Posts Tagged ‘New York Law’
Sunday, January 6th, 2013
I have previously written on the issue of whether there was a right to trial in a divorce case brought under the no-fault grounds. Earlier, trial level decisions were split, with some courts holding that a party was still required to establish no-fault grounds at trial, and other courts holding that a sworn statement that the marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of 6 months or longer was sufficient to establish that party’s right to divorce.
Finally, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, issued a decision resolving this issue. In Palermo v. Palermo, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07528 (4th Dept. 2012), the court affirmed Justice Dollinger’s decision holding that there is no right to dispute an allegation of irretrievable breakdown under the no-fault divorce ground provided by DRL §170(7). Appellate Division agreed with the key language in Justice Dollinger’s decision which stated that:
Under DRL §170(7), the grounds cannot be disputed. Either a party swears the marriage is irretrievably broken or they do not. The grounds are established by the oath; there is no legislative requirement of a judicial finding on the reliability or veracity of the oath.
As the no-fault statute requires, in order for a judgment of divorce to be entered, all the issues relating to the divorce, including equitable distribution, maintenance, child custody and support need to be resolved before a party can be granted a divorce.
The Appellate Division’s decision in Palermo is significant since it clarifies the Legislature’s intent in creating a true no-fault divorce in New York. Further, as a result, the parties will be able to avoid costly grounds trials that usually result in added animosity between the parties.
Tags: county, Domestic Relations Law, grounds, Livingston, Monroe, New York family law, New York Law, no fault divorce, Ontario, Orleans, procedure, rochester ny divorce lawyer, Supreme Court, Wayne
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Tuesday, July 26th, 2011
One issue that may come up in custody cases is whether a nonresidential parent has ability to take a child abroad during his or her period of visitation. It is not uncommon for a residential parent to object to such request, and sometimes parties wind up in court seeking a determination whether such travel can be permitted.
In a recent case, Russo v. Carmel, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 05889 (4th Dept. 2011), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, permitted the father to travel to Italy with his two year old child for a period of not more than 15 days on 60 days’ notice to the mother. The mother opposed the request, arguing that the child was never away from the mother for longer than 48 hours, that the father’s visitation was limited to 48 hour periods and that the child would be in an unfamiliar environment with relatives who were unknown to the child. The court held that the record established that, although the father’s visitation with the child was limited, the father has a close bond with her and, during visitation, he prepared her meals, bathed her, administered medication as necessary and took her on outings. Further, the mother did not express any concerns that the father would abscond with the child. The court concluded that it is in the best interests of the child to travel with the father to Italy to meet her extended family.
While in most cases the court is unlikely to allow a parent to travel abroad with a very young child, in this case, the father was able to present convincing evidence that the trip was intended to introduce the child to her relatives abroad. Further, the mother was unable to present any evidence of the father’s inability to take care of the child and was not afraid that the father would refuse to come back to the United States. In view of these facts, the trial court’s decision and the Appellate Division’s decision were clearly correct. While the residential parent may have a significant measure of control over non-residential parent’s ability to travel with the child, the residential parent should not raise objections unless there is specific evidence that such travel would be inappropriate and not in the best interests of the child.
Tags: abroad, best interests of child, child, county, custody, Family Court, Family Law, international, Livingston, maintenance, Monroe, New York Law, Ontario, order, Orleans, rochester ny divorce lawyer, travel, visitation, Wayne
Posted in best interests of the child, court orders, custody, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, visitation | No Comments »
Monday, July 4th, 2011
On June 24, 2011, New York Senate voted, 33-29, to give final approval to a bill, A-08354, that recognizes same sex marriage in New York. Govenor Andrew M. Cuomo immediately signed the bill which will become effective in 30 days.
The bill, codified as the Marriage Equality Act amends the Domestic Relations Law to provide:
• A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex
• No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being the same sex or a different sex
• All relevant gender-specific language set forth in or referenced by New York law shall be construed in a gender-neutral manner
• No application for a marriage license shall be denied on · the ground that the parties are of the same or a different sex
Under the bill, the rights under same-sex marriage will include:
• Employer-sponsored health insurance.
• Equitable property distribution, maintenance, custody and visitation if the couple divorces.
• A presumption that a child in a dissolved marriage is the child of both parents.
• Statutory inheritance rights.
• The right to bring a claim for the wrongful death of a spouse.
• The right to seek Workers’ Compensation death benefits.
• The spousal privilege in legal proceedings.
Tags: Domestic Relations Law, New York family law, New York Law, rochester ny divorce lawyer, same sex marriage
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Saturday, June 18th, 2011
While the vast majority of cases petitions seeking to modify custody are brought by parents, can any one else bring a petition seeking to modify custody? I have written previously about petitions brought by non-parents, such as grandparents or someone who has a relationship with a child. A recent decision brought forth yet another party who can bring a petition seeking to modify custody – a child himself. In a recent decision, Trosset v. Susan A., 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21151 (Fam Ct. Otsego Co. 2011), the court held that a child had standing to bring a petition seeking modification of present custodial arrangement. In Trossett, the child’s attorney filed a petition to modify prior court order. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition arguing that child’s attorney lacks standing to file petition concerning custody on behalf of child. The court held that ”[w]hile absence of specific authority regarding custody and visitation is problematic, absence of statute granting child standing, such standing depends upon whether party has alleged facts showing disadvantage to himself or herself.” (citations omitted). According to the decision, the attorney for child made allegations that directly relate to child’s desire to live with father. The court opined that the child has stake in outcome sufficient to confer standing upon him to file petition, or by child’s attorney on child’s behalf.
The decision does not provide much in a way of facts or legal authority for the court’s decision, however, I would guess that the child was older and, therefore, would have an opportunity to have input on any custody decisions. In addition, I would think that the parties were involved in court proceedings previously since the child had an attorney representing him.
Since the decision dealt with procedural issues related arising out of petition being filed by attorney for the child, we may never know how the case was resolved. However, I suspect that this issue may be appealed in the future and we may learn of further developments in the case.
Tags: attorney for child, child, county, custody, Family Court, Family Court Act, Livingston, modification, Monroe, New York family law, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, petition, rochester ny divorce lawyer, standing, Wayne
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Saturday, April 9th, 2011
One question that so far has not been resolved with any degree of certainty by the courts is whether in a divorce action brought pursuant to the new no-fault divorce statute requires specific proof that the parties’ marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of six months or longer. It is an important question since in the past divorce attorneys were able to challenge grounds for divorce and force plaintiffs to establish that there were adequate grounds for divorce. In a significant number of cases, grounds trials were held for economic reasons, i.e., the monied spouse did not want to divide assets and/or pay spousal maintenance.
Six months after the no-fault statute was enacted by the New York’s legislature, we are learning that the courts are divided on this issue, with some courts requiring proof that the marriage was actually irretrievably broken for a period of six months or longer, and with some courts holding that there is no defense to the no-fault grounds.
In Strack v. Strack, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 21033 (Sup. Ct. Essex Co. 2011), the court held that the question of whether the marriage was irretrievably broken was a question of fact requiring a trial.
The facts in Strack are as follows. The parties were married on May 25, 1963 and plaintiff sought a divorce based upon the no-fault grounds contained within Domestic Relations Law §170 (7). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, contending (1) that the complaint lacked specificity; (2) that the conduct alleged in the complaint was barred by the five-year statute of limitations; and (3) that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for divorce under Domestic Relations Law §170 (7).
Effective relative to actions commenced on or after October 12, 2010, Domestic Relations Law §170 (7) permits divorce where “[t]he relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath.” This additional ground for divorce has given parties the option of securing a divorce without alleging fault.
Here, the allegations in the complaint were as follows:
The relationship between husband and wife has broken down such that it is irretrievable and has been for a period of at least six months. For a period of time greater than six months, Defendant and Plaintiff have had no emotion in their marriage, and have kept largely separate social schedules and vacation schedules. Each year Plaintiff and Defendant live separately throughout most of the winter months. Though they share the residence for several months out of the year, Plaintiff and Defendant have not lived as husband and wife for a period of time greater than six months. Plaintiff believes the relationship between she and Defendant has broken down such that it is irretrievable and that the relationship has been this way for a period of time greater than six months.
Having decided that the above allegations stated a cause of action and were not barred by the statute of limitations, the court stated that Domestic Relations Law §170 (7) is not a panacea for those hoping to avoid a trial. Rather, it is simply a new cause of action subject to the same rules of practice governing the subdivisions which have preceded it. By referring to Domestic Relations Law §173 which provides that “[i]n an action for divorce there is a right to trial by jury of the issues of the grounds for granting the divorce” and, here, the Legislature failed to include anything in Domestic Relations Law §170 (7) to suggest that the grounds contained therein are exempt from this right to trial. The court further held that since the phrase “broken down such that it is irretrievable” is nowhere defined in the statute, the determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question to be determined by the finder of fact.
In a more recent decision, A.C. v. D.R., 2011 N.Y Slip. Op. 21113 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2011), the court held that once the plaintiff makes a sworn allegation that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, a trial not required, and there is no defense to the action. The court held that the only requirement to satisfy the no-fault ground for divorce is a party’s sworn statement alleging that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Specifically, the court stated:
It is sufficient that one or both of the parties subjectively decide that their marriage is over and there is no hope for reconciliation. In other words, a plaintiff’s self-serving declaration about his or her state of mind is all that is required for the dissolution of a marriage on grounds that it is irretrievably broken.
As the no-fault statute requires, in order for a judgment of divorce to be entered, all the issues relating to the divorce, including equitable distribution, maintenance, child custody and support need to be resolved before a party can be granted a divorce.
While I am not aware of the court decisions on this issue here in Rochester, I hope that the courts will grant divorce solely on the party’s subjective allegation that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Since the trial courts are split on the issue, it is likely that appellate courts will have to address this issue eventually. I hope that the holding of the more recent case will be widely adopted follwint he Legislature’s intent in creating a true no-fault divorce in New York.
Tags: county, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, Family Law, grounds, Livingston, Monroe, New York Law, no-fault, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, rochester ny divorce lawyer, Supreme Court, Wayne
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Friday, November 19th, 2010
I have recently written about a trend in court decisions involving enhanced earnings toward reducing non-titled spouse’s interest to less than a 50% share. A recent decision, Haspel v. Haspel, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 08530 (2nd Dept. 2010) illustrates this issue very well.
In Haspel, the trial court granted to the wife 50% of the husband’s enhanced earnings which resulted from his acquisition of several professional licenses, including, several securities dealer’s licenses and a real estate broker’s license. The trial court’s decision was appealed, and the Appellate Division modified the trial court’s decision.
Specifically, the Appellate Division held that the wife was entitled to 25% of husband’s enhanced earnings. While the court did not provide specific reasons for this reduction, the parties were married for nearly 23 years before the divorce action was commenced, they had two children, and at the time of trial, the plaintiff was 52 years old and the defendant was 49 years old. The wife was also going to receive spousal maintenance, however, this issue was remanded to the trial court for recalculation since the lower court’s decision improperly engaged in double counting of the same income for enhanced earnings calculations and maintenance calculations.
As I have written previously, the trend toward unequal division of enhanced earnings is continuing. Divorce lawyers and their clients would be well advised to review evidence related to non-titled spouse’s contribution carefully, if an argument is being made that the non-titled spouse should receive more than 25% of such enhanced earnings.
Tags: county, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, enhanced earnings, equitable distribution, Family Law, Livingston, Monroe, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, rochester ny divorce lawyer, Wayne
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Sunday, October 10th, 2010
I have previously written about equitable distribution issues here and here. One of the most important issues that divorce attorneys have to address in dealing with equitable distribution is division of businesses or enhanced earning capacity arising as a result of acquisition of a professional degree or a license by one of the spouses.
In distributing marital property of almost every variety, the courts have focused on the relative significance of the non-titled spouse’s contribution toward the marriage, which would almost always result in equal or almost equal distribution. However, with respect to distribution of business interests and enhanced earning capacity, as of late, the courts have focused on the degree to which the non-titled spouse’s efforts contributed toward the acquisition of each specific asset.
In the past, the non-titled spouse’s contributions to the other party’s business, career or degree, usually resulted in equal distribution of those assets. However, the recent trend in court decisions has been to grant the non-titled spouse less than one half of the asset.
The courts have described their reasoning as follows: “[a]lthough in a marriage of long duration, where both parties have made significant contributions to the marriage, a division of marital assets should be made as equal as possible. . . there is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis.” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 51 A.D.3d 635, 637 (2d Dept. 2008). In equitably distributing a spouse’s business interest, the court must consider the direct contributions the non-titled spouse made to the business as well as the indirect contributions to the ma-rital partnership, including homemaking, parenting, and providing the necessary emotional and moral support to sustain the titled spouse in carrying on the business. Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 15 (1986).
Unlike other marital assets, in valuing a non-titled spouse’s share in a spouse’s business interest, the trend has been toward awards between 25% and 35% to the non-titled spouse. Chalif v. Chalif, 298 A.D.2d 348, 349, (2d Dept. 2002)(25% award to wife of husband’s medical practice and enhanced earning capacity); Granade-Bastuck v. Granade-Bastuck, 249 A.D.2d 444, 445 (2d Dept. 1998)(25% award to plaintiff of defendant’s law practice); Giokas v. Giokas, 73 A.D.3d 688 (2d Dept. 2010)(10% award to wife of husband’s business); Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 71 A.D.3d 737 (2d Dept. 2010)(35% award to wife of the husband’s business); Ciampa v. Ciampa, 47 A.D.3d 745, 747 (2d Dept. 2008)(35% award to wife of husband’s business); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 51 A.D.3d 635, 637 (2d Dept. 2008)(30% award to wife of the husband’s dental practice).
This has been a trend state-wide and has been followed by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which is located here in Rochester, New York, and to which decisions from Allegany, Cattaraugus, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Livingston, Monroe, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Orleans, Oswego, Seneca, Steuben, Wayne, Wyoming and Yates Counties are appealed to.
As a result, the non-titled spouses and their divorce lawyers have an uphill fight if they try to obtain a substantial share of such assets as a spouse’s business, educational degrees or professional licenses.
Tags: county, division of business, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, enhanced earnings, equitable distribution, Livingston, Monroe, new york, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, rochester ny divorce lawyer, Supreme Court, Wayne
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Wednesday, September 8th, 2010
When New York’s Legislature finally passed the no-fault divorce law and made changes to temporary maintenance and attorneys fees awards, it also passed a number of less publicized changes to the Child Support Standards Act, and related laws, which govern child support in New York. The new legislation modified the Family Court Act, Domestic Relations Law and the Social Services Law, substantially altering the parties’ ability to modify child support awards. It also gave the Family Court additional powers in situations where the party paying child support is unemployed.
The following will describe the most significant changes included in the new legislation.
Family Court Act (FCA) §451 was amended to conform the language of the FCA provision governing the modification of child support orders to the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) so that both provisions provide for a “substantial change in circumstances” as a basis for modification of an order of child support.
This section further provides two new bases for modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party’s income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section would provide that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions and also would clarify that retroactive support is paid and enforceable as provided under FCA §440.
DRL §236B(9)(b) was amended to separate out the “substantial change of circumstances” basis for modification of child support orders into its own section for clarity and would provide two new bases for the modification of an order of child support: (1) the passage of three years since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or (2) a 15 percent change in either party’s income since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted provided that any reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability and experience. The parties may specifically opt out of the two new bases for modification in a validly executed agreement or stipulation. This section provides that incarceration is not a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances under certain conditions.
The bill also added a new FCA §437-a to authorize the Family Court to require the non-custodial parent of a child to seek employment, or to participate in job training, employment counseling or other programs designed to lead to employment, where such programs are available, if he or she is unemployed at the time the court is establishing the support order unless he or she is in receipt of supplemental security income (SSI) or social security disability (SSD) benefits.
Another section of the bill amended Social Services Law (SSL) §111-h to provide that if the respondent is required to participate in work programs or activities, and if the order of support is made payable on behalf of persons in receipt of public assistance, the support collection unit may not file a petition to increase the support obligation for twelve months from the date of entry of the order if the respondent’s income is derived from the work activity or program. FCA §461 was also amended to reflect the two new bases for modification of an order of child support.
Sections of the bill dealing with modification of child support only apply to child support orders which incorporate but do not merge stipulations or settlement agreements if the stipulation or agreement was executed on or after the effective date of the bill. The amendments, with exception of certain sections of the Tax Law, become effective 90 days after the passing of the bill. The effective date of the amendments is October 14, 2010.
This bill represents a substantial change to the prior statutory provisions and case law dealing with modification of child support. While New York’s child support orders were always subject to modification, these changes will make modification of child support easier. I do not know at this time how these provisions will apply to the orders already in place and whether the party seeking modification of child support will be able to use some of the new provisions to modify existing child support orders.
Tags: amendments, attorney, change in circumstances, child support, Child Support Standards Act, county, Family Court Act, Family Law, lawyer, legislation, Livingston, modification, Monroe, New York Law, Ontario, Orleans, rochester, rochester ny divorce lawyer, Supreme Court, Wayne
Posted in child support, child support enforcement, Child Support Standards Act, court orders, Domestic Relations Law, Failure to Pay Child Support, Family Court, Family Law, New York Law, procedure, Settlement Agreements, Stipulations, Supreme Court | No Comments »
Sunday, August 15th, 2010
The no-fault divorce bill has been signed by the Governor Patterson and will go into effect in 60 days. That means that starting on October 13, 2010, someone who wants to be divorced in New York will no longer be required to make allegations of martial fault by the other spouse and will only be required to swear that the relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months. The new law will apply to the divorce actions commenced on or after such effective date.
In addition, the Governor signed legislation that will revise the process for setting awards of temporary maintenance while a divorce is pending, by creating a formula and list of factors that would presumptively govern such awards. This would allow for speedy resolution of the maintenance issue, and prevent less well-off parties to divorce proceedings from falling into poverty during litigation, because they lack the resources to obtain a temporary maintenance order. Another bill would create a presumption that a less monied spouse in a divorce case is entitled to payment of attorneys’ fees. Under current law, a party that cannot afford to secure representation in a divorce proceeding must make an application for fees at the end of the process, which can force a poor individual to proceed without a lawyer, or to surrender on important issues due to lack of means. Provisions of the Domestic Relations Law related to temporary maintenance and attorneys fees will go into effect in 60 days as well.
These are important development in New York’s family law and I think that it will take some time to assess their impact. At the same time, I think that they will be welcomed by divorce lawyers in this state and will make divorce easier for the divorcing spouses. With respect to the bill establishing the formula for temporary maintenance, it is highly likely that any such temporary maintenance award is going to be used by the courts as a basis for a permanent maintenance award.
Tags: attorney, attorneys fees, county, Domestic Relations Law, grounds, Livingston, Monroe, new york, New York Law, no fault divorce, Ontario, Orleans, procedure, rochester, rochester ny divorce lawyer, temporary maintenance, Wayne
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Sunday, April 18th, 2010
While the parties are married, they tend to accumulate personal mementos such as photographs, videos, recording, pictures, drawing and other items that represent their memories of people and places. For many people, those photographs and videos of their children are precious and irreplaceable. For that very reason, the courts are forced to get involved in dividing such items since parties tend to have a difficult time dividing them.
In a recent case, M.R. v. E.R., 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50575(U) (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2010), the court demonstrated how these issues should be approached and resolved. In M.R., the parties resolved all of the issues in their divorce by stipulation, with the sole issue left unresolved that of the right to numerous photo albums, which contain more than 7000 photos of the parties and their children which were taken during the course of their marriage. The husband moved for an order directing that he be awarded the photo albums and the wife cross-moved for the same relief.
In a decision and order dated November 13, 2010, the court set the motion and cross motion down for a hearing after noting that the issues raised in the papers concerned equitable distribution which were not resolvable on paper submissions. At the time that the hearing was conducted on April 6, 2010, neither party was represented by counsel. After hearing, the court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the limited issues addressed therein. The court noted that the parties rejected all settlement attempts, and at the hearing, maintained their intractable and opposite positions, to wit, to each keep all photo albums. The court also noted that the parties did previously attempt to settle the issue, and seemingly agreed that the husband would retain all photo albums and share equally in paying the cost of reproducing the photographs contained therein. The wife testified that the agreement was based on the parties’ understanding that the quality of reproduction would be satisfactory. The parties paid more than $2,100 to scan the photographs onto disc(s), which were admitted into evidence. As noted, other than what is described above, there was no signed or notarized agreement regarding the distribution of the photo albums.
The court found that the husband was intricately involved with taking, compiling and cataloging the thousands of photos at issue. In this regard, the husband testified in great detail about his meticulous cataloging of photographs, love of photography; he equated his collecting of photographs of family with the hobby of collecting rare books. The husband described the Wife’s involvement with this process as limited, and often, antagonistic. He believed that his wife had manufactured a dispute over the photographs, not out of any real desire to obtain them for sentimental or other qualitative value, but out of some vindictive desire.
The wife gave somewhat conflicting testimony and the court found that the wife had some involvement with the compilation of photos, but that such involvement was far more limited than what she testified to at the hearing. She testified to her dissatisfaction with the reproductions, and several photographs (printed from disc) containing imperfections/problems were admitted into evidence in support of her contentions.
The court has reviewed the photographs admitted into evidence both on disc and in photo albums. The disc appears to contain the contents of 75 photo albums, most of which have approximately 100 photographs. The quality of photos contained on the disc is, to the court’s view, satisfactory for the most part, although it does appear that the photographs on disc are not exactly equivalent in quality to the “hard” photographs in the albums admitted into evidence. The vast majority of photos are of the children alone, or (apparently) with relatives or friends. Many photographs depict vacation places or sites visited by the parties themselves or with their children. On disc, and in the albums admitted into evidence, the husband is pictured in numerous photos; the wife is pictured in far less photographs. The court accepted as credible the husband’s testimony regarding the wife’s general apathy with respect to the photographic process throughout the marriage and to his greater interest in retaining the photos, and rejected the wife’s contention that the reason she does not appear in many photographs is because she was either holding the camera or did not otherwise wish to be photographed. However, the court did not conclude that the wife desired the albums, which contain many photographs of the parties’ children, for completely vindictive reasons.
Taking into account the previous agreement of the parties, and other facts, which the court considered to fall within the “catch all” factor required to be considered in making an equitable distribution award, the court hereby awards the wife 25% of the original photos; the husband is awarded 75% of the photos. The percentages are approximate because the court held that the selection of the photos will take place in accordance with the following method, or if parties can agree any other method. Starting with the first album, the wife shall, counting from the first page thereof, be entitled to receive every fourth original photograph in that album until reaching the end of the album. Selection shall continue in like manner with respect to each successive album.
In my opinion, it is impressive that the court took the time to address this issue. In general, courts’ time is limited, and most lawyers do not want to get involved with the issues dividing such personal property. Here in Rochester, a common practice is to refer the parties to the Center for Dispute Settlement to resolve any issues involving personal property and possessions. The problem with this approach is that the Center does mediation, and, if the parties cannot agree, they are forced to come back to the court. I generally counsel my clients that they should make every effort to resolve those disputes since it is expensive to litigate them.
Tags: county, division, divorce, Domestic Relations Law, equitable distribution, Monroe, New York Law, personal property, rochester ny divorce lawyer
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