Non-custodial Parent’s Right to Particpate in Child Rearing Decisions

In 1996, Mathew’s parents, Jesus Fuentes and Karen Fuentes, were divorced. On August 1, 1996, “Order Directing Custody” was entered, granting Mathew’s mother exclusive custody of Mathew. Mathew attended New York City public schools, where he received special education services to accommodate his disability.

In 2000, because Mr. Fuentes believed that the education accommodations Mathew received were inadequate, he requested that Mathew be reevaluated for additional services. After the Committee on Special Education for the Hearing, Handicapped, and Visually Impaired determined that Mathew’s current services were adequate, Mr. Fuentes requested a hearing to review the committee’s determination. On January 8, 2001, the Impartial Hearing Office denied Fuentes’s request for a hearing. Its Chief Administrator based her denial on Mr. Fuentes’s custodial status. Because Mr. Fuentes was the non-custodial parent of Mathew, Chief Administrator determined that he was not the “person in parental relation” as defined in N.Y. Educ. Law § 3212 and concluded that Mr. Fuentes did not have the right to participate in educational decisions affecting Mathew and refused to process his father’s requests.

Mr. Fuentes, the non-custodial biological father, brought an action in the Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Board of Education of the City of New York, under 42 USC §1983 and 20 USC §1415(f)(1) [IDEA], to review the City’s assessment of his son’s special educational needs and to be granted an impartial hearing for reconsideration of the City’s determination that his son did not need more special education than what he was receiving. After determining that, under New York law, a non-custodial biological parent has no right to make special education decisions, absent a court order or agreement between the parties affording such rights to the non-custodial parent, the Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint for lack of standing [FRCP 12(b) and (c)].

The Second Circuit held that although the First and Second Departments of the Appellate Division have held that a non-custodial parent, absent an order or agreement to the contrary, has no right to make educational decisions, the Second Circuit chose to have New York’s Court of Appeals definitively state the law of New York and, thus, certified the following question: “Whether, under New York law, the biological and non-custodial parent of a child retains the right to participate in decisions pertaining to the education of the child where (1) the custodial parent is granted exclusive custody of the child and (2) the divorce decree and custody order are silent as to the right to control such decisions.” Fuentes v. Bd. of Ed. of City of New York.

I have previously written about the custodial arrangements and the right of decision-making associated with each type of custody, and while there are many decisions on this issues from the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals so far has not issued a definitive ruling on this issue. When the Court of Appeals decides this case, this is likely to be the controlling statement of New York law on the rights of non-custodial parents with respect to their right to be involved in educational and other decisions effecting their children. The Court of Appeals is likely to issue its decision in the next few months.

Relocation and Modification of Custodial Arrangements

One of the most common post-divorce scenarios is that the custodial parent wishes to relocate, the other party objects to such proposed move and argues that such move may negatively impact on the other parent’s relationship with the child. Assuming that the parties’ Judgment of Divorce, or separation agreement, does not conclusively address this issue, the party seeking to relocate will typically need to seek the court’s permission to do so.

As laid out in the leading case of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (1996), the issue is to be determined is whether the proposed relocation is in the best interest in the child. In doing so, the court is to consider the following criteria:

1. Each parent’s reason for either seeking or opposing the relocation;

2. The current state of the relationship between each parent and the child;

3. The impact that the relocation will have on the quality and of the child’s relationship
with the non-custodial parent;

4. The emotional, economic and educational effects that the move will have on the
child; and

5. The feasibility of maintaining the relationship between the child and non-custodial
parent.

The trial court must weigh all of the factors and determine not what would be best for the parents but, rather, what is in the best interests of the child.

In Noble v. Noble, 52 A.D.3d 490 (2nd Dept. 2008), the mother sought to relocate from relocation from Long Island to upstate NY. The court held that the proposed relocation was in children’s best interests since the proposed move would provide economic, emotional and educational benefits for the mother and parties’ children without precluding meaningful and regular contact between children and father.

In Mallory v. Jackson, 51 A.D.3d 1088 (3rd Dept. 2008), the parties consented to June 2006 order awarding joint legal custody with mother having primary physical residence of the children. In October 2006, mother sought permission to relocate with parties’ children to North Carolina. Mother moved to North Carolina while petition was pending, leaving children with father at maternal grandmother’s home in Schenectady County. Mother was required to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence that proposed relocation would be in children’s best interests. Mother alleged that father had failed to provide her financial support throughout their relationship, and she was moving to be near a relative who offered financial assistance. The Appellate Division held that mother, who had already relocated, failed to present evidence at hearing that her financial situation in North Carolina was significantly better than while living in New York. Mother’s remaining extended family continues to reside in New York. The proposed relocation to North Carolina would deprive child of meaningful contact with father and members of their extended family and mother failed to establish existence of compelling reason to justify relocation of children to North Carolina.

If the court does not find the proposed move to be in the best interests of the children, the parent who has the primary physical residence of the children usually has a choice between staying or losing that primary physical residence to the other parent.

The Return of Engagement Gifts

A person’s right to the return of wedding presents given in contemplation of a marriage that fails to materialize is governed by §80-b of the Civil Rights Law, which permits the recovery of such gifts. The statute provides that:

Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to bar a right of action for the recovery of a chattel, the return of money or securities, or the value thereof at the time of such transfer, or the rescission of a deed to real property when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or securities or real property was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred, and the court may, if in its discretion justice so requires, (1) award the defendant a lien upon the chattel, securities or real property for monies expended in connection therewith or improvements made thereto, (2) deny judgment for the recovery of the chattel or securities or for rescission of the deed and award money damages in lieu thereof.

This statute permits recovery when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or securities or real property was a contemplated marriage that has not occurred. It has been held that there is a strong presumption that any gifts made during the engagement period are given solely in consideration of marriage. This presumption is rebuttable, but clear and convincing proof is necessary to overcome it.
In Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80 (1971), the Court of Appeals held that fault was irrelevant under Civil Rights Law §80-b, which contemplates situations where one party has directly transferred property to another, as well as situations where the transfer was made by a third party to both of the parties. The Court held that just as the question of fault or guilt has become largely irrelevant to modern divorce proceedings, so should it also be deemed irrelevant to the breaking of the engagement. The purpose of §80-b was to return the parties to the position they were in prior to their becoming engaged, without without rewarding or punishing either party for the fact that the marriage failed to materialize.
Thus, if an engagement does not result in a marriage, the ring or any other gifts given in contemplation of the marriage, should be returned to the party who made the gift. Alternatively, one should be prepared to fight a law suit.

Good Faith Allegation of Abuse Cannot Be Held Against Accuser in Custody Proceeding

Recently, in divorce and custody cases, the so-called “parental alienation” factor has become particularly prominent among the statutory criteria dealing with custody. The court decisions have described “parental alienation” in terms of failure to support the child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent. This particular issue has carried a tremendous force in custody cases, and often was used to override the primary caregiver criterion. The significance of “parental alienation can be explained as follows. If “parental alienation” is proven, it often has resulted in a change in custody despite the long-standing parenting arrangements that have been successful otherwise.
The problem with claim of “parental alienation” is that in some cases judges have treated allegations of abuse and neglect that could not be proven as tantamount to “false” allegations maliciously brought to advance an agenda of alienation. This has placed concerned parents between the proverbial rock and the hard place. If they act in good faith to protect their child, they do so at risk of losing custody. If they don’t act, they are abdicating their parental obligation to protect their child. The Legislature has acted in response to this problem and the Governor has signed into law an amendment to DRL § 240 to provide protection for litigating parents who report abuse or neglect in good faith and based on a reasonable belief that the allegation is legitimate.
Domestic Relations Law § 240, subdivision 1 (a) was amended to provide that a good faith allegation of abuse cannot be held against the accuser in child custody proceedings. The amendment to the statute is intended to ensure that the accuser engaging in a good faith effort to protect or seek treatment for the child due to the child abuse or neglect cannot have these actions used against them when determining custody or visitation. If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief which is supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent may not be deprived of custody, visitation or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief. If an allegation that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court must consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court may not place a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that child. Laws of 2008, Ch 538, effective September 4, 2008.

Calculations of Child Support in New York

The New York courts use a statutory guidelines to determine what child support amount the non-custodial parent is obligated to pay. The guidelines as applicable to the Supreme Court in actions for separation and divorce are contained in Domestic Relations Law §240 and its counterpart for the Family Court is contained in Family Court Act §413. New York child support amounts are based partly on the non-custodial parent’s adjusted gross income and partly on how many children are on the order. The court determines the non-custodial parent’s gross income, and then deducts from that amount Medicare, social security tax, New York City or Yonkers tax, and other allowable deductions to establish the non-custodial parent’s adjusted gross income. An identical calculation is performed with respect to the income of the custodial parent. The court then multiplies the combined adjusted gross income by the standard guideline percentage for the number of children. These percentages are 17% for one child, 25% for two children, 29% for three children, 31% for four children, and at least 35% for five or more children. Subsequently, that child support amount is multiplied by the ratio of non-custodial parent’s adjusted gross income to the combined adjusted gross income.

The standard guideline is applied to most parental earnings up to $80,000 (minus certain local and social security tax amounts). This includes any worker’s compensation, disability payments, unemployment benefits, social security payments, and many other forms of income. Beyond $80,000, the courts determine whether or not to use the percentage guidelines, and may consider other factors in determining the full support amount.

The State of New York provides for interest on missed payments and adjudicated arrears at a rate of 9% per year, but only on arrearages reduced to a money judgment by the courts.

Family Court Lacks Power to Modify Maintenance Provision in Separation Agreement

In a recent decision, Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., the Court of Appeals held that the Family Court lacks power to modify maintenance provisions contained in the parties’ separation agreement. The separation agreement that the wife and the husband both signed, explicitly stated that the wife is “completely disabled” and will be in need of maintenance “for the remainder of her life”. The agreement provided for current maintenance payments of $100.00 per week payable to the wife and recited that this being only a determination of her “present” need and his “present” economic circumstances. It further stated that the wife could if need be seek a “modification” of those sums in a “de novo” proceeding in a court of “appropriate jurisdiction”. A divided Court of Appeals held that the Family Court is not such an “appropriate” court and that in respect of spousal (as opposed to child) maintenance, family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of a “modification”.

The Court pointed out that there was no risk that the wife would become a public charge. According to the Court of Appeals, the danger of a spouse becoming a public charge is the only circumstance in which, under Family Court Act § 463, the Family Court can modify a separation agreement when the matrimonial action has not been brought as of yet.

A key factor in Johna M.S. was that Family Court lacks “equity” jurisdiction. As Judge Smith points out in his dissent, the prior cases held that Family Court’s attempt to “modify” such a separation agreement amounts to a kind of “reformation or rescission”, which are equitable remedies: they seek to alter the parties’ agreement and there was no effort by the wife to do that here. On the contrary, the agreement itself contemplated modification, wholly negating the “equity” analogy. As a result, the disabled wife’s only choice is to either accept maintenance of $100.00 per week as permanent, or to sue in supreme court for a divorce or separation, where she will be able to seek a greater amount of maintenance.