parties make a deal as a part of their divorce settlement, provided that the settlement was arrived at fairly, the settlement will stand despite the fact that the circumstances have changed.

In Debreau, the wife accepted title to the family home as prepayment for 15 years of child support.  After the house sold for only two-thirds of the value estimated at the time of the divorce, she sued for child support arrears.  The court held that “[t]he law is clear that both [the Domestic Relations Law] and the public policy in favor of finality require the enforcement of property distribution agreements pursuant to their terms, absent fraud, regardless of post-agreement changes in the values of the assets.”  The court stated that “[t]he law views the equitable distribution of marital assets as a snapshot, not a movie… If an agreement distributing marital assets is not subject to vacatur, on the date of its execution, on grounds sufficient to vitiate a contract, it may not be modified or set aside on the ground that future events have rendered the division of assets inequitable.”

When the parties divorced in 2007, they agreed by stipulation to allow the husband’s share of the marital home serve as a prepayment of the child support he would owe for the couple’s four children over the next 15 years. Mr. Deabreu’s child-support obligation was set at $2,972 per month, or a total of about $535,000. The parties agreed that the husband’s share of the $1.85 million Melville house, after paying off its $400,000 mortgage and other expenses, was comparable to that obligation. They therefore stipulated that his obligation would be met by transferring over title. In June 2008, the house sold for only $1.2 million, netting the wife $734,000 rather than the $1.45 million she had anticipated. Ms. Deabreu subsequently filed a motion seeking child support arrears of $484,492, the amount she contends her husband owes to her from 2006 through 2021.

The trial court rejected Ms. Deabreu’s motion, ruling that any shortfall in the sale of the house should be taken from the wife’s share of the marital assets, not from the husband’s prepayment of child support. “While the prepaid child support sum…was specified and fixed pursuant to the parties’ stipulation of settlement, the value of the marital assets distributed to each party was determined only as of the date of the stipulation,” Justice Falanga held. The sum that the wife was to receive for her marital share “was not guaranteed by the husband, but rather, was subject to various factors such as market fluctuations and the manner in which the premises was maintained.” The decision also mentioned that Ms. Deabreu was not without other methods of seeking redress. According to the decision, “[t]he receipt by the wife, upon the sale of the [house], of approximately $650,000.00 less than she expected when entering into a stipulation of settlement…may constitute an unanticipated and unreasonable change in her financial circumstances, and may have left her, as she has alleged in her within application, unable to provide for the financial needs of the parties’ four children, entitling her to seek an upward modification of child support.”

In my opinion, it is not likely that Ms. Debreau would be able to establish an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances in the above situation.  I am also left wondering why the house was not sold earlier.  I also would like to know if Ms. Debreau entered into this stipulation after discussing the risk of decline in real estate values with her divorce lawyer. Personally, I don’t think that I would recommend this type of an arrangement to a client.  The risk of decline in the value of any asset subject to market forces is too great. As a divorce attorney, I would also be concerned about giving advice to the client to retain a fixed asset as a prepayment of future child support or maintenance obligation.

Overpayment of Pendente Lite Maintenance and Equitable Distribution

Saturday, May 16th, 2009

I have previously written that the Supreme Court has wide latitude in fashioning pendente lite (interim) maintenance awards while the divorce action is pending.  But what happens if the trial court ultimately decides that the pendente lite maintenance award was excessive?  The Court of Appeals recently addressed this issues in Johnson v. Chapin, 2009N.Y.  Slip. Op. 03630 (2009).

In Johnson, the Court of Appeals held that when a pendente lite award of maintenance is found at trial to be excessive or inequitable, the court may make an appropriate adjustment in the equitable distribution award.  Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving husband a credit representing the amount of the pendente lite maintenance he paid that exceeded what he was required to pay under the final maintenance award.  In determining the temporary maintenance award, Supreme Court imputed an average salary in excess of $2 million to husband. However, at trial, it was established that his income was significantly lower. Given the disparity in the maintenance amounts, under the circumstances of this case, it was appropriate for the husband to receive a credit for excessive maintenance paid.

This decision is significant since it reaffirms the principle that pendente lite awards are temporary and are subject to adjustment.  An experienced divorce lawyer will not rest after obtaining a favorable pendente lite relief for the client, but will continue to work to make sure that the any pendente lite maintenance, or other interim award, is preserved as a part of a final decision.

Separated Siblings and Their Right of Visitation

Saturday, May 2nd, 2009

I occasionally see cases involving separated siblings.  In those situations, the parents, or the guardians of the children should be aware the siblings, or half-siblings have an independent right of visitation with each other. The Family Court has the same jurisdiction as the Supreme Court to determine visitation of minors, including visitation between siblings.  Family Court Act §651, Domestic Relations Law §71.  DRL §71 provides that “where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, a brother or sister or a person on behalf of a child, whether by half or a whole blood, may apply to the family court [for visitation rights] as the best interest of the child may require.”  Thus, in cases involving sibling visitation, like grandparent visitation, the court must first determine whether equitable considerations grant a party standing to bring a petition and then, if so, whether it is in the best interests of the children to award such visitation.  E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007).  The court in such a case is charged with determining what is in the best interests of all the children involved.  State ex rel. Noonan v. Noonan, 145 Misc.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. 1989).  The importance of sibling relationships has long been recognized by the courts of this state.  Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167 (1989).  This is manifested not only in preferring arrangements which allow siblings to live together, but also in ensuring that half-siblings have adequate contact with each other.  Olivier A. v. Christina A., 9 Misc 3d 1104 [A] (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2005).  The State’s recognition of the importance of siblings maintaining contact with each other is also manifested in Family Court Act §1027-a, which provides that foster care placement of a child with his or her siblings or half-siblings is presumptively in the child’s best interests. See also 18 NYCRR §431.10, which provides that a social services district must make diligent efforts to place siblings or half-siblings in foster care with each other unless such placement is determined to be detrimental to their best interests.

In a recent case, Isabel R. v. Meghan Mc., 23 Misc.3d 1102(A) (Fam. Ct. Dutchess Co. 2009), the court had to decide whether the half-siblings who were living in separate households after their parents’ breakup, were entitled to visitation with each other.  The court found that the evidence demonstrated that the children did indeed have a relationship until that relationship was unilaterally terminated by the mother after she and the children’s father split up.  While the mother argued that she has an absolute and unfettered right to determine whether sibling visitation should take place and that any direction by the court for sibling visitation would violate her constitutional rights. Relying on E.S. v. P.D., supra, the court held that mother’s constitutional argument was meritless and proceeded to decide whether visitation would be in the children’s best interests.  In considering the children’s best interests, the court has considered, among other factors, their prior relationship, the reason visitation was stopped, the reasons given and basis for the respondent’s decision to deny visitation at the present time, the views of the attorneys for the children, the future benefit to the children and the content of the Court’s in camera interviews. The children wished to see each other and expressed no negative feelings about doing so; the children have fond memories of times they spent together and activities they did together.  The court held that under those circumstances, visitation would be in the children’s best interests.

Parental Interference With Visitation and Suspension of Child Support

Sunday, April 26th, 2009

I have previously written that a child support obligation can be suspended or terminated in situations where the court makes a finding that the child has deliberately severed his/her relationship with a parent, thereby abandoning that parent. However, in order for a court to make a finding of abandonment, the child must be of employable age.

Even if the child is not of employable age, the non-custodial parent’s child support obligation can be suspended or terminated, if the breakdown in the parent-child relationship came as a result of the actions of the custodial parent.

In Ledgin v. Ledgin, 36 A.D.3d 669 (2nd Dept. 2007), the Appellate Division held that interference with visitation rights can be the basis for the cancellation of arrears of maintenance and the prospective suspension of both maintenance and child support. However, such relief is warranted only where the custodial parent’s actions rise to the level of “deliberate frustration” or “active interference” with the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights.

In Frances W. v Steven M., 15 Misc.3d 839 (Fam. Ct. Queens Co. 2007), the court held that petitioner was not entitled to child support where she intentionally aided her sister in brainwashing the child, who is almost 20 years old, into falsely believing that the father had sexually abused her when she was an infant, and otherwise poisoned the child’s relationship with respondent from the time she was four years old. The court stated that since petitioner was an active participant in destroying her niece’s relationship with the father, “she was precluded from obtaining child support from respondent as a matter of fundamental fairness.”

In S.M.B. v D.R.B, 17 Misc.3d 1132(A) (Fam. Ct. Onondaga Co. 2007), petitioner father sought vacatur of order of support contained in parties’ divorce judgment, which incorporated their opt-out agreement. Father began his action after the mother engaged in pattern of active interference and deliberate frustration of child’s relationship with father. Mother was very angry that father paid no more child support than what’s been ordered by court. Mother has withheld father’s access to child since she moved to Florida and remarried. The court found that mother’s acts of alienation were not isolated incidents but a continuing pattern. The court further found that the child now shows no interest in having relationship with father because of mother’s unfortunate endeavors. Father’s support obligation vacated since father met his burden of establishing that mother unjustifiably frustrated his right to reasonable access.

If the child is not of employable age, and the custodial parent did not interfere with the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child, the non-custodial parent’s obligation to pay child support will not be terminated by the court. Foster v. Daigle, 25 A.D.3d 1002 (3rd Dept. 2006).

Since most of these cases are tried on the issue of parental interference, it is important that each such case, before it is brought, is carefully screened by an experienced family law lawyer. Because parental interference cases require a significant level of proof, it is important that a petitioner is represented by an attorney familiar with such cases.

Downward Modification of Child Support

Monday, April 6th, 2009

I have mentioned last week that I have been seeing a significant increase in Family Court and Supreme Court filings seeking downward modification of child support. Most of these filings were brought on by a non-custodial parent after a loss of employment. In today’s economy, a loss of employment is not uncommon, so the courts are dealing with a significant rise in downward modification petitions.

There are two different situations that may arise when a non-custodial parent seeks downward modification of child support. First, if the child support was established by a stipulation or an agreement, that parent must establish that the loss of employment represents an unreasonable and unanticipated change in circumstances since the time of the stipulation to justify a modification, and that the alleged changes in that party’s financial position was not of his/her own making. See Connolly v. Connolly, 39 AD3d 643 (2nd Dept. 2007); Terjesen v. Terjesen, 29 A.D.3d 705 (2nd Dept. 2007). Additionally the party who lost employment will also have to establish that he/she used his/her best efforts to obtain employment commensurate with his/her qualifications and experience. Cox v. Cox, 20 A.D.3d 527 (2nd Dept. 2005). Further, allegations of a reduction in actual income are insufficient to support an application for a downward modification, as a matter of law, where contractual support obligations are based on a payor’s ability to earn rather than on his or her actual income at the time of the execution of such stipulation or agreement. Ellenbogen v. Ellenbogen, 6 A.D.3d 1026 (3rd Dept. 2004).

If the child support order was set by the court after a hearing, the parent seeking the modification of a child support obligation has the burden of establishing that there has been a substantial and unforeseen change in circumstances warranting a change in the support obligation. See Ketchum v. Crawford, 1 A.D.3d 359 (2nd Dept. 2003); Cadwell v. Cadwell, 294 AD2d 434 (2nd Dept. 2002). This standard is much easier to meet than the one applicable to the situations where child support was set by a stipulation or an agreement.

Depending on the circumstances, a downward modification case will fall in one of the two situations discussed above. Before commencing any proceeding, discuss your situation with an experienced New York family law lawyer to make sure that the proceedings are properly commenced and that you can meet the applicable legal standard.

Recession and Increase in Downward Modifications Petitions

Sunday, March 29th, 2009

I read New York Times article today that closely parallels my experience over the past few months. As the economy continues to deteriorate and jobs are lost through no fault of the party paying child support, the Family Court has seen a significant increase in petitions seeling downward modification of child support. While the article discusses how the cases are handled in New York City, as opposed to Rochester and nearby counties where I practice, I see a lot of similar issues in our local Family Courts.

I have previously discussed issues related to the contents of a Family Court petition seeking a modification of child support obligation. I should note that downward modification of child support due to a loss of employment is never guaranteed, and anyone seeking downward modification should use assistance of an experienced child support lawyer. I am planning to write a more detailed post on downward modification of child support in the near future.

Downward Modification of Maintenance

Saturday, February 28th, 2009

In these uncertain economic times, someone obligated to pay maintenance may lose a job, experience significant investment losses, or suffer other adverse financial events. Can something be done about maintenance under those circumstances? The answer, as I have often written, depends on the specific facts.

A party seeking the reduction of a maintenance obligation bears the burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances. Klapper v. Klapper, 204 A.D.2d 518 (2d Dept. 1994). In Klapper, the Second Department held that, in determining whether there was a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant downward modification, the change is to be measured by a comparison between the payor’s financial circumstances at the time of the motion for downward modification and at the time of divorce or, as the case may be, the time that the order of which modification is sought was made.” Id. at 519. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department utilized the same standard of review in Able v. Able, 245 A.D.2d 1026 (4th Dept. 1997).

In Simmons v. Simmons, 26 A.D.3d 883 (4th Dept. 2006), defendant lost his job and subsequently moved for a downward modification of his maintenance obligation. The Appellate Division held that since despite defendant’ diligent job search, he had little prospect of finding employment at a salary comparable to his salary at the time of the divorce, the downward modification was warranted.

The party seeking to modify the maintenance provisions of a judgment of divorce in which the terms of a stipulation of settlement have been incorporated but not merged, must demonstrate that the continued enforcement of the party’s maintenance obligations would create an “extreme hardship”. Beard v. Beard, 300 A.D.2d 268 (2d Dept. 2002) (the proper amount of support payable is determined not by a parent’s current economic situation, but by a parent’s assets and earning powers). See also, Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b).

A reduction in the payor’s income will not result in decreased maintenance where it is the result of a voluntary action, such as self-imposed retirement. Fendsack v. Fendsack, 290 A.D.2d 682 (3d Dept. 2002); DiNovo v. Robinson, 250 A.D.2D 898 (3d Dept. 1998). In Dallin v. Dallin, 250 A.D.2d 847 (2d Dept. 1998), the Second Department held that Family Court properly rejected the father’s claims that his financial situation, prolonged unemployment, and illnesses warranted a drastic reduction of his maintenance and child support obligations. The father had failed to produce any competent evidence to support his claim that he used his best efforts to obtain employment commensurate with his qualifications and experience or that his medical conditions rendered him unemployable.

In Lenigan v. Lenigan, 146 Misc.2d 627 (Sup.Ct., Albany County 1990), the defendant sought to reduce his maintenance and child support obligations. The defendant claimed that, in the prior three months, his compensation as a stock broker had been reduced. It is well settled that the party seeking to obtain a reduction of support bears the burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances. Id. A drastic change in income can constitute a substantial change of circumstances. Id. In Lenigan, the defendant was a stockbroker, and by the very nature of his business, his income would fluctuate throughout the year. The Supreme Court held that, adopting the defendant’s theory of allowing a modification based upon temporary fluctuations in income would lead to a ludicrous result. Although the defendant asserted a three-month lull in business, there was nothing to establish that sales would not pick up in the following months.

In conclusion, an experienced divorce lawyer faced with a significant change in client’s economic situation, must carefully construct an argument for the court that the change was not created by his/her client, that the change is significant, that it is likely to last for a some time, and that the client has exhausted all other alternatives.
In Watrous v. Watrous, 292 A.D.2d 691 (3d Dept. 2002), at age 55, the plaintiff voluntarily retired from State employment and, shortly thereafter, moved to terminate or, in the alternative, reduce his maintenance obligation. The plaintiff asserted as a substantial change in circumstances that he took early retirement due to his poor health and would be experiencing a significant reduction in income. A hearing was held and, at the close of plaintiff’s proof, Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff had failed to establish a sufficient change in circumstances. The Third Department affirmed on appeal, stating that a maintenance obligation established by a judgment of divorce will not be modified absent clear and convincing proof of a substantial change in circumstances. The record revealed that, at the time of the divorce, Supreme Court was aware of both the medical restrictions on plaintiff’s employment and the possibility that his poor health might cause him to retire early. Accordingly the circumstances existing at the time of the plaintiff’s application for downward modification were foreseeable, and anticipated at the time of the parties’ divorce. Furthermore, the record was devoid of evidence that the reduction in the plaintiff’s income would substantially diminish his standard of living or his ability to satisfy his maintenance obligation. The Third Department therefore concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances.